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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, an auxiliary bishop, Rev. Francis Kane, in the Archdiocese of Chicago sat with a
parish staff at St. Teresa of Avila Church to discuss how the parish was growing and serving the
community in faith.1 Bishops generally meet with the staff of each parish in the Archdiocese. In
2010, this numbered roughly 350 parishes. At these meetings, each member of staff, as led by the
pastor, takes a turn speaking about their part of parish growth. One of the areas of interest is
always the children’s catechesis program. Children’s catechesis provides a foundation in faith for
children who do not attend parochial or private Catholic schools. In affluent neighborhoods, the
programs are usually tuition based. Tuitions can range in these neighborhoods from $100-$250
per child. Not every parish is required to charge the same rate throughout the Archdiocese, nor to
charge tuition at all. The catechesis program for those parishes requiring tuition should ideally
cover the cost of materials, salary, and training. At this particular meeting, the director of
religious education described the parish’s program to the auxiliary bishop. For over five years,
the parish had used the Catechesis of the Good Shepherd program. The bishop’s reaction was not
particularly positive. He questioned the validity of the program as a non-traditional catechesis
method. What happens if they don’t memorize prayers? Why aren’t they learning from textbooks
or workbooks? Why is the teacher not lecturing? His skepticism was not assuaged by the director
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I was present at this meeting as the business manager of the parish, as well as a volunteer for the RCIA
program. It was one of the first meetings where I was faced with the questions that I raise in this
dissertation.
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of religious education’s explanations of the Montessori based program. The bishop left the
meeting dissatisfied and hoping that the Confirmandi would actually be prepared come Spring.
The skepticism that this parish met by using the Catechesis of the Good Shepherd
program is met in other parishes and dioceses throughout the United States. Some dioceses have
embraced the need for catechetical change more quickly than their peers. Other dioceses are
more skeptical than the bishop in this anecdote. This meeting was an actual event. Similar events
dot the landscape of various diocese throughout the United States. My work in this dissertation
brings to light the issues surrounding the theology, the pastoral ministry, the pedagogy, the interrelationship, and the law regarding how the Roman Catholic Church understands the person of
the child. The focal ethical question is, “Does the Roman Catholic normative understanding of
the child support the child’s dignity, subjectivity, and growth in their faith through catechetical
programs?” In order to properly address this question, I will dig deeper into the history of
Christianity, followed by an examination of child pedagogies and theologies through modernity.
This will provide a basis for my ethical reflection in the last part of my dissertation.
While the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops sets guidelines,
recommendations, and the mission for dioceses and each individual parish, it does not yet have a
pedagogical framework or recommended catechesis program that all parishes could follow. My
proposal here promotes such a framework as is needed. The landscape of the United States
Roman Catholic Church does not lend itself to a universal catechesis program, it is in desperate
need of new normative guidelines and resolutions to educate the dioceses, parishes, religious,
and laity as to who the child is, how the child learns, and what we adults must to do to ensure the
child’s flourishing. Sharing the Light of Faith: the National Catechetical Directory for Catholics
in the United States provides information on the goals of catechesis without an explanation on
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how to achieve those goals. Many parishes receive little to no guidance in children’s catechesis
and development. In order to do what is best for children in the Church, the current landscape
needs to change.
In chapter One I begin with the theological foundations that provide three basic
typologies of the child that are carried forward in Roman Catholic Doctrine. Out of these three
typologies of the anthropology of the child, only one – the child as a potential adult – emerges as
the normative framework for the Roman Catholic Church. This normative framework that
understands the child as subordinate in the child-adult relationship and waiting-to-become an
adult becomes the bedrock of theological ethics of the child through modernity.
In chapter Two, I turn to pastoral theological teachings on the child. Beginning with the
Irish Penitentials, moving into papal documents, and into the catechisms of the Roman Catholic
Church, I examine how the pastoral documents have or have not upheld the dignity and
subjectivity of the child. I also examine the precedent that these pastoral teachings have formed
in parishes and lay groups. In this chapter, I demonstrate that according to the Roman Catholic
doctrine the child should be subordinate to the authorities in their life. Based on the theological
underpinnings from chapter One that become the foundation of this relationship as we see it in
chapter Two, we see that the relationship is authoritarian.
In chapter Three, I investigate the Enlightenment’s understanding of the self, as it
pertains to the child. During this time the understanding of the child as a person changes, and
children become important, if not in and of themselves, then certainly for the good they bring to
society. Due to their elevation in status and attention, the pedagogical methods needed to teach
the child also develop rapidly. The thinkers John Locke, Emile Rousseau, and Mary
Wollstonecraft. Each exemplify an area of progress in understanding and teaching the child.
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Locke develops pedagogical methodology that puts the child at the center of her learning and
recognizes the child’s importance to greater society. Rousseau establishes the value of the child
independent of their social norms and context allowing for a new perspective of the child.
Wollstonecraft critiques both Locke and Rousseau’s pedagogical methods, both of which she
condemns as coercive and not based in an education of moral truth. Each of these writers give an
important piece to the greater body of this work that upholds the child as a dignified acting
subject.
Chapter Four turns to the theological and ethical studies on the child by Friedrich
Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher emphasizes the inherent dignity and intrinsic value of the child.
For Schleiermacher, children are held in highest esteem by God based on his reading of the
Gospel of Matthew, as they are, not what they become. Schleiermacher also demonstrates the
importance of the child-adult relationship as mutual, not authoritarian. While the child is utterly
dependent, the role of the adult is complementary to that of the child. The adult provides love,
support, and wisdom to the child’s dependency, as the child brings the adult the joy and frivolity
of childhood. In the early twentieth century, Maria Montessori and the Montessorian scholars
pick up where Schleiermacher left off. Montessori identifies the child-adult relationship as the
single most important factor for a child’s healthy development as a subject. For Montessori, the
parents have obligations that they must take seriously for the good of the relationship. She forms
the groundwork for Sofia Cavalletti and John Berryman to design catechetical programs based
on mutuality in the child-adult relationship, appropriate space for the child to learn, and concepts
of work and play as essential developmental to the child.
In chapter Five, I take up the study on children’s rights in Canon Law, by Mary
McAleese, using it as a conversation partner for my ethical reflection. McAleese provides a
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comprehensive study pulling together the references to the child in the Roman Catholic Code of
Canon Law into one work. McAleese indicates that the canon law does not provide a consistent
understanding of the child, nor does it hold up to the international standards of rights and dignity
of the child. My reflection on three particular pillars in McAleese’s work provide a framework
for understanding the changes that must be made in canon law and Roman Catholic doctrine. I
turn to the child-adult relationship, the child’s dependency, and moral vulnerability as methods
to insure the child’s dignity and subjectivity.
Finally, in my conclusion, I suggest five resolutions to address the shortcomings of
Roman Catholic theology of the child, providing some resolutions on how to move forward.
These resolutions are meant to be put into action by the Roman Catholic Church and Catholic
laity, particularly in the United States. This work that I have labored over, that I have poured my
love and time into, is so that we can unmask and address the inherent abuses in a system that has
thus far been unwilling to change. These, the reforms I propose, are not optional, they are
essential work. They are a work aimed at quieting our own voices so that we may hear our
children speak.

CHAPTER ONE
THE CHILD IN PATRISTIC AND MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY
Nothing is without origin or foundation. The way the Roman Catholic Church, primarily
in the United States, thinks about children in contemporary theology and pedagogy harkens back
to Patristic and Medieval theologians. After the advent of Christianity, who were some of the
prolific writers on the subject of children? What were their thoughts and beliefs? Most
importantly, how were these teachings handed down theologically and pastorally to shape the
Roman Catholic understanding of the child?
It is not the task of this research to mention all early texts concerning the child or
children. It is my intention to discuss some the most important teachings, writings, and beliefs
concerning the child. This chapter is largely a survey of three main theologians, Clement of
Alexandria, Augustine of Hippo, and Thomas Aquinas. Each of these theologians uses a different
methodology to develop their understanding of children, resulting in three typologies. The first
we find in Clement of Alexandria. Clement turns toward Scripture as his main source of
information. The interesting thing about Clement, however, is that he also uses his observations
and experiences with children to inform his belief that children are the exemplar measure for
entering God’s kingdom. Clement’s typology of the child is very useful to this research project
as he holds a unique position in understanding the child’s significance. Augustine’s
anthropological look of children is postlapsarian, they are inflicted with Original Sin from the
fall of Adam. Augustine is consistent in using this lens providing a second typology. Aquinas
6
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focuses on a different perspective, looking at the child in an ontological way. Using Aristotle as a
philosophical foundation, Aquinas is primarily concerned with the child’s being and becoming.
These three theologians’ different perspectives each inform the Roman Catholic Church’s
understanding of the child, though I argue that the Augustinian and Thomistic typologies are
favored. My intent is to take each of them on their own terms, as they understand the child. I
have three goals for this chapters. First, to develop an understanding of each theologian’s
ideology. Second, to gain a dynamic view of the information on the child in the Patristic and
Medieval eras. Third, to examine how each typology shaped the Roman Catholic understanding
of the child throughout history.
Clement of Alexandria
In Clement of Alexandria’s work, Paedagogus, there are many instances where he uses
the words “child” or “children.” For the purpose of this work, I will examine his writings on the
child that elevate the child as favored in the eyes of God. Paedagogus, is the only work of
Clement’s that most defines his teachings on children through the use of allegory, while his other
writings mention children sparsely. Clement’s focus on the child becomes clear in Paedagogus.
Clement weaves together a tapestry depicting the life of the human as an eternal child and
student with Christ as the eternal teacher. Clement teaches the catechumenate what it means to
be, and to become, a Christian. The Paedagogus text should be looked at for its contextual
commentary on children in Hellenic and Roman society, and the ways in which it illuminates the
child in Christian Scriptures. Each of these elements lends insight into one typology of the
contemporary understanding of children. It is not, however, the view favored by the Roman
Catholic Tradition.

8
Middle-Platonism
Before diving into the specifics of Paedagogus, I first want to describe Clement’s
historical context. Several factors influence Clement’s theological thinking and leanings.
According to some scholars, Clement’s writings on the will, its volition, and the soul draw from
the works of Plato. Clement is specifically described as a middle Platonist.1 The vast majority of
scholars find that deep within Clement’s Christian writings there is always a thread of middle
Platonist philosophy. However, there are a few who argue, and rightfully so, that Clement is not
entirely a middle Platonist and that indeed he draws heavily from the works of Aristotle.
Clement’s writing is based solely on the Greek masters that came before him, but is also
motivated by his vehement position against Gnostic teachings and its teachers.
Middle Platonism, chronologically set as the period between Plato and Plotinus, is argued
to have influenced Clement more than any other philosophical source.2 Hägg argues that middle
Platonists, like Philo of Alexandria and Clement, read the works of Plato in a distinctive way.
They are loyal to the text by interpreting the Platonic text via another Platonic text, and, though it
is debated, they see Aristotle and the Stoics as Platonists themselves.3 Hägg argues from this
point that the middle Platonists replaced the Platonic vocabulary with Aristotelian terminology to
modernize the vocabulary.4

1

Lilla and Hägg. Lilla is one of the foremost scholars commenting on the connection between Clement
and specifically middle Platonism. Hägg, a recent scholar, agrees with Lilla’s link to middle Platonism,
but also feels that the connection may be stretched and out of context.
2

Henny Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 71-72.
3

Ibid, 80.

4

Ibid, 81.
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Hägg is certainly not alone in focusing on the Platonist trajectory in Clement, Salvatore
Lilla, in one of the most respected works on Clement of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria: A
Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, wrote in 1971 that the issue of Clement’s loyalty
to Plato should not be the key area of focus. Lilla argues that Clement of Alexandria was put in a
very unique position during the convergence of Hellenism and Gnosticism in Alexandria at that
time; Clement’s position was one of dynamic complexity.5 Clement lives in the midst of a
Hellenic world that also feels the vast influences of Roman and Judaic teachings. Clement, as
Lilla explains, tries to reconcile the Christian faith to the other major rival religious and
philosophical streams of thinking present in Alexandria.6 Certainly the allegorical style that
Clement turns toward in Paedagogus is reminiscent of that from Plato, but Lilla is astute in
claiming that Clement’s writings and ideas are founded on more than that of middle Platonism.
Aristotle also had a profound impact on Clement’s own work. Even though Lilla nods to
Aristotle as having been a part of Clement’s development, for Elizabeth Clark that is not enough.
Clark argues shortly after Lilla’s work is published that Clement turns to Aristotle for more than
is given credit.7 She pushes Lilla’s ideas on the complexity of Clement even further.
As Clark discusses in her text, Clement is reliant not only on the philosophy of Plato, but
perhaps even more on Aristotle’s. Clark understands Clement may not be cognizant in his use of
Aristotle rather than Plato. Actually, Clark states, that based on references in Clement’s work,

5

Salvatore Romano Clemente Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and
Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
6

7

Ibid, 9.

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of Alexandria's
Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 3-4.
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that it is more that Clement does not believe himself to be Aristotelian. She alludes that Clement
8

may believe that he was more Platonic, even though her argument is that his use of philosophy is
actually Aristotelian.9 Clement goes beyond a simple change to Aristotelian vocabulary; his
writings indicate a deeper turn to Aristotelian epistemology and concepts of the good –
eudaimonia, volition, and choice. Clement labels Aristotle a “naturalist” and denies certain
aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy that depart from Stoicism.10
And when He says, “Let my lambs stand on my right,” He alludes to the simple children,
as if they were sheep and lambs in nature, not men; and the lambs He counts worthy of
preference, from the superior regard He has to that tenderness and simplicity of
disposition in men which constitutes innocence. Again, when he says, “as suckling
calves,” He again alludes figuratively to us; and “as an innocent and gentle dove,” the
reference is again to us.11
Clement certainly turns to examples in his own work of the natural world. Clement
returns time and again to pastoral themes within Paedagogus, likening children to lambs, calves,
and chicks in chapter five. In chapter nine, Clement likens fear for salvation to a bitter root
cleansing the soul. Clark critiques scholars for “making” Clement more Platonic and Gnostic
than Aristotelian, without turning to Clement’s philosophical leanings.12 In looking at the
Paedagogus, Clement does not transition to Aristotelian vocabulary, but turns to his philosophy

8

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of Alexandria's
Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 3-4.
9

Ibid, 2-3.
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Ibid.

Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus: The Instructor. Eds. Arthur Cleveland Coxe, Sir James, and
Alexander Roberts. 1.1, location 337.
11

12

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 3-4.
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as well. Finally, a case can be made that Clement brings Christian belief into Greek philosophy
13

and society.14 There is no better place than Paedagogus to see Clement’s handy work in weaving
together Greek philosophy and Christian pistis.
Paedagogus reads like a manual for the catechumenate. Not unlike the modern
Catechism, it is laden with biblical passages and references to earlier Christian works that help
establish a moral and spiritual code for the new Christian. How ought one to act? Behave?
Think? Within these questions, Clement pushes for an answer to the question, who is Christ and
what is Christ’s role? Though many threads in Clement’s Paedagogus could be investigated
concerning their Aristotelian elements, for our purposes I will focus mostly on Clement’s
understanding of the morality of the Christian person, focusing mainly on children and infants.
Clement has an Aristotelian understanding of the person, including children. Clement
understands the rational soul not only relates to the body, but indeed propels the body forward as
a result of cognitive thought. Clement uses Aristotle as a corrective lens to, what he saw as,
Christianity’s dependency on Gnosticism.15 Gnostic writings describe the person as being made
of a good soul and an evil body. Clement seeks to teach the catechumenates that they are
students aimed toward the ultimate good of God. In order to attain this goal, Clement must allow
for free will rather than determinism. Within Clement’s discussion on becoming Christ-like,
threads of Aristotelian thought are present. Aristotelian perception, the imprint that is left by the
sensible form of things, is recycled in the writings of Clement on the instruction of the

13

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 7.
14

Ibid, 17.

15

Ibid, 45.
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Catechumenate. Christ, Logos, leaves an impression on His followers, allowing them to strive
16

for goodness.
But our Educator being practical, first exhorts to the attainment of right dispositions and
character, and then persuades us to the energetic practice of our duties, enjoining on us
pure commandments, and exhibiting to such as come after representations of those who
formerly wandered in error.17
Clement understands this to be possible because of the functions of the soul. There are
two types of movements within the soul.18 There is the involuntary and voluntary.19 It is
important to note that the involuntary and voluntary do not indicate a difference between
faculties in the mind.20 An active mind is the actualization of a what has already begun in the
passive mind. When I discuss the child-adult relationship in chapters Four and Five, the concept
of agency through passivity is a focal point. For Clement, an involuntary movement of the soul
should not be taken as lesser than a voluntary movement. He considers the infant searching for
the mother’s breast to be instinctive to an infant. The action, however, is not less important
simply because it is not born out of choice through reason.
When it comes to the use of the voluntary soul and moral reasoning, Clark is correct in
that Clement’s driving force behind the appropriation of the Aristotelian will was to combat

16

Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 101.

17

Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus: The Instructor. Eds. Arthur Cleveland Coxe, Sir James, and
Alexander Roberts. 1.1, location 147.
18

It is important to note here that Lear disagrees with Clark’s reading of Aristotle. Actually, Lear agrees
with Diamond in that the soul is always one unified soul. See Lear’s treatment of the soul pages 140-143.
For the purpose of this project, we will proceed with Clark’s suppositions.
19

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977),48.
20

Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 136-7.
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Gnostic determinism. After all, Clement was an advocate in his writings, including
Paedagogus, for taking responsibility for one’s own actions.22 The concept of the soul also
differs from Platonism: there, the tripartite soul chooses either to reflect the goodness of the
forms or to be dragged down by the afflicted part of the soul. The Aristotelian soul uses a moral
determinism only in the broad sense of being rooted in the determinism of any organism, yet
different in the human capacity to self-consciousness. It is much more complicated than arguing
humans are determined to do right or wrong. Rather, there is always space for reflection and the
grey area between excessive choices and the path of virtue. Clement even rejects, surprisingly,
the Stoic idea that there are no degrees between vice and virtue, in favor of Aristotle’s gradations
of improvement.23 Clark suggests that both praise and blame were essential to Clement to show
growth.24 Interestingly enough, this is a hallmark of pedagogy; growth indicates learning. “For so
is the truth, that perfection is with the Lord, who is always teaching, and infancy and
childishness with us, who are always learning.”25 Recalling Clement’s goal of writing for
catechumens, Clement is better able to teach those becoming Christian with the openness needed
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Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 15.
22

Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus: The Instructor, Eds. Arthur Cleveland Coxe, Sir James, and
Alexander Roberts. 1.1, location 153.
23

Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 40.
24

Ibid, 41.

Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus: The Instructor, Eds. Arthur Cleveland Coxe, Sir James, and
Alexander Roberts. 1.1, location 385.
25
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in conversion. Clement believes that converts to Christianity in Alexandria will not be able to
26

keep up with the lofty ideas of Stoic apatheia; they need something more to learn by.27
Paedagogus
The purpose of Clement’s Paedagogus is to examine the precepts that make Christ the
supreme teacher for both men and women. Adult humans are the students of the Word and of
God.28 While Clement does not make a judgment specifically on the state of the child in this
work, he uses what he believes to be the “facts of children” and the principles of childhood and
childishness to make his point.29 Important to this study are three main points that Clement
brings to light regarding the concept of the child. First, the use of specific Greek terms for
children, metaphorically. Their unique definitions lend depth to the conversation in that there are
multiple words for “child” in Greek, each term having a connotation that would indicate a
particular contextual usage. Clement not only changes his usage, while the English translation
continues to use only one word, “child,” or in some cases “infant,” but he also discusses the
varied use of the Greek words in the New Testament writings to describe different types of
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Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement's Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of
Alexandria's Refutation of Gnosticism (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977), 44.
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Ibid, 30-33.
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Clement was already familiar working with and coming to understand the catechumenate.
His teacher, Pantaenus, was the head of a catechumenal school in Alexandria. Brown, Peter, Brown, Peter
Robert Lamont, and American Council of Learned Societies. The Body and Society : Men, Women, and
Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity. Lectures on the History of Religions ; New Ser., No. 13. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 123.
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The phrase, "facts of children," simply alludes to the solid information on who the child
was, how the child functioned in society, and how the child functioned in and of themselves. The intent of
this discussion is, in part, to unravel Clement's packed thoughts in Pedagogue concerning the child to be
able to better see their origins. The reason that I state he does not “make judgment” is because the work as
a whole is really about the catechumenate, not about Clement’s thoughts on children, though those
certainly do come to light via his explanation.
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“child” or “states of childhood.” The English language lacks precision in using a more
purposefully defined word for “child” that would denote a very narrow and specific type of the
more common definition.
Second, Clement uses the child as the reference point and example by which he explains
the relationship between adults who are learning their faith and Christ who is teaching it to them.
Clement does not tackle in depth the topic of children in a direct manner in terms of who they
are, what they are, and how they are purposeful beings in and of themselves. However, he gives
glimpses into his thoughts by using the ‘child’ as a part of his allegory, looking to Greek,
Roman, and Jewish society for contextualization. This is not an easy task in itself. The plurality
of familial structures in Clement’s Alexandria alone was vast. I will explain later in this chapter
some of the social structures as Clement understands them from these cultures.31 He uses their
respective household structures as the foundation of his allegory, which likens the role of the
child to that of a catechumen. In his allegory, the child is fashioned in the likeness of children in
Clement's contemporary culture.32 It is worth noting that whether the child forms the household
around them or the household forms the child is up for debate amongst scholars.
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Third, Clement gives us a commentary on the New Testament explaining how the terms
“child” and “children” were meant to be read and understood by the Christian community.
Clement then comes to represent one way of reading the child in the New Testament text. The
positive aspect that Clement brings to this project is his use of the New Testament in order to
explain the position of the child as one of privilege in the eyes of God. When we turn, in chapter
four, to the contemporary usage and understanding of the New Testament’s teaching on children,
Clement will become a useful ally in affirming the turn that some religious education programs
for children take in terms of their view on the child; that the child is privileged as the closest to
God.
Language and Etymology in the Paedagogus
Language and the choice to use specific words and terms versus alternate words are
important for Clement. Specifically, he discusses why the word, paidarion is used rather than
other terms. Clement explains that the term in Greek is general for children regardless of
gender.33 This is notable because he does not wish to delineate so strictly between male and
female Christians. He references the use of the term “man” that is common to both men and
women. Similarly, he feels that paidarion be applicable to all children. “Common therefore, too,
to men and women, is the name of man. For this reason, I think the Attics called, not boys only,
but girls, paidarion, using it as a word of common gender…”34 The claim that Clement makes in
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Paedagogus is that once one is born into Christ, whether they are woman or man, slave or free,
no longer bears weight upon them. The importance, rather, is that they are children of God.35
In addition, the term paidon is specific to the kind of child that Clement wishes to serve
as his model; it is a child learning morality, intellect, and physical training in the Greco-Roman
world.36 Clement weaves this particular model of the child throughout his work. He focuses on a
pais as being a human that is constantly in a state of development and innocence; a being that is
newly alive in awe and wonder. Clement also uses the term nepios for infant and distinguishes
that further from paidarion. Nepios, an early infant, is used to show development of the child
from its beginnings through the time of learning.37 “For so is the truth, that perfection is with the
Lord, who is always teaching, and infancy and childishness with us, who are always learning.”38
Clement distinguishes not only between children and adults, but even between the different
stages of childhood in themselves. For instance, a new catechumen would be likened, in
Clement’s ideology, to an infant. The term nepios indicates one who had limited faculty in terms
of understanding the context of the world around them. A child, in contrast, would be in an
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active phase of learning and understanding. Both, however, are used allegorically to show
relationship with Christ as teacher.39
We, then, who are infants, no longer roll on the ground, nor creep on the earth like
serpents as before, crawling with the whole body about senseless lusts; but, stretching
upwards in soul, loosed from the world and our sins, touching the earth on tiptoe so as to
appear to be in the world, we pursue holy wisdom, although this seems folly to those
whose wits are whetted for wickedness. Rightly, then, are those called children who
know Him who is God alone as their Father, who are simple, and infants, and guileless,
who are lovers of the horns of unicorns.40
These terms indicate a thoughtful reflection upon the child as a being that not only experiences a
variety of stages, in which the importance of the person is placed on the completion or
fulfillment of those stages, but also a being whose personhood is important in their current stage:
an important young person who is symbolic of the ideal Christian. Christian formation should be
modeled after the formation and stages of human development.41
Clement does not regard childhood, infancy, or their respective stages as being less than
that of their fully-grown counterparts. When he refers to children he turns to the qualities in them
that he sees as being angelic, closer to God.42 Innocence, simplicity, eagerness, and gentility are
all qualities that he elevates. In contrast, the qualities of being low, stupid, earthen, and crude
might be attributes of being childish, but not necessarily a child or of childhood.43
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Contextualizing the World of Clement
Clement is influenced by the society and cultures around him when forming his thoughts
concerning infants and children in Paedagogus.44 The question concerning Clement’s social and
cultural context is, “What does Clement use or refute from these structures?” Exhaustive studies
have been done on Greco-Roman-Judaic families at different places in the empire, Egypt
included. There have also been studies on the differences between the Christian and nonChristian families of the Mediterranean and Near East. The true “greekness” or “romanness” of a
particular family structure is also difficult to pinpoint.45 None of these cultures existed in a
vacuum and so each had a certain amount of fluidity. In later chapters when we reference
Clement in our own contemporary context, the defining points of “family” will have to be
revisited and explained further as they do not necessarily match the western contemporary
culture’s ideals. Most important in Clement’s writing is to understand these terms in his own era,
second century A.D., which hopefully lends insight not only into Clement’s opinion of his
Greco-Roman-Judaic society, but also explain the possible sources of his normative stance on
children.46
Clement’s terms, as discussed above, for child and infant are purposeful. PseudoPlutarch, traditionally, refers to paidaion as free-born males.47 While references to children being
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educated usually do refer to male children, historians such as Maier argue that a traditional
Roman household would not have had a hierarchy between young children.48 The Pater is the
head of the household and ruled over his children with potestas, which incidentally is the same
power with which he ruled over slaves.49 Similarly, the relationship in Rome between the state
and the citizen is mimicked in the power within the familias, “If the state was a familias, the
emperor was its paterfamilias.”50 In chapter Five I note a similar asymmetrical relationship
structure between the child and the adult, as well as the adult and the Magisterium of the Church.
In relationships, children are always subject to this hierarchy of power. There is a difference,
however, between the family and the household, each having a specific connotation.51 While the
treatment of slaves and children may be similar, they are not identical; children are part of the
inner family structure, specifically a biological one.52
Clement’s use of the term paidion links the structure of the familias where slaves and free
children both had relationships with the father, who in Christianity, is Christ. This may be,
however, where the similarities between Clement’s idea of the child and the Greco-Roman idea
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of the child come to an end, at least with respect to wealthy families. Clement’s development of
53

paideia, in the Christian sense, differ strikingly from society’s notion of paideia. He holds the
Christian image of a child up to a higher standard.54
What are the specific traits and attributes of the stages of development, or children, or
infants in general? Greek, Roman and Jewish cultures all have their own beliefs about infants
and children. Clement writes, “…with respect to the appellation of infant (nepios), that to nepion
is not predicated of the silly: for the silly man is called neputios: and nepios is neepios “since he
that is tender-hearted is called epios), as being one that has newly become gentle and meek in
conduct.”55
Dasen notes that much revolved around infant mortality rates.56 She identifies that the
“infancy” stage would have ended around two or three years old.57 Much is dependent upon the
practical milestones of children, not so different from our own western twenty-first century
social context.58 But this is all very much discussed in terms of a common social knowledge59
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Language, even in turning to context, is particular thing. Clement might agree on the stages of
development with those of Greece and Rome, or perhaps not since the language he uses would
undeniably be different. Clement’s “nepios” and the Roman “infans” or “bimus” may not reflect
the same defining characteristics. The terms are not interchangeable from author to author or
culture to culture.
Speaking specifically to the traits or portrayal of infants and children, there are some
stark differences between Clement’s understanding and prevalent beliefs about infants and
children such as those based in Aristotelianism. Aristotelianism is important to this project in
how it is understood by writers, such as Augustine. Aristotle’s description of infants can be
found in Generation of Animals.60 Both Clement and Aristotle turn to nature for knowledge on
humans. They do not agree, however, on the concepts of what it means to be an infant and child.
While Aristotle finds infants weak, both in their physical and mental states, Clement does not see
a weakness in the same light. “For we are not termed children and infants with reference to the
childish and contemptible character of our education, as those who are inflated on account of
knowledge have calumniously alleged.”61 Due to their weak and globule state, Aristotle aligns
infants with lower creatures, like animals.62 This idea is not reflected in Clement’s thought, quite
the opposite. Clement understands the infant to have an instinctive ability to relate to other
humans. Infants also have to progress enough through stages and rituals in both Greece and
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Rome to even be considered viable as they are in a liminal state at birth. Once the infant begins
63

to receive the care of the family, they are accepted as viable. Before that time, the mid-wife or
wet nurse is their sole contact. In some accounts, this could be seven to ten days after the birth of
the child.64 The entire ritual bears striking resemblance to the sacrament of infant baptism, which
will be discussed later in the chapter.65 According to Dasen and Gourevitch, it is not until six
months of age that the child would even be allowed funerary rights. This also indicates another
area where infant baptism, infant mortality, and the personhood of the infant intersect. Clement,
however, at least in the Paedagogus, does not indicate that he is in agreement with these cultural
norms. He turns instead to biblical accounts and descriptions of infants and children to discuss
their importance through his allegory of the instructor and the faithful.
Brown is quick to note in The Body and Society that the treatment of Roman versus
Greek children who are coming upon puberty would have been very different.66 Although this
conclusion is contested. In Brown’s writing, while the pater of the Roman household would
marry a girl that has just come upon puberty and is of child-bearing capability, the proposed head
of a Greek household might marry a women in her late teens and he himself be of a similar age.67
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The Roman husband would retain a title of "pater," father, to his wife, as their relationship is one
likened to a relationship between a parent and a child.68 Wives and children, differently than
those who were slaves, ensure the husband’s power over his family.69 The age difference
between Roman couples, which is more than in the classical Hellenistic social structure, have
supported the husband in this role. Not only does this change the structure of the household
entirely based on society and region, but it most likely had an impact on Clement’s writing as he
discusses the notion of what is proper for children. The matter may be more complicated than the
way in which Brown portrays it. Dasen finds archaeological support of a more interwoven
structural similarity between Greek and Roman family, each culture marrying off girls as young
as twelve years.70 In addition, under the Roman Empire, a woman always belonged to her
father’s household and retained the wealth and benefit of that house.71 The argument could then
change to support a claim that Clement did not necessarily turn to one culture over another, such
as having a higher influence of Greek over Roman. Clement made the Christian family his
normative reference for familial life. The Christian family represented relationships as God
intended them.
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How and why is Clement’s work important to the Christian understanding of children
moving forward in time, and what did Christianity keep, if anything, from his writings and ideas?
Clement, I argue, is important to this research topic because of the way that he understood the
personhood of the child and their relationships to society, family, and God. He uses allegories of
Christ and Christ’s followers as the model by which humans understand their relationship to
Christ. He believes that the innocence and humility in a child was the key to accepting the
goodness of Christ and Christ’s salvation.72
But the childhood which is in Christ is maturity, as compared with the law. Having
reached this point, we must defend our childhood. And we have still to explain what is
said by the apostle: ‘I have fed you milk (as children in Christ), not with meat; for ye
were not able, neither yet are ye now able.73
Clement’s notion of the nursing infant at the breast of its mother is likened to the way in which
Christ nourishes His children and elevates his love of children’s innocence, gentleness, and
purity.74 “And He alone, as is befitting, supplies us children with the milk of love, and those only
are truly blessed who suck this breast.”75 The focus and meaning of childhood for Clement is one
of goodness. There are disputes between scholars as to whether or not the Pauline and Johaninne
literature that refer to children literally meant children. Clement, however, understands children
in those passages in a very literal way. By using children as the perfect allegory for Christ and
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Christ’s followers, he completes his story. Without a doubt, children have a place of prominence
in the biblical literature according to Clement. Clement builds upon the mainly the Hellenistic
understanding of the child, forming one idea within Christian theology.
Clement on Children in a Biblical Context
In The Body and Society, Peter Brown claims that Clement did not readily give himself
over to a mainstream reading of New Testament writings.76 It seems, rather, that when Clement
turned to Matthew, or John, or Paul, he had a specific reading in mind. The foundation and
support for Clement’s Paedagogus lies within the unraveling and understanding of particular
New Testament passages that make reference to children and infants. He turns to 1 Corinthians
3:2 in discussing the perfection of infants, who are following in the path of the most perfect
infant, Christ.77 Clement uses the infant as symbolic for the rebirth into the Christian faith.
Maturity, for Clement, does not necessarily indicate perfection, but rather perfection can be
found at stages that one could consider infantile.78 Other accounts of the Christian household at
this time are also important, particularly because of their references to women and children.79
Though the power, certainly the political power, is with the men of the household, women and
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children create a positive place in Christianity for those coming to the table. The state of the
household, even in Christian families, is one of complexity. As stated earlier, “Christian”
households are also Greco-Roman-Judaic households in their given culture.81 It is inaccurate to
imagine that they exist in a vacuum where their Christian identity stood at the forefront. The
reality is that even within these households there is a tension between the “paterfamilias”
structure of the Roman household and the Christian family who believe in a more holistic
structure where women and children make decisions as well as the head.82 Osiek claims that part
of the structure of the Christian family takes its cue from Pauline Hellenism.83 Descriptions of
the household and each individual’s role is emphasized, as is the role of the church as that of
“pater.”84 Outside of the New Testament references, however, and reference within writings
such as Paedagogus, children are not discussed much at all. This is supported by Osiek who
claims that she has found references to children only in sparse biblical references such as
Matthew 18:3.85 This Mattheian reference, however, is foundational for Friedrich
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Schleiermacher in the nineteenth century as he continues the work Clement began.
Schleiermacher, as I will discuss in chapter Four, critiques the inherent authoritarian structure
between the child and the adult as he takes seriously the call for adults to become like little
children.
Conclusion and Critique
Clement is certainly promising in terms of being a good source and foil against later
thinkers, such as Augustine. In terms of how he views the anthropology of the child, there are
problems with his work as well. Clement continuously turns to the natural world as the source
for conclusive information on human beings, both children and adults.86 Clement uses animals as
a source to discuss relationships between the family, as well as diminutive terminology of young
girls.87 This is indicative of an early natural law argumentation though this seems to hold true
more when Clement discusses relationships rather than individual being. For instance, the idea
that children and infants are important because of their particular stage in life, as well as the
purpose of each stage, indicates that Clement looks beyond the natural law to understand the
child. While Clement focuses on relational terminology using animals he does not insinuate that
children are likened to animals in ability or lack there-of.88 Perfection in adult life is also not
completely absent in Clement. He does note that a person is in a continuous stage of learning,
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but perfection lies with finding finality in God. While this could seem oriented toward looking
89

out at the future rather than the importance of the immediate stage, Clement quotes Matthew in
pointing not only to the importance of today, but also the importance of finding a pure love of
God in the way an infant would.90
Augustine
Context
Delving into Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus to investigate how he understands
children in terms of personhood is quite a different path than that of Augustine. Augustine of
Hippo, one of the most prolific theologians of early Christianity, has more influence on doctrine
and tradition than Clement. This point becomes more obvious as this discussion continues into
the latter chapters. Much of the sacramental theology of the Church, in foundation, comes from
Augustine. So too does the Church’s understanding of children; so much so that the Church has
difficulty putting Augustine into perspective.91 The goal of discussing Augustine in this project is
to parse out the use of Augustine’s theology and anthropology affecting and regarding children,
both positive and negative, as seen against the theologies of other major theologians. Clement
obviously wrote earlier than Augustine, while Aquinas follows.
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Two of Augustine’s works are extremely important to this study. The first is a glimpse
into Augustine’s thoughts on anthropology including the human condition and personhood. The
Confessions explains not only the fallen state of humanity, but describes in detail birth, infancy,
and childhood. While Clement is an admirer of the child, Augustine takes an alternate stance.
The second typology of the child is the child as a small adult, but equal in moral culpability
whether or not they are considered moral agents. The other work in question, Merit and the
Forgiveness of Sins, and the Baptism of Infants, situates baptism in the Church and impresses on
Christians that infant baptism is a necessity. While Augustine’s body of work is immense and
comprehensive of Christian theology, these two particular works represent his writings on
children. It also allows modern Christian theologians to better understand the position of the
Church today on the place of children, their personhood, and their sacramental lives.
The Confessions
Book one of The Confessions is the focus of this discussion on Augustine’s
understanding of children, though small amounts of text from later books are examined as well.
It is important to note that Augustine’s Book one is written through year fifteen of his life, while
book two picks up on his sixteenth year. In Augustine’s mind and in forming his confessional
autobiography, he delineates ages. Augustine describes six stages of aging in total: infancy
(language acquisition,) childhood (rationale acquisition,) adolescence (puberty,) young
adulthood, middle age, and old age.92 Several questions arise based on his understanding of those
stages. Augustine makes a stark comparison between childhood and age sixteen. Most likely this
was because of the onset of puberty in boys. Was Augustine purposeful in indicating that fifteen
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was still childhood, but sixteen was not? Was his intention to delineate strictly between
childhood and puberty? At which point does the child become a reasoning person? These are a
few of the questions that should be considered when looking more closely at the ending of book
one.93 Unfortunately, as I explain in chapter Five, many of the answers regarding the threshold of
reason still remain unaddressed and unanswered in the Roman Catholic Code of Canon Law.
Augustine writes about infants, children, and young adults as part of his autobiographical
material in The Confessions. Book one begins as Augustine describes how he understands
newborns and then infants and children.94 The information that Augustine garners concerning,
particularly, newborns and infants comes to him in two ways, first his own observation of the
babies that he has been in contact with, and second what those who knew him as a child had told
him about his own disposition at that time.95 Augustine, unlike Aristotle, is not the son of a
doctor or a doctor himself. His observations on infants are that of using his senses and then
coming to conclusions based on those senses, they were epistemological. He forms an
anthropology dependent upon these assumptions.96 He describes elements of infancy that most
parents or caretakers of children would be familiar with; infants laughing in their sleep, crying
for needs, frustration with lack of language.97 It is clear that in Augustine’s mind there is a
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marked difference in stage between a child being a newborn and the infancy stage. What marks
these stages for Augustine? At the close of section eight, after describing what a baby is like after
birth, Augustine states, “Then little by little I perceived where I was, and I wished to make my
wants known to those who could satisfy them. Yet I could not do so, because the wants were
within me, while those outside, could by no sensible means penetrate the soul.”98 This “little by
little,” as Augustine puts it is that short phase from birth moving into the stage of infancy. It also
shows how Augustine understands the progression of senses, communication, and perhaps as we
read further into this book, the reason formation in the child. Augustine states that his infancy
was indeed not long-lived and even as an adult happened a short time ago. The natural
progression of an infant is to continue to learn, “For even then I had being and lived, and already
at the close of my infancy I looked for signs by which I could make known my meanings to
others.”99 It is also clear from Augustine’s writings that he feels the infant is a living human.
While this may seem to be a common sense statement in our contemporary world, for Augustine
this is an important statement. The infant is given the status of a living human, not an animal, not
a plant, not a decaying thing. Augustine writes, “…you have given to the infant life and a body,
which, as we see, you have thus furnished with senses, equipped with limbs, beautified with a
shapely form, and, for its complete good and protection, have endowed with all the powers of a
living being.”100
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It is important to note that Augustine does not use the terms “person” or “personhood”
for the infant. He always refers to the infant as a living being. He does not, other than in the
quote above, refer to the infant in a positive way. He explains that the infant has been “beautified
with a shapely form,” but other than that Augustine only posits facts about how the infant
functions.101 Further to this point, Augustine writes at the end of section twelve that these
statements concerning the infant, his infancy even, do not matter.102 The child is, according to
Augustine, to be regarded in the same fashion as an adult. Childhood is not an important stage or
group of stages that hold much meaning outside of ordinary child development and physical
growth. Infancy is a time that humans are not able to remember though those around them may.
Since it is not a time of remembrance for him, he writes infancy off as not important, “But, see, I
now set aside that period. What matters that now to me of which I recall no trace?”103
From this point Augustine transitions in section thirteen to an infant who is beginning to
learn to communicate, learning motor skills, and striving that the infant’s “will would be
obeyed.”104 Augustine suggests that the infant’s will and need to begin communication and
speech is driven by their desire. This is not so different from the desire that Aristotle suggested
drove people to choose and propel them forward. Augustine goes so far to state,
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I pondered over this in memory: when they named a certain things and, at that name,
made a gesture towards the object, I observed that object and inferred that it was called
by the name they uttered when they wished to show it to me. That they meant this was
apparent by their bodily gestures, as it were by words natural to all men, which are made
by change of countenance, nods, movements of the eyes and other bodily members, and
sounds of the voice, which indicate the affections of the mind in seeking, possessing,
rejecting, or avoiding things.105
In order for the infant to pick up on these adult cues they must have the ability to reason through
the actions as they happen. Augustine suggests that the infant has a mind that works with the
same instinctual capacity that other adult human beings have as well. Cristina Traina, so aptly
wrote that this non-distinction between the moral agency of the adult and the moral agency of the
child poses a problem.106 The infant crying for milk is a sin of desire no different from an adult’s
desire.107 Children, even newborns and infants, are labeled as agents affected by their sinful
choices and behaviors. Augustine does not mean that children have the capacity to reason
morally the same as an adult. Children act based on innate desire. The desire they feel, however,
is not innocent.108 The child’s desire is indicative of a corrupt nature. While Augustine does not
find that children are intentionally depraved, their wills are continuously afflicted by their
Original Sin.109 This point will be important later in this work when we discuss the implications
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of Augustine’s work on the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s doctrine. As Augustine
moves from his writings on infancy and into his discussion of school-aged children, it is clear
that the progression of newborn to infant continues from infant into child. The child is able to
reason, now has a deep understanding of language, and has the ability to understand social
norms.110
On Baptism, Against the Donatists
The second document from Augustine that is important to the discussion on infant
baptism is On Baptism, Against the Donatists. When looking for a clear argument as to why
something should or should not be done, it is always helpful to look at a defense of a case.
Essentially, On Baptism is Augustine’s defense of Christian baptism to the heretical Donatists.111
Within this work, Augustine methodically confronts the misconceptions that the Donatists
believe concerning baptism. He explains why they should accept to the “orthodox” Christian
way. While there are many issues that arise in Augustine’s commentary from licit baptisms to the
baptisms of criminals, infant baptism is also included in the discussion. Of baptism Augustine
states that a person does not ever lose their baptism and needs not seek re-baptism.112 Though
Augustine also argues that baptism is merely a salve to the wound of Original Sin. The baptized
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need to be in a state of grace to repent for Original Sin throughout their lifetime.

When an

infant is baptized, this should be their one and only baptism, as it would be for an older child or
adult. Augustine alludes to the “firm tradition of the universal Church” for explanation as to why
infants can and should be baptized.114 Regardless of an infant’s inability to consent, to believe, or
to “make confession unto salvation,” the baptism is licit as long as a Christian adult is speaking
on their behalf.115 The act of baptizing, the remission and cleansing of Original Sin, is the prime
purpose of the baptism; it does not, or so it seems, require the attention of the newborn.116
Furthermore, Augustine describes the baptism of the infant along the same logical lines as to
why an infant should be circumcised; the presentation of righteousness upon the infant, put to the
infant, bestowed upon the infant is an important seal of faith.117 Children, regardless of whether
or not they have moral agency, whether or not they knowingly choose to sin, are condemned for
their sinfulness in the same way that an adult would be condemned.118 The necessity of baptism
is because of this indelible mark of sin.119 Without baptism, even newborns are damned to hell.

113

Martha Ellen Stortz, “’Where or When Was Your Servant Innocent?’: Augustine on Childhood” in The
Child in Christian Thought, Ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 95.
114
Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatist, ed. By Philip Schaff, (1886), location 2541.
115

Ibid.

116

I write this only because it will become of utmost importance in later chapters when I begin to discuss
the role of children in their own spirituality.
117

Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatist, ed. By Philip Schaff, (1886), location 2550, and Martha
Ellen Stortz, “’Where or When Was Your Servant Innocent?’: Augustine on Childhood” in The Child in
Christian Thought, Ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 95.
118

Martha Ellen Stortz, “’Where or When Was Your Servant Innocent?’: Augustine on Childhood” in The
Child in Christian Thought, Ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 79.
119

See Babcock. Babcock writes an in depth article on Augustine’s changes over time on issues of free
will, the mind, and sin. In Babcock’s estimation, Augustine became more restrictive over time on the
availability of free will to humans. Whereas early in Augustine’s teachings human must have free will in

37
This was Augustine’s position against the Donatists and the Pelagians. It was not, however,
always his position. In 396 Augustine considered the Holy Innocents who were needlessly
slaughtered to be martyrs who deserved grace regardless of baptism.120 As he wrote his
autobiographical material in The Confessions he reversed his stance; standing firm against what
he considered heresy.121
Augustine did not focus on the agency of the infant or the child other than positing
Original Sin onto them. He even goes as far to say that infants do not suffer unjustly because of
Original Sin, even though they make no choices that would lead to their suffering.122 On one
hand, he admits that infants have no ability to make rational choices for themselves, and on the
other he states that they must continue to be held accountable.123 Augustine writes that if infants,
having righteousness bestowed upon them, continue in Christian piety, conversion of the heart
will eventually follow.124 Some scholars believe that Augustine gives the child full agency. I
would push back on arguments that Augustine understands the child to have the same agency as
an adult in all situations.125 All children, even the youngest, are agents of Original Sin. Children
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moving into adolescence begin to become moral agents in addition to being agents of Original
Sin. They are not however, deemed as culpable in action or depravity as an adult. Therefore,
Augustine states that they do not have extensive punishment in hell.126 Sacramentally they are
always being-done-to with consent of an adult. Where I agree with scholars, such as Traina, is
that there is no grey area where children are allowed to be children. There is only an austere
dichotomy of being adult agents or not agents at all. While the infants, due to an “insufficiency
of age,” lack the ability to “believe with the heart unto righteousness” or “make confession with
the mouth unto salvation,” they can have someone speak on their behalf as to their dedication to
God.127 Augustine is clear, however, in the separation of righteousness bestowed through
baptism and a true conversion of the heart.128 Salvation can only be achieved through having
both of those pieces. If this is the case, what is the benefit of baptism for infants? Augustine
might say that it is for the purpose of regeneration from the sin of Adam. God, according to
Augustine, supplies the want for the conversion of the heart.129
When Augustine wrote the two pieces that are examined in this work, he is continued the
tradition of certain theologians and Church fathers before him. Augustine is not the first to
suggest infant baptism as the norm for the time.130 Ireneaus, Hippolytus, Cyprian of Carthage,
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and Gregory of Nazianzus, each in turn write on the good of infant baptism. Augustine’s
tradition, however, arguably outlive itself within the active teachings of the Church.131 In
addition to the teachings of Augustine having a profound effect on Catholic doctrine and social
teachings, the teachings of Thomas Aquinas also become very important for Church canon.
Thomas Aquinas
Context
Following Augustine by over 700 years, Aquinas revives early Greek philosophy as well
as earlier theological thinkers, while also engaging the scholarship of Islamic philosophy and
metaphysics. His masterpiece, the Summa Theologiae, represents his thinking on everything
from creation of the universe to creation of law and governance. Aquinas, calling Aristotle the
“Philosopher” to underline the importance of the ancient Greek philosopher for his own work,
builds an understanding of the soul based, in part, on Aristotle’s understanding. In addition,
Aquinas’ understanding is not unlike Aristotle’s when it comes to his thoughts on children. His
understanding of children harkens back to likening them to a lower form of an adult or an
irrational animal.132
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For a child is by nature part of its father. Thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as
to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth,
and before it has the use of free choice, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is
like a spiritual womb, for so long as a child does not have the use of reason, he does not
differ from an irrational animal.133
Because children, or male children for Aquinas, are the property of their parents in the same way
that an oxen or domesticated animal would be the property of a man, children are an instrument
or extension of the family.134 Infants are entirely helpless. Possessing no rationale, moral, or
spiritual formation, infants are nothing but potential. Upon the use of reason, during Aquinas’
pueritia stage, the child gains free choice and the right to determine their own interests, including
decisions regarding their faith.135 Agency is gained in time for Aquinas. Consequently, no
agency is granted to a child below the age of reason. Aquinas again takes Aristotle’s lead in
looking toward the natural world for cues concerning the essence of children. The question of
reason and the age of reason is a common thread woven into the Summa Theologica. The age of
reason continues to be problematic in canon law. Aquinas’ third and final stage of childhood is
adolescentia, the age beyond puberty where the person should be treated as an adult, but still is
lacking in full maturity.136 Making the move from the infantia stage to the pueritia stage
indicates that the child has become verbal and is beginning to decipher moral problems. Pueritia
is the time where the child gains reason and will reach puberty. During Aquinas’ time this is

133

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Trns: Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Chicago:
William Benton Publishing), 2.2 Q19 Art 12 pg 437.
134

Ibid, 437. Also Traina, Cristina L. H. “A Person in the Making: Thomas Aquinas on Children and
Childhood.” in The Child in Christian Thought. Ed. Marcia J. Bunge. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans
Publishing, 2001, 107.
135

Cristina L. H. Traina, “A Person in the Making: Thomas Aquinas on Children and Childhood.” in The
Child in Christian Thought, Ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 117.
136

Ibid, 119.

41
approximately beginning at the ages of twelve to fourteen, though in contemporary scientific
understanding we know that the age of puberty may happen around a particular age, but varies
greatly from child to child.
Reason, Rationale, and the Soul
Reason for Aquinas indicates one primary theological feature, a rational soul. Reason, as
well as intellect are powers that operate from the soul.137 What is not properly explained by
Aquinas, however, is exactly how a child goes from the irrational to the rational or from nonagent to agent. Where is the threshold that indicates rationality? When Aquinas addresses
whether or not children can decide to enter religious life, he gives some guidelines as to his
prescription of the age of reason. When children reach the age of puberty, which Aquinas puts
around twelve for girls and fourteen for boys, he states that children gain the guile of reason.138
Aquinas explains that this age is a general age that may change from child to child depending on
their “disposition.”139 While there are challenges latent in Aquinas’ discussions and
understanding of children, he is ahead of his time in recognizing that this age is flexible
dependent on the individual child’s development. How does reason correlate with the onset of
puberty? Why would the biological function of puberty be a catalyst for the child to develop a
rational mind?
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Reason and intellect for Aquinas are intertwined to each other. The Intellect represents
the power in the soul of understanding of things both internal and external.140 As it develops, the
use of the power of intellect is the power of reason. Intellect understands a thing in and of itself.
Reason guides the soul in understanding one thing via another thing.141 Aquinas understands that
humans are rational and therefore have free choice, except those before the age of puberty.142
Prior to the age of puberty, children do have a soul, which is active with certain powers. These
powers of the sensitive and vegetative souls are parts of the soul that are natural to the human,
but not under their control; they are the involuntary parts.143 Humans are able to sense, but again
involuntarily; the human organs are moved toward for preservation and the good of the body.
The vegetative soul is the function of digestion that allows involuntary growth of the body.144
Children, therefore, are able to grow, digest, and sense, but devoid of the capability of a rational
soul and will.145 The will is the part of the soul that allows for agency. The will, according to
Aquinas, is the mover of the intellectual powers of the soul.146 Aquinas indicates that the sensible
part of the intellect is compromised in children. The sensible intellect, for example, would allow
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an adult to see a man and understand that the man can be a father, but the man is distinguished
from being either the adult’s father or a father at all. Fatherhood is simply one possibility of
being a man. Children, according to Aquinas, see a man and believe that the man is her/his
father.147 This shows that the child is not able to distinguish the less common or the more
particular features of objects, in this case that only some men are fathers and not all men are the
child’s father. The reason that Aquinas gives for this incapability is that children’s brains are too
moist.148 The moistness results in children not having enough strength at birth to use their limbs
and body properly, but also unable to use their brains for reasoning.149 Obtaining rationality and
thereby agency for a child, as understood by Aquinas, is only acquired with the maturity of the
child beyond the age of being able to generate a new human being themselves; puberty.
Undoubtedly some of these theories and theologies are not accepted in many Catholic
communities today. The scientific understanding of human development and psychology has
changed how we understand children. Aquinas applies both theological and scientific
knowledge of his time. He used the most advanced research from amongst the best scientists of
his time. Still, taking into consideration child development, child psychology, and theories in
education, our critique of Aquinas must not fall short. We certainly must not continue
proliferating a body of knowledge that is in need of refining and editing. Given his method to
incorporate the knowledge available to him, would Aquinas still believe that children lack a
sense of reason until puberty? As I write on children in chapters Four and Five it becomes
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apparent that the definitions of reason and agency are not singular. The gifts of nineteenth and
twentieth century theologians is in understanding the child and their stages, as unique in the type
of reason and agency particular to them.
Infant Baptism
Another issue that arises within discussions of Aquinas’ writings and theology is the
circumstances of infant baptism. Keeping in line with the theological tradition, Aquinas states
that in the case of infants, baptism should not be delayed under any circumstance.150 Salvation is
only acquired through baptism and as such, if an infant remains unbaptized, their soul is in
peril.151 Children also do not need the instruction and conversion to Christ that an adult would
need, thus there is no reason to delay baptism.152 Issues regarding infant baptism will arise again
in chapter two, where I will discuss teachings on baptism in modern Roman Catholic teachings.
Augustine and Aquinas’ views on baptism are important because they inform the modern and
contemporary Church on its current teachings. Traina suggests that Aquinas is responsible for
bridging the gap between his belief on infant formation from Aristotle and the Doctrine of
Original Sin from Augustine.153 Aquinas believes that the newly formed child has the potential to
receive God’s full grace and be made whole. Aquinas understands the goodness of the child’s
potential from his studies on Aristotle. On the other hand, Aquinas was cautious of suggesting
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that human beings are able to save themselves because of their inherent goodness.

154

Nevertheless, Aquinas stands firmly on the belief in the limbus puerorum where unbaptized
infants will go in they die a premature death.155 Since infants are not moral agents, they are
unable to receive a baptism of desire; limbo is their only option.
Conclusion
Arguably each of these theologians has been a contributor to the shaping of Catholic
Social teachings, teachings on baptism, and the Catholic understanding of the child. Also
arguably, Augustine and Aquinas have had a longer legacy and more widely promoted teachings
than Clement of Alexandria. The purpose of this research is not necessarily to explain why that
might be, but rather to illuminate that there are more theological sources than Augustine and
Aquinas. Looking forward into the next chapters, Clement’s sagacious understanding of the child
and his use of scripture can guide theologians, teachers, and clergy today to an enlightened way
of educating and helping children to grow in Christ. Clement’s methodological approach to
children also takes their personhood into account more so than other early theologians. Clement
does not speak in terms of psychology or autonomy, but he does have an organic understanding
that the child is more than an animalistic mass. These three primary typologies inform
theological understanding on children through the twenty-first century.
Chapter two is the pastoral counterpart to this chapter. One of the goals of this chapter
was to investigate and understand the theological underpinnings of the teachings on the child. A
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goal of chapter two is to understand the movements within pastoral theology that fuel teachings
on the child. Both of these are important as the theological teachings inform the pastoral
teachings as the pastoral teachings then inform the laity. The laity, the parents within our laity,
are responsible for the care of their children. What information are they receiving? What
teachings are passed down? Do these teachings fairly represent the autonomy of the child and
what they need to learn?

CHAPTER TWO
FOUNDATIONAL TREATMENT OF THE CHILD IN PASTORAL THEOLOGY
The Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church, historically, has used pastoral-moral
theology as the foundation for teaching the laity about acting as a morally good agents.
Beginning with the earliest penitentials and ending with contemporary Ecclesial teachings, this
chapter will discuss the importance and meaning of these teachings for lay members of the
Roman Catholic Church. Particularly before the rise of literacy and widespread access to formal
education, the laity relied upon their pastors, bishops, and other religious as the connection to the
teachings of their faith. These pastoral teachings were present with the laity to help guide their
life within families and within the broader community. How would they treat other members of
the community? How would they react to difficult situations? Most importantly for this chapter,
how did this inform their understanding and care for their children?
Children are often the topic of discussion in many of the teachings. Yet, paradoxically,
the teachings do not contain many insightful conclusions or even detailed information on
children. In some cases, such as The Catechism of the Catholic Church, the missing information
stands out more than the topics actually covered. We can become informed about what has
happened to our understanding of children, the child’s agency, and children’s rights based on
both the affirmative and absent statements in these documents. When the penitentials were
written, there were no sciences that dealt with understanding children’s emotional, mental, or
physical development. Understandably, the Church relied upon the resources and understanding
47
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they had to inform their writings on children at that time. Moving into the 20th century, however,
sustained study of children’s development was underway. Theologians who wrote these
teachings in the last half of the 20th century had access to early scientific studies on child
development. But it is difficult to see evidence of these mounting studies were draw upon in
the formation of catechisms used in the United States during that time. At the very best, the
teachings of John Paul II are fervent for the rights of children, their health, and well-being.1 They
still, arguably, lack an understanding of the needs of the child to develop into a person with
personhood and an individual relationship with God.
The goal of this chapter is not to be overly critical of past teachings regarding children.
Rather, the goal is to discuss and dig into the Church’s pastoral-moral teachings as a way to
grasp the laity’s understanding of children present with the laity. Pastoral theology is closely
intertwined with teaching the laity the moral foundations within the Catholic faith. It is our
responsibility then that pastoral theology engage the best information possible, including
working with the sciences to understand dignity, subjectivity, and the development of the child.
Sources for Moral Development
Theological writings have not always been available to the laity for mass consumption. In
the sixth through eighth centuries the laity of the Western Church did not have the access, nor the
ability to read the works of Augustine or Clement of Alexandria.2 While some of the clergy may
have had access and ability, it was more likely that an elite population of the ecclesiastical
Church were primarily responsible for knowledge of these texts. The repercussions for the laity
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and uneducated clergy in not having access to a moral guide(s) was that their local religious
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communities of priests became responsible for distilling the morality from these teachings into
manuals that were easily understood by the uneducated population as a whole. Out of this need,
the penitential manuals were written. The penitentials would be one of the earliest forms of
pastoral teachings and documents that would attempt to convey moral theology. The penitentials
served as a way for Christian believers to understand and respond to what was being asked of
them by their Church and their faith. As Wilhelm Kursawa states in his writings on the
penitentials, the Western Church needed a way for the laity to find repentance for sins. They
found that the formation of manuals would structure the different types of sin, as well as assign
appropriate penances depending on the severity of each sin.3 In the Eastern Church, a penitent
made reconciliation to Christ directly, not through the priest as a mediator. In addition, the
penitent also made their supplication public to their entire church community. The Roman
Catholic Church sought to make penance less public and with the priest as the intermediary. The
penitentials became the foundation, along with theological and biblical writings, for the moral
formation of those learning and practicing their faith.4 The Catechism of the Catholic Church is a
compiled account of Scripture, theological, and moral sources.5 It is the modern-day handbook of
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the practicing or learning Catholic layperson, as well as the primary pastoral teaching method of
pastors in parishes. The third and perhaps least widely read amongst parishioners are Papal
documents. Papal documents provide another source for moral teachings and authority for
modern day Catholics. These documents are made available to the public via print or the Vatican
website. Pastors might also disseminate these documents to be read together at the local parish
level. Together these three segments of pastoral teaching, which focus in part on moral theology,
make-up the body of teachings that the Ecclesia prescribes for how an active practicing Catholic
ought to act in given situations.
The Penitentials
Cummean and Beyond
Pastoral theology from the time of the Penitential of Cummean in 650 A.D. until
Aquinas’ writings in beginning in 1265 used the penitentials to understand the personhood, or
lack thereof, of children. The laity used the penitentials as a lens to understand what made
children, children. What was the child’s place in society? Were they to be treated morally as
adults? Were they owned objects? Yet, the penitential manuals themselves are not reflective of
all previous theological writings on children. They tell a different tale entirely of the
understanding of children in the sixth through eighth centuries. What is troubling is that they set
a tone for the way in which children are regarded as objects rather than autonomous subjects.
The penitentials, such as Cummean and Finnian, both from the late sixth century, The
Catechism, revised in 1994, and Papal writings, such as Auctorem fidei, in 1794, all affect the
social development of the laity in their understanding of how to treat children and act towards
them in society.

Irish Penitentials

51

The development of the penitentials, some also known as the Irish penitentials or
penitential manuals, became increasingly necessary for the Western Church in what is now
Ireland and Great Britain. The purpose, as discussed, was to provide a manual of sins and
penance for the monasteries, but also for the lay communities. The Western Church regarded the
penitential practices of the Eastern Church as too awkward and potentially alienating in its public
nature for the western laity.6 Instead, the clergy sought “paenitentia privata,” which would allow
those who wanted to be in good faith standing to confess their sins and do the suggested penance.
The penitentials were lists with penance fines rather than written manuscripts. Each sin listed had
its own particular penitence depending on the severity of the sin. The severity of the sin was
dependent, in part, upon how it was categorized into one of three types of sin. Three classes of
sin that were presented in the penitentials were capital, later to become mortal, grave, and minor
sin.7 Grave and minor sin later merged into venial sins. Kursawa, who writes in depth on the
differences between these types of sins within the penitentials, argues that they use John
Cassian’s eight vices to decide on severity and distinction of sin.8 Cassian’s eight vices were
gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, sadness, sloth/despondency, vainglory, and pride. Out of
these sins, gluttony was the source of all other sins.9 Gluttony meant to put the body before the
6
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spiritual and as a result always led the person into other sins. For instance, a thief would become
more avarice by being gluttonous; constantly seeking more. Though many of the penitentials
built upon the penitentials written before them, they were not necessarily identical. They also did
not prescribe identical penances for each particular type or specific sin.10 It was up to the
discretion of the different communities to decide for their particular setting the need for
penances. As Kursawa states, it is hard to find one line of common penances that runs between
the penitentials.11 It is, however, easier to see the commonality of sins since they were brought
over from the earlier writings. Based on a survey of the penitentials, homicide and adultery seem
to be the most egregious of capital sins resulting in the harshest penances.12 In some cases,
however, such as the penitential of Finnian, adultery by a man who begets a son and kills the son
results in three and a half years of penance.13 If he does not kill the son, the penance remains
three and a half years.14 There are numerous examples of similar content that indicate homicide
was not universally treated in the same manner. It also indicates that other offenses were still
deemed more offensive than the taking of human life. While this does not seem like an overt
critique on the personhood of the child, the penance served makes it clear that the child’s life was
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As with any historical document, it is important to remember that these sins and penances
were applicable to a particular setting in history. At the time that these penitentials were written,
the communities were at the mercy of raids and wars with the invading Vikings.15 This was
particularly true of the early monastic settlements.16 The Penitential of Cummean, for instance,
though it was a manual diagnosing sins and prescribing penances, also considered blood shed by
the community as a result of wars.17 Alongside the violence accompanying the invasions, the
communities were trying to combat the influences of paganism, magic, and witchcraft.18 These
were important daily issues for the early to late Medieval Christians. Being in such an anxietyridden state of war with loss of life, it is understandable that they focused on homicide and
adultery as particularly problematic. Loss of life and loss of the family foundation were
detrimental to the entire stability of society. They were already losing many people to the
violence of invasion; they could not allow their numbers to dwindle further. Heading toward the
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leaders, having an ecclesial leader as well as lay leaders usually provided by head families.19 As
these communities gained a foothold in their prospective geographical areas, the penitentials
changed to fit the needs of their communities.
For example, Praefatio Gildae and Sinodus Aquilonalis focused heavily on families and
adultery between married persons versus earlier penitentials like Cummean that focused
primarily on monastic community.20 This change indicates a continuing shift over time from
monastic rules to familial rules. The focus shifts from monastic fornication to marital fornication.
No matter what type of fornication, sexual sins remain a central issue. The place of sin in society
continued to be a noticeable thread woven into the fabrics of communities and their written rules.
The Northern part of Ireland and parts of Great Britain were the epicenter of the production of
the penitentials. They had a deeply rooted influence on the formation of both the lives of those in
religious vocation and the faith-filled lives of the laity.21 The structure of the community, as well
as the hardships the community faced, resulted in the importance put on care of the children
within that community.
Martha Brozyna offers her own methodology when it comes to understanding gender and
sexuality in the Middle Ages.22 In her introduction, Brozyna discusses how gender and sexuality
19
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were woven into a complex web of social constructs.23 As discussed previously in this chapter, it
is impossible to understand Western societies from the sixth through the eighth century without
taking its complexity into consideration.24 Not only historical documents, but written law,
Church Canon, communal culture, and even medical writings were influential in forming opinion
and judgment on relationships between people, including the relationship between adults and
children.
…to understand medieval sexuality and gender, it is important to examine the regulations
of the Christian church as well as their interpretation in both the theoretical writings of
theologians and glossators and the practical workings of ecclesiastical decrees and court
decisions.25
It is necessary to view the dynamic context of this time period in order to examine how children
were treated as they were depicted in the penitentials. Ultimately, this treatment of children
became socially normative behavior. Revisionist Catholic ethical theory would suggest that these
manuals were abandoned for a fully integrated moral theology.26 Some scholars, such as James
Keenan, suggest that as theology developed, the penitentials became less important to the
development of moral theology. In terms of the sources, academia has turned to for moral
foundations, he may be correct. It can be argued, however, that in terms of the applications of
pastoral-moral theology, the penitentials never lost their importance amongst churches and
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communities. The impact of the penitentials is more deeply rooted in Catholic social history and
lay communities than originally thought. The characterization of children in the penitentials
persists through the next two centuries in Catholicism.
When it comes to looking at specific instances regarding children in the penitentials,
Cummean may be one of the most interesting. Cummean highlights sins against children, as well
as sins against animals. For instance, when it comes to fornication, sinning with a beast calls for
penance for a year while sinning with a fifteen year old boy calls for forty days of penance.27 If a
layman should lay with a virgin, his penance would be a year while consuming only on bread
and water.28 Yet if a child dies without baptism, a man shall do penance for three years.29 The
focus on the child, which is not unusual for this period in time, is on the sanctity of the soul as
well as the importance of begetting children through marriage. What is lost, or perhaps what was
never there to begin with, is caring for a child’s whole being; body and soul. The strict focus on
baptism, as seen in earlier writings in chapter One and will become apparent in chapter Five, is
arguably still the case in twenty-first century society. Penance severity was indicative of which
sins against the community were of importance. An Old Irish Table of Commutations from the
8th century discusses penance for the abandonment of infants in a Church. The penance time
ranges from one and a half years up to seven and a half years based on whether or not a bishop or
priest is buried in the Church.30 The abandonment of a child is inconsequential in terms of
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penance, while the potential “desecration” of the burial site of a holy man is noted as important.
The same document also lists abortion as worthy of excommunication, while crimes against a
living child are of lesser offense.31 In addition, there is a section of the penitential that focuses
solely on the sins of boys listed up to twenty years of age. What is missing entirely from the
penitential is any mention of female children other than mentioning them as virgins. The
reference to virgins, in context, indicates that they are of puberty age, while infant, toddler, and
young female children who are pre-pubescent are rarely mentioned.32 In contrast, trespasses such
as those against the Holy Communion carry the heaviest of penances. This is, again, not all that
surprising of the time, but it does suggest that what was passed down socially may still be latent
in Catholic practice today.
Catechisms
Baltimore Catechism
Beyond the penitential canons, there are other sources of pastoral teaching that affect how
children are treated and accepted by the laity as promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church.
The faithful are the laity who were, and are, trying to stay within the moral laws of the Church
and in its good graces.33 In 1891, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops published the
Baltimore Catechism, the first of its kind based on the Council of Trent in the 16th century.34 The
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purpose of the text was originally to stand against the Protestant Reformation.35 Four versions of
this catechism exist, each one more detailed than the previous. The Baltimore Catechism was the
first English written copy of Church law and moral teaching for children’s and adult’s religious
education. It was the beginning of a new movement of children’s catechism, or CCD –
Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, in the modern American Catholic Church. On one hand, the
intent of this catechism was to aid teachers in addressing material deemed proper for Catholic
learners without having them read primary sources, which were thought to be too complicated.36
The Baltimore Catechism broke down this material and made it easier to digest. No explanations
of the material were needed, only information to be ingested and recited.37 The risk of presenting
material in this manner was that it also oversimplified, distilled, and made pervasive the
information being taught. It would become engrained in the children learning it well after the
advent of Vatican II. Paul Boudreau, in his short piece on the Baltimore Catechism, is still able
to recite answers from when he was a child.38 The question and answer format left little for
discussion and most to memorization. It did not teach or allow a person to think or contemplate
the questions posed.
Baltimore Catechism Q & A
The questions answered in the Baltimore Catechism concerning children, their age of

35

Paul Boudreau, “What is the Baltimore Catechism?” U.S. Catholic, May 2003, 26.

36

Thomas L. Kinkead, Baltimore Catechism no. 4 An Explanation of the Baltimore Catechism on
Christian Doctrine (New York: Archbishop of New York, 1891),10. Though adults are not the subject of
the work at hand, it is good to note that adults at times were also treated as children. They are unable to be
trusted, to understand concepts, and not to be trusted to their own decisions or reasoning.
37

Ibid.

38

Paul Boudreau, “What is the Baltimore Catechism?” U.S. Catholic, May 2003, 26.
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room for questioning by parents or even the children themselves. While the Baltimore
Catechisms Numbers One and Two say very little concerning who is baptized or what happens if
infants are not baptized, Numbers Three and Four include quite developed answers. Some of the
answers in Numbers Three and Four should require a deeper theological explanation, and yet
none is given. Infants, for instance, who have died and did not receive baptism, are said to “go to
some place similar to Limbo, where they will be free from suffering, though deprived of the
happiness of heaven.”39 For a parent who has lost a child before baptism this is of little comfort.
Aside from the emotional dismay imposed on such parents by this answer in the Baltimore
Catechism, it gives no further explanation as to why this is the case or where this teaching
originated. Due to the danger to the soul of the infant, it is recommended in question 642 not to
delay baptism of an infant.40 An argument can be made that because of the urgency placed upon
salvation for the infant’s soul the rights of the infant are given to the parents. This will be
discussed, in detail, in chapter Five. Parents are convinced that the care of their infant’s soul
takes precedence over their personhood because of the imminent danger presented to them. The
risk is that the infant becomes the obligation of the parent to be baptized, rather than a person
with rights of their own. The child has something done to them without being able to make the
most important religious decision, agreeing to baptism, freely and based on understanding the
impact. Parents are undeniably responsible for their infants’ lives until they are able to
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communicate sufficiently and become agents in the world who can and must make decisions on
their own.41 This does not mean that parents should not baptize their children as infants; rather,
my aim is to account for this important de facto stance. Roman Catholic parents must
acknowledge the inherent asymmetry in the relationship so that they are able to address that
asymmetry as their child develops. The child is dependent upon their adults for a good
foundational relationship. Children begin their lives in the Church as passive beings acted upon
by parents and religious leaders as baptism is necessary for salvation. Keeping in mind this
particular point, when the Baltimore Catechism discusses who can baptize in case of necessity, it
refers to someone who has reason. Children are said to be at the age of reason “…when he [sic]
knows the difference between good and bad or right and wrong. Persons acquire this knowledge
at about the age of seven years.”42 The age of the capacity to reason and its continuing problems
for the Roman Catholic Church will be addressed in a chapter Five. The importance of noting the
age of reason at this point in the research and at this time, in the history of the Church, is that a
child’s agency is assumed only after “about” the age of seven.43 While children were part of the
working class, in devastating conditions in many cases, they were not considered as beings
capable of reasoning by the Church during the time of the Baltimore Catechism. In terms of
discussing children, their needs, both developmental and spiritual, in the remainder of the
catechism, there is almost no information addressing children. One exception is the section on
41
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baptism in catechism Number Three – the only place to find a discussion about children.
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Baltimore Catechism Number Four is by far the most detailed of the set, with instructive
material for the catechist or religious education provider. The commentary throughout, which is
meant to assist in relaying the material, is a narration of prescriptions and proscriptions, beyond
the simple answers presented for each question asked in the manual. While the catechism
Number Three answers the questions in more detail than the first two, it does not have narration
alongside the answers. Question 154, for instance, in catechism Number. four indicates that
baptism is not only needed for salvation, and salvation needed for entry into heaven, but also it
continues to indicate that whoever does not baptize their child and allows them to die without
proper baptism is “heartless and cruel” to deprive an infant away from heavenly eternity with
their family.44
Think then, what a terrible crime it is to willfully allow anyone to die without Baptism,
or to deprive a little child before it can be baptized! Suppose all the members of a family
but one little infant have been baptized; when the Day of Judgment comes, while all the
other members of a family – father, mother, and the children –may go into Heaven, that
little one will have to remain out; that little brother or sister will be separated from its
family forever, and never, never see God or Heaven. How heartless and cruel, then,
must a person be who would deprive that little infant of happiness for all eternity – just
that its mother or someone else might have a little less trouble or suffering here upon
earth.45
When Vatican II concluded in 1965 it became apparent to the Church that the Baltimore
Catechism was no longer sufficient teaching for the laity of the Roman Catholic Church in the
United States.46 Vatican II was a watershed moment for the teachings of the Church. The
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question and answer format of the Baltimore Catechism was too outdated and too simplistic for
the heavy theological discussions of Vatican II. Many of these discussions were heard, for the
first time, by the lay people of the Church, who began to take a deeper interest in their faith.
The New Catechism
Published for the first time in 1992, The Catechism became “the first general catechism
for the entire church in more than 400 years.”47 In terms of anyone being inquisitive or searching
for poignant answers to questions concerning Catholic doctrine, this is the authority on those
subjects. The Catechism replaced the Baltimore Catechism of 1891. It is also the first catechism
of its type since the Roman Catechism was published in 1566 following the Council of Trent.48
As of today, The Catechism, remains the only catechism approved for use in parishes for
religious education. While this newly minted version had the stamp of approval from Pope John
Paul II as well as noted members of the hierarchy such as Bernard Cardinal Law, Archbishop of
Boston. It was also a point of contention amongst religious educators and progressive bishops
such as Bishop Kenneth E. Untener of Saginaw, Michigan.49 The Catechism veered from the
familiar question and answer style of the Baltimore Catechism. Instead, it progressed through
Scripture, sacraments, and Catholic social teachings while utilizing approved doctrine such as the
Church fathers and Scripture as authority. The text draws from “liturgical texts, patristic sources,
and the writings of saints and mystics.”50 Unlike his progressive counterparts, Michael J. Wrenn,
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in the Archdiocese of New York, fought the attempt to replace the Baltimore Catechism. Wrenn
wrote that the new editions of the catechism resulted in “‘deficiencies’ in religious education in
succeeding years - what he refers to as a ‘strange creedless, contentless e [sic], non-cognitive
kind of so-called catechesis…’51 In short, there was no consensus at the time as to how effective
the catechisms were on their intended students. The arguments for or against using particular
methods did not involve pedagogical study. The Catechism surged in sales in United States of
America after its release.52 A 1994 edition of the National Catholic Reporter had sales reaching
an estimated two million books.53 For some, it was a unique experience to read something other
than the Baltimore Catechism, for others, such as Rev. James J. Billinger of the Diocese of
Witchita, it meant a return to doctrine and “magisterial ‘substance,’ not fluff.”54 Some educators
and priests were excited to have this new catechism to share with their parishioners and students.
Others, however, assert as currently as 2011, that any catechism was meant for “namely bishops,
priests, and catechists.”55 These authorities would then use The Catechism to teach those
parishioners or students seeking education on Catholic teaching and doctrine. Avery Dulles, S.J.,
agreed that the catechism be used for “serene presentation of assured teaching, not to engage in
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statement, Dulles indicates that a layperson could pick up the text with an understanding of its
content. Regardless of this, his opinion of The Catechism is that it is best read by a cautious
reader. He writes that the new catechism requires guidance since it is not an exegetical work, nor
entirely philosophical in position.57 Dulles rallies to support the theologians who are experts in
these more specific fields as well as the job of the pedagogue.
The New Catechism as Educational
What does all of this information from The Catechism mean for the children of the
Catholic faith? In some ways it does not indicate much at all. On one hand, the material within
The Catechism is meant to allow for a greater depth than a question and answer series. This
should allow children to learn their faith dynamically. On the other hand, as Dulles suggests, the
reading of the New Catechism even for adults is not without its difficulties. Some suggest, laity
should not attempt to read it without someone considered an authority on Catholic doctrine to
guide them. Chapter Five will discuss how many parishes in the United States dioceses use a
pedagogy of religious education that lacks substance of theological material or pedagogical
methodology. Where in The Catechism, where is the material and doctrine about children and
children’s religious education? What does the material on children and children’s religious
education mean for the children being raised Catholic and in Catholic education systems?
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One of the most poignant points in The Catechism is not any specific writings or details
about children. It may seem unimportant to some, but looking at how The Catechism of the
Catholic Church is organized can reveal important information. If one were to go to The
Catechism of the Catholic Church to look up information on children, they would be met with
the following, “Children; Childrearing: see Parents.”58 There is no listing in the index of The
Catechism for anything regarding children, under children, childrearing, children’s education,
child, infants, or anything associated with that stage of life listed under its own entry. Everything
regarding children is listed somewhere else such as under “Parents,” “Baptism,” or other
sacraments. There is material and information on children, but it does not own its own category.
How indices and the material presentation of a book are organized tells a great deal about not
only the focal points of the book, but also the importance of those focal points by their listed
entries. In searching through the index under “Parents,” some of the points referring to children
are listed such as, “childrearing,” “children as a sign of God’s blessing,” “commandment to
honor parents,” “duties of parents,” and “God’s fatherhood and human fatherhood.”59 Under the
subject of “childrearing” there are sub-headings for children’s needs and education. Everything
presented is from the standpoint of parenting children, not the personhood of the child. It is
noticeable in the material that children, and the importance of their stages in life, never exist as a
subject that is not sublimated underneath the importance of the parent. In chapter Five this will
become even more apparent in the Code of Canon Law.
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The Catechism undoubtedly reveals itself to be a tool or guide used by the parent to
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understand their duties to their children as well as to understand how they should parent
faithfully. The Catechism does not discuss the growth of the child, the stages of growth of the
child, the reasoning ability of the child, nor the moral development of the child. In order to
understand religious formation for the child, we must understand how the child is formed as a
person. In looking at the passages on childrearing, the positive aspect of the information
provided does note that parents’ duty is to love, care, and respect their children as human beings
while promising to educate them in the faith.60 “Parents must regard their children as children of
God [sic] and respect them as human persons [sic].”61 Different than teachings that have been
mentioned previously in this research material, the call to parents is to see children as people, not
as animals or a lower-form of person. This is a definite point of dignity for the child. Having
parents understand that there is a necessity for respect, love, and affection, is also a step forward.
Parents have the first responsibility for the education of their children. They bear witness
to this responsibility first by creating a home [sic] where tenderness, forgiveness, respect,
fidelity, and disinterested service are the rule. The home is well suited for education in
the virutes [sic].62
In addition, the meager amount of material on childrearing, however, is about educating the child
in the contents and practices of the Catholic faith. It is understandable that The Catechism would
include religious formation of the child, but there is no indication as to how the child can and
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will learn the material, how their development of reason allows them to know the material, and
most importantly, how these children have an ever-present connection to God.
Challenges with Children
Turning to the section in The Catechism that discusses the duties of children, the focus of
the material is on filial piety; respect for the parents.63 “As long as a child lives at home with his
[sic] parents, the child should obey his parents in all that they ask of him.”64 Relationships with
parents, and grandparents, are of utmost importance and foremost in the duties of the child. The
Catechism does not include a discussion on the child and their role in the Church. The child is
called a “human person” and yet the responsibility of the child’s moral decisions, outside of
obedience to their parents, belong squarely on the shoulders of the adults in their lives.65
Children are done “for” and “to,” lending no indication that they possess authentic self-autonomy
or self-determination to make choices, let alone moral choices.
Baptism is also one of the highly discussed areas in childrearing amongst people of the
Catholic faith. The standard for a Catholic family, who are practicing their faith, in the Catholic
Church is to baptize the child in infancy.66 The Catechism states that after baptism, the child will
be considered to be in the “post-baptismal catechumenate” phase in which they are to use the
catechism as a guide of “grace in personal growth.”67 The purpose of The Catechism is to guide
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the child after their infant baptism, but it is not succeeding in that purpose. It is impossible to
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support the growth of the child if we are unable to first understand child development. The
Catechism does not include any resource material from child psychologists, child development
specialists, or other specialists knowledgeable in appropriate fields. According to the
Magisterium, The Catechism should be used by an authority in the teachings of the Church; this
is inaccessible to children. It is also problematic that the majority of child’s religious education
programs at parishes do not enroll children in religious education programs until they are in first
grade and beginning preparation for their First Holy Communion. Very few parishes begin
religious education for children before first grade. Those parishes that choose to prepare young
children, or in even fewer cases infants, face criticism for not following the approved diocesan
methods. More will be discussed on the specifics of children’s religious education in subsequent
chapters. Ideally, there should be an education program age-appropriate for the catechumenate
phase following infant baptism. Currently, there is no rule within the Catholic Catechesis
programs at parishes that makes it mandatory for them to hold religious education classes for
children before they enroll for First Holy Communion. The infants are not given an opportunity
to grow as individuals or to grow in their faith.
Finally, regarding baptism, The Catechism states that unbaptized infants will be prayed
for and given over to God’s mercy.68 There is no indication given that the unbaptized, no matter
how young, will be spared eternity outside of the light of God. The Catechism changes in
structure from the Baltimore Catechism in that it does not state that anyone can know for sure
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where unbaptized infant’s souls will go thereby eliminating the explanation of limbo. In closing
the section on unbaptized infants, which consists solely of No. 1261, The Catechism states that
this is exactly why parents should choose to baptize their children in infancy.
There is progression from the Baltimore Catechism to the The Catechism. The Catholic
Church certainly made strides in viewing children as valuable parts of the family who should be
respected, educated, and loved as human people. The research, methods, and understanding of
children and the ways to educate children have changed vastly over the past twenty-five years. In
chapters four and five, many researchers think of children as reasoning beings who are
uneducated in societal norms, but not ignorant, stupid, or animalistic.69 The good of the child,
and the importance of caring for children, is echoed in other documents of the Catholic Church
as well. Papal documents and statements from the United States Council of Catholic Bishops
both have material dealing with the importance of children. This material, however, is most
similar to The Catechism and in fact repetitive in nature.
Papal Documents and Declarations
Gravissimum educationis
Gravissimum educationis, the education declaration of Vatican II promulgated by Pope
Paul VI, was the first declaration on education in the Roman Catholic Church. Written in 1965, it
was a declaration on Christian education with a focus on the importance of receiving a Christian
education whether in a parochial, private Catholic, or secular school. In addition, evangelizing is
also a primary concern of Gravissimum educationis. It is a focus of the Catholic Church to
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concern itself with the spiritual development of its members. John Garvey relates Matthew 28:19
to Gravissimum educationis; “Go forth and make disciples of all nations.”70 The declaration was
written during Vatican II to refocus the Catholic Church’s education system, but it is important
to note that evangelization was also a prime goal.
The declaration issues twelve points that indicate the areas of importance regarding
education. The first point discusses the need for a “universal right to education.”71 It states,
Therefore children and young people must be helped, with the aid of the latest advances
in psychology and the arts and science of teaching, to develop harmoniously their
physical, moral and intellectual endowments so that they may gradually acquire a mature
sense of responsibility in striving endlessly to form their own lives properly and in
pursuing true freedom as they surmount the vicissitudes of life with courage and
constancy.72
I would like to question, however, if the Church has truly followed its own guidelines? On one
hand in 1965 there was a push for the use of science, including psychology, in understanding
children’s needs in their development. After examining The Catechism, as well as pedagogical
and catechesis documents presented in chapter Five, the answer to that question is no. The
pedagogical methodology applied in catechesis classes from 1965 to the present time, has in the
majority of cases not kept up with psychological developments of the child in line with the best
sciences available.
What of the other eleven points written in Gravissimum educationis? Their focus is on
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the importance of Christian faith in education, parents as primary teachers of their children, and
how religious education is done in both public and private sectors. Concerning this declaration
on education, the Church’s prime motivator is that children should take with them, no matter
where they are educated, the moral foundation provided for them by the Church’s teaching as
promulgated first and foremost by their parents.
John Garvey, President of The Catholic University of America, rightly poses the question
as to whether or not this declaration is still pertinent to today’s atmosphere. While recognizing
the inherent social change between 1965 and 2018, Garvey states that Catholic education schools
are only pertinent to Gravissimum educationis if the material they are teaching upholds “a sense
of man’s [sic] transcendence or wonder at creation.”73 In his vision, a true Catholic school, a true
Catholic education, permeates even the sciences with faith. Garvey’s perspective looks directly
at Catholic schools only, not Catholic education programs outside of Catholic schools. While
Catholic schools have their share of problems with infusing Catholic teaching into their diverse
course offerings, catechesis programs at the parish level struggle to maintain an effective
program that not only teaches children about their religion, but also helps them to live their faith.
Familiaris consortio
“Marriage and the family constitute one of the most precious human values…”74 On
November 22, 1981, Pope John Paul II released his exhortation, Familiaris consortio, concerning
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the growing challenges of families in the changing world. Throughout the exhortation, a heavy
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influence is placed on the traditional family unit, the importance of conjugal love as the basis for
marriage and family, and how parents are to protect their children and the family unit. Though
the majority of this exhortation focuses on the struggle and ideal for the family as a whole, there
are a few points that I want to discuss in further detail. These points will be further examples into
the Church’s progression of thought concerning the child. Again, John Paul II will turn to three
issues of children as a gift of marriage, the rights of children, and the rights and duties of parents
regarding education.75
Parental love is a sign of God’s love.76 The heading of section fourteen of Familiaris
consortio is “Children: The Precious Gift of Marriage.”77 John Paul II quotes Gaudium et spes by
writing, “According to the plan of God…marriage and conjugal love are ordained to the
procreation and education of children, in whom they find their crowning.”78 Children are first
and foremost recognized as gifts of love from God. John Paul II, author of Man and Woman He
Created Them: A Theology of the Body, is not unfamiliar with this line of thinking.79 The child
becomes a physical manifestation of conjugal bliss. The danger with this anthropological claim is
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that the good of the child is first associated with the conjugal act of their parents, not with their

73

own being. It is a precedent set for parents as followers of Roman Catholicism that has the
possibility of becoming the foundation of their parenting. As a result, the child’s personhood is
in a subordinate place to their parents. In fact, the quotation above is the only section within this
part of Familiaris consortio on the child as a gift that mentions the child. The remainder of
section fourteen focuses on the good and importance of conjugal love. This is not to say that the
Roman Catholic Church or John Paul II do not believe the child to have the dignity of a subject. I
do argue, however, that how we speak about the child, and how we refer to the child in their
relationships determines our understanding and treatment of them as subjects with dignity.
Following the section on the child as a gift, section twenty-six is about the rights of
children. John Paul II made great strides in having the humanity of children recognized
worldwide, including to the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York city on
October 2, 1979. In Familiaris consortio John Paul II recalls the spirit of his address first given
at this assembly by stating, “In the family, which is a community of persons, special attention
must be devoted to the children by developing a profound esteem for their personal dignity, and
a great respect and generous concern for their rights.”80 It becomes clear from reading this that
his intention is not to place children as an after-thought amongst the rest of humanity, but to hold
a special and protected place. Dignity, respect, and concern are quite possibly the most important
words regarding how we tend to children.
Finally, in section thirty-six of Familiaris consortio, John Paul II discusses the rights and
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duties of parents to be the first and primary educators of their children.81 Parents are to raise their
children with the morality provided by the Church’s teachings. Parents are asked to speak as
their infant’s representative at baptism as they are responsible for them until they come of age.
Parents are therefore agreeing that their child will gradually grow in the mystery of salvation.
They acknowledge that their infant will come to understand the gift of faith that they have
received in hopes that they may be a transformative member of the worldwide community.82
John Paul II then urges parents, if their children do not attend a parochial school, to enroll their
children in religious education so that they may continue with their moral development. But this
raises the question. At what point does the Church and the child’s parents allow the child to act
as an individual seeking to grow in their faith?
John Paul II presents a problematic exhortation. His anthropological view of the child as
first a gift of conjugal love does not match his insistence upon the dignity, respect, and concern
for the child as a human person. Their being, their personhood, as given by God is a good that
stands apart from any conjugal act. The child is good because of their existence. The child does
not become good due to a successful conjugal act.83 In grammatical terms children should always
be considered the subject, not the object. If they are considered first and foremost an object, their
objectification becomes all too easy to act upon. There are problems with parents being the
81
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primary educators, including moral educators, of their children.
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Two issues arise from this responsibility as primary educators. First, when parents are
having their child baptized Roman Catholic in infancy, they are making statements of faith on
behalf of their child. In the words of John Paul II, parents are making a commitment that they
will guide their children to be part of the mystery of salvation and under the guide of the Roman
Catholic Church to become members of a community. Children aren’t given a choice. This of
course, is a main argument against infant baptism. My goal, however, is not to suggest that the
Church would be better off throwing out infant baptism, but that it needs to take its task in
spiritual and moral development more seriously. Questioning when the child should begin their
religious education after baptism is a good start.
Conclusion
From baptism through their childhood, what are the elements of morality that children
learn in religious education and in Catholic schools? There is no worldwide curriculum
developed for Catholic schools to follow. In the United States of America, each state has its own
developed state standards that are set for every subject to have some sort of uniformity. Catholic
schools lack that uniformity. In addition, the newly named Executive Director of the Secretariat
of Catholic Education for the United States Council of Catholic Bishops holds very admirable
education degrees, but no degree in theology, pastoral studies, or religious studies. Mary Pat
Donoghue is well adapted and certainly skilled in handling the administration of schools, but I
believe what is lacking in Catholic education is not administrative, but a revamping of
curriculum and pedagogy all together.84
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What I will be discussing in the following chapters is the need for restructuring catechesis
programs at parishes based on a deeper understanding of the child. The expected outcome for
Roman Catholic children is to understand their moral responsibility to their worldwide
community and participating in a relationship with God. These goals are not met by our current
education systems. Likewise, there is no consistent teaching method or catechesis program
amongst parishes across the United States of America. Each diocese is responsible for their own
parishes and for the curriculum taught. These weak programs do not allow children to grow as
moral individuals, to fall in love with God, or to understand adequately their faith. There are
programs in some dioceses that could serve as models for weaker programs, as will be discussed
in chapter Five, but they are often met with general opposition. This chapter outlined a survey of
moral-pastoral documents presented by the Church with regard to caring for, educating, and
rearing children. The documents, however, lack pedagogical substance, as well as a child-centric
lens for understanding children.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENLIGHTENMENT PEDAGOGY AND PERSONHOOD
Pedagogy for teaching young students becomes an important focus for many thinkers,
writers, and educators at the beginning of the seventeenth century in Western Europe, namely
France and Great Britain alike. Locke, Rousseau, Macaulay, and Wollstonecraft were among the
major figures developing pedagogical methods for educating and raising children.1 During the
Enlightenment, philosophers like Descartes begin to view children with fresh eyes. Writers
developed a new and particular stance on the education of the child. Each raised distinctive
questions about the nature and moral agency of the child. They discussed at length how children
should be educated academically, as well as socially. The main focus in chapter Three describes
the change in interest that occurs during this period. The nature of the child is at the heart of the
discussion. How do the views of Rousseau and his contemporaries change pedagogical methods?
What could the Roman Catholic Church have adopted into their own methods during this time
and in the following centuries?
The views of these seventeenth and eighteenth century writers differed greatly from the
views of the then teachings of the Roman Catholic Church on children. Rousseau remains an
important figure in discussions on pedagogy and the child. There is some commonality between
these thinkers in their views that transcend any previous methodology of working with the child.
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Locke theorizes that through pedagogy the child can become a reasonable being making
moral choices for the good of society. Locke has help on his views on education from a family
friend, Mary Clarke. Rousseau places emphasis on the child as a pure and good being, but lacks
attention to female children as having equal autonomy. Unlike his contemporaries, Rousseau
would like to keep the child out of society and its tendency toward worldly depravations. Finally,
Wollstonecraft critiques both Rousseau and Locke for their lack of insight into educating female
children as well as male children. She points out dangerous repercussions of not including all
children in their understandings of child development and education. Catharine Macaulay writes
on the good of friendship in learning, the importance of community, and the basis of all moral
learning; seeking the revealed truth of God.
Locke
British Western Enlightenment Pedagogy
John Locke wants his pupils to learn how to make moral decisions in the context of their
society. Locke’s main treatise on education, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, written in
1693 reflects society’s need for well-educated people. One of Locke’s main themes is that
parents need to be concerned with their children being “imprintable” as well as “contaminable.”2
Simply put, if one teaches children as early as possible the moral good of society, they will
become productive members of society.
We are generally wise enough to begin with them when they are very young, and
discipline betimes [sic] those other creatures we would make useful and good for
somewhat. They are only our own offspring, that we neglect in this point; and having
made them ill children, we foolishly expect they should be good men.3
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He believes that if one allows children to be spoiled and fallen to vice, they will be a burden to
society. “For Locke, not learning virtue and the rational control of the passions and desires were
the main goals of education.”4 Locke is mostly concerned with a well-functioning society in
order to produce the greatest good. He wants his pupils able to make decisions freely; to choose
the good without persuasion. Children need training to become good adults who serve society.5
Though Locke does not directly draw upon religious themes, he does come from a
Puritan background and this colors his thinking. Locke lived through a very tumultuous era. He
moved to the Netherlands when his employer was accused of treason. After returning, he
continued to witness fighting between the Catholic, Protestant, and Parliamentary factions.
Locke during this time is best known for his political thought. Locke’s treatise on education,
however, is important to parents interested in raising their sons properly during this period. I am
only concerned with his ideas on children, specifically, the child’s mind and personhood, the
child’s body, habits, and inclinations, and pedagogy in education. Perhaps, however, we gain the
deepest knowledge from looking at Locke’s personal life and correspondence with his friends.
One family, the Clarkes, were particularly important to John Locke. Their correspondence shines
an important spotlight helping us understand Locke’s views on education.
The Mind of the Child
Tabula rasa, the blank slate, best describes Locke’s theory on the child’s mind. Locke
believes that children come into the world as unmarred, unreasoning, and untrained in
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controlling their inclinations. In his work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke
6

describes in detail the workings of the human mind and his understanding of personal identity.7
While philosophically important in understanding the adult male mind, Locke simplifies his
writings on children’s minds. “For Locke, educating children, then, entails instructing their
minds and molding their natural tendencies.”8 The mind, through reason and morality, should
come to control irrational desires, vices, and tendencies. Children, however, are not born with the
capacity of reason. According to Locke, they are certainly unable to reason morally. The child
only learns moral reasoning through having an educated mind. Similarly to Rousseau, the child’s
initial inclinations after birth are their primary means of interaction and understanding. Locke
considers a tendency or inclination something that is innate to the infant. Children have
preferences and personality from birth.9
John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, defends the fundamental
belief that humans are born without innate ideas, and thus must derive their knowledge
entirely from ‘external, sensible Objects … perceived and reflected on by ourselves.’10
Rousseau and Locke disagree over the notion that inclinations are good or bad. While
Rousseau offers that a child’s sensory driven nature are their best tools for education and growth,
Locke understands inclinations as something that can, and will, drive a child to an immoral path
as an adult.11 Initially, Rousseau and Locke would agree that rationality and reason are learned
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and not natural to the child. Rousseau, unlike Locke, believes that reason begins early and is
inherent in the child’s experiences. Locke believes children in the infant or toddler stage are
devoid of reason and driven entirely by sense and inclinations.
The younger they are, the less I think are their unruly and disorderly appetites to be
comply’d with; and the less reason they have of their own, the more are they to be under
the absolute power and restraing of those in whose hands they are.12
Anything outside the realm of reason should not be trusted. Unlike Rousseau, Locke does not
believe that a child given tools and left to their own devices would grow into an adult who is able
to reason morally.
What is the chief function of the mind for Locke’s children? The mind is the person’s tool
to control habit, inclination, desires, and vice through reason.
As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardships, so also does
that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is plac’d
in this: that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and
purely follow what reason directs as best, tho’ the appetite lean the other way.13
According to Locke, children are born without virtue just as they are born without reason. Since
children are tabula rasa, the role of the parents is essential in forming proper habits, virtue, and
reason in children from their birth. Children’s minds begin to grasp types of rationality as they
grow, experience, and especially watch the adults around them. Locke surmises that by watching
examples of rationality, children come to understand reason in action.14 This is a major point of
contention between Rousseau and Locke. While Locke insists children looking to adults to form
their habits and reason, Rousseau urges parents to leave the child in Nature, with only their tutor,
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as to develop their reason without interference of society. As Locke puts it,
I imagine everyone will judge it reasonable, that their children, when little, should look
upon their parents as their lords, their absolute governors, and as such stand in awe of
them; and that when they come to years, they should look on them as their best, as their
only sure friends, and as such love and reverence them.16
Such is the parent-child relationship for Locke.
The Body, Habits, Inclinations, and Vice
As important as the mind of the child is for Locke, some of his first thoughts about the
child concern the body. Locke, a physician by trade, takes notice of how the child’s body moves
and adapts. The body is able to work with and overcome physical hardship.17 As Locke states,
“Our bodies will endure any thing, that from the beginning they are accustom’d to.”18 The body,
accordingly, should be conditioned as early as possible.19 The child’s teacher therefore needs to
be concerned with the inclinations, habits, and vices that Locke believes are expressed in the
child.
He therefore that is about children should well study their natures and aptitudes, and see
by often trials what turn they easily take, and what becomes them; observe what their
native stock is, how it may be improv’d, and what it is fit for: he should consider what
they want, wether they be capable of having it wrought into them by industry, and
incorporated there by practice; and whether it be worth while to endeavor it. For in many
cases, all that we can do, or should aim at, is, to make the best of what nature has given,
to prevent the vices and faults to which such a constitution is most inclin’d, and give it all
the advantages it is capable of.20
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Similarly to Aquinas, Locke understands habit and vice as the root of unraveling morality
and reason. Children are naturally inclined to such vices. Their inclinations need to be meted out
quickly beginning after birth. Locke also warns against coddling or over-affection given to the
child.
[C]hildren should be us’d to submit their desires, and go without their longings, even
from their very cradles. The first thing they should learn to know, should be, that they
were not to hae anything because it pleas’d them, but because it was thought fit for them.
It things suitable to their wants were supply’d to them, so that they were never suffer’d to
have what they once cry’d for, they would learn to be content without it, would never,
with bawling and peevishness, contend for mastery, nor be hald so uneasy to themselves
and others as they are, because from the first beginning they are not thus handled.21
Parents who do not control their children properly will have children who are obnoxious and
hated by society.22 Locke writes that children will only be able to practice this control of their
inclinations at young ages. It is not until they are adults that they will have the ability to reason
well and accurately. The stakes are higher as an adult for giving into vices and inclinations that
are prescribed by society. A young man runs the risk of not being accepted in social circles and
therefore not having the opportunity for a full and successful life. “He that has not a mastery over
his inclinations, he that knows not how to resist the importunity of present pleasure or pain, for
the sake of what reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue and industry,
and is in danger never to be good for anything.”23
According to Locke, the progression of reason and morality takes from birth until a
young man is ready to enter society. It seems like a clear and straightforward lesson.
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Pedagogy
Pedagogy, according to Locke, is meant for moral and reasonable perfection of the
person.24 Pedagogy is not meant to impart particular knowledge or subjects, such as a necessity
to learn math or English. Locke believes that with proper training in habit and control of the self,
the child can master subjects naturally as they progressed into adulthood. There is a need to
ensure their rational mind, their will, and their morals were in place before any other elements.
This is the only way that they will be dedicated members of society. If they are educated
properly, they will be able to resist the sins that may be present within. “The great thing to be
minded in education is, what habits you settle; and therefore in this, as all other things, do not
begin to make any thing customary, the practice whereof you would not have continue and
increase.”25 Locke counters the tabula rasa of the child’s mind with a strict guidance in habit and
morality.
Since Locke is not interested in teaching subjects, but rather habits, custom, and morality,
the choice of the educator was of utmost importance. Locke describes parents as the ideal
educators of their child up through young adulthood. Parents are responsible for the earliest
corrections and limitations given to their children. As we read earlier, Locke recommends
curbing vice and bad inclinations from birth.26 This means that the parents must be the primary
educators, not nannies, nursemaids, or a school system external to the home. Locke’s argument is
that the child has not yet entered society and will receive better care and understanding in their
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household. This forms an interesting distinction between parental power and institutional power.
The parents are the sovereign rulers over their household. For Locke this means that not even the
government has a right to get involved in what the parents deem necessary for raising and
educating their children.27 Wollstonecraft, Rousseau, Macaulay, and Clarke all writing around or
during the eighteenth century, treat the home as the preferred site for educational instruction.28
Parents should only give up educational rights to an institution, such as the government, in grave
matters such as a national security interest.29 What does this mean for school systems? Under
Lockean pedagogy, school systems are appropriate for young adults who have already developed
a sense of rationale and morality. After they have developed appropriate habits and customs, they
can then move on to learn specific subjects.
Parents are also able to take their children’s individual personalities into account better
than an institution.30 In order for an institution to teach a large number of students, it has to
create concrete rules of morality that are good for the whole and not necessarily the individual.
Locke sees that if children stay at home with their parents, their lessons can be created to suit
each child individually. Though Locke sees a necessity for parents to be stern with their children
from birth, he also recognizes that children have personalities and free spirits.
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On the other side, if the mind be curb’d and humbled too much in children if their spirits be
abas’d and broken much, by too strict an hand over them, they lose all their vigour and
industry, and are in a worse state than the former. For extravagant young fellows, that have
liveliness and spirit, come sometimes to be set right, and so make able and great men; but
dejected minds, timorous and tame, and low spirits, are hardly ever to be rais’d, and very
seldom attain to any thing. To avoid the danger that is on either hand, is the great art; and he
that has found a way how to keep up a child’s spirit easy, active, and free, and yet at the same
time to restrain him from many things he has a mind to, and to draw him to things that are
uneasy to him; he, I say, that knows how to reconcile these seeming contradictions, has, in
my opinion, got the true secret of education.31
Parents should be careful to reprimand in private and praise publicly.32 It is up to the parent to
decide when anger is a necessary punishment for a child’s misbehaviors.33 A parent withholding
resolution might teach the child that they chose unwisely. Corporal punishment is rarely
necessary or wise according to Locke. He does not write off corporal punishment entirely,
especially in difficult cases. “Beating them, and all other sorts of slavish and corporal
punishments, are not the discipline fit to be used in the education of those we would have wise,
good, and ingenious men; and therefore very rarely to be apply’d, and that only in great
occasions, and cases of extremity.”34 These include episodes of defiance, extreme stubbornness,
or giving in to vice on the part of the child. The use of corporal punishment may, however, have
consequences and be a detriment to the child’s development. The child must have proper
motivation to act in a particular way. Stimulations, such as pain and pleasure, are the only
motivators for good behavior.35 Locke, as we have seen, is entirely against coddling and spoiling
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children. He has this in common with Rousseau. Without proper training, children will desire
only things that they instinctually perceive as good, rather than what a higher reasoning might
dictate as good. When we refer to Lockean pedagogy, should we actually continue to use the
word “training” rather than “educating?”
John Locke and Mary Clarke: The Letters
Locke’s treatise on education is not the perfect document to describe the personhood of
the child or how they should be educated. While it remains an important document to the study
of education, it also received much critique since its inception from academics, politicians, and
societal leaders. One voice, a female voice, is perhaps the most important critique of Locke’s
work.
The Clarke family are good friends to John Locke.36 Mary Clarke, the matron of the
Clarke family, was the party responsible in the household for the education of their children.
Mary was not only responsible for a brood of children, but also for the running of the estate as
her husband worked away from their home the majority of the time.37 While the letters between
the group of friends begin between John Locke and Edward Clarke of Chipley, it is Mary who
soon interjects and proceeds to engage the conversation. She is concerned with the education of
her children, particularly her eldest son and her two eldest daughters.38 While Locke, in the end,
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is impressed by the intellect and personality of Clarke’s daughter, Betty, he has many concerns
about their eldest child, Ward.39 Throughout their years of friendship, Locke continuously
changes his pedagogical approaches due to the experiences of the Clarke family.40 Mary writes
about methods that work and methods that do not work for the children.41 At the same time,
Mary’s chief critique of Locke is that he does not initially take the circumstances of the family
into account while writing his pedagogy.42 How do children differ from one another? How does a
family with nine children educate all of them under the same guidance?
Friends of Locke urge him to publish the letters between himself and Edward Clarke as a
guide to educating sons, in this case, Ward.43 Yet, it is Mary’s experiences with her daughters,
Betty in particular, which provide much of the information for Locke’s pedagogy. There is no
mention of educating girls in Locke’s treatise. Mary’s female influence is also omitted entirely.44
Locke believes that he cannot write about girls and women being that he is a man.45 It is simply
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not socially acceptable during this period. In the end, Betty becomes a rather successful woman.
She keeps in contact with John Locke, as friends, despite her parents’ rejection of his
friendship.46 Mary Clarke wondered if using Locke’s methods were the right choice concerning
Ward.47 This ultimately drives a wedge in the friendship between the Clarkes and John Locke.
Was Locke’s methodology too strict for a child like Ward? Did Locke’s pedagogy weigh the
individuality of each child adequately? What Locke’s pedagogical method lacks, particularly in
the case of a child like Ward, is attention to a child who has different needs. Locke’s pedagogy
falls short of attending to children who may not fit what society deems is the norm. Mary Clarke,
and other women writing at this time, are more concerned with understanding how to attend to
differences in children’s personalities, needs, and desires. Sadly in the end, Ward commits
suicide by drowning himself.48
Some Thoughts Concerning Education is a watershed moment in the seventeenth century
for a new approach to pedagogy. Locke’s public and private thoughts on education are not,
however, identical. Publicly, he provides the gentlemen around him in society with a manual of
how to raise young boys into productive young men. This, however, is not the entire truth of
Lockean pedagogy. There are undercurrents of context below the many editions of Some
Thoughts Concerning Education. Put within the context of a real family, Locke’s pedagogy
sometimes works and sometimes does not. His pedagogy works differently for different children.
It cannot be prescribed as a “one size fits all” based learning. What becomes of Mary Clarke’s
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questions, concerns, and critiques? They never make it fully into Locke’s work.
While Locke adapts his manuscript by taking into consideration his experiences with
families and children, he does not to our knowledge believe Mary to be a competent editor of his
work. Mary, who runs an estate, educates her children, and reads the latest pedagogical
approaches so she can assist her children, remains voiceless. What is interesting is that Locke, at
least in private, takes her experiences into consideration. Ultimately Locke’s pedagogy does not
discriminate between how to raise male or female children. Whether male or female, it also does
not take account of a child’s personality or inner struggles.
In the case of Ward Clarke, it is not a lack of intelligence or reason that keeps him from
entering society as his parents wish, it is a seemingly complicated mental illness that begins
around the time of puberty. His illness is undiagnosed properly due to lack of medical
understanding. Ward is diagnosed by physicians as having melancholy.49 Edward Clarke writes
to Locke asking him for advice. Locke’s reply is that when he attends to Ward, he does not note
any issues that would be the cause of melancholy.50 Betty Clarke, on the other hand, is able to
follow Locke’s pedagogy having no outstanding impediments. She is an unremarkable case.
Since Betty fits the standard, unlike her brother, learning the habits and self-control that
dominates Locke’s pedagogy is a fairly easy task. Since the pedagogical basis for Locke’s
pedagogy is based on the learning of habit, Ward is unable to conform to the resolute system that
Locke proposes. In the end, Edward and Mary Clarke fault Locke for being unable to take an
individual child’s context and full personality into consideration in his pedagogical
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understanding. They also fault him directly in the case of Ward, for insisting that he continue on
the normal course of education.51 The child’s goal of success as an adult drives Locke’s
pedagogical practices, not the needs of the child.
There are scholars who disagree with the extent to which Locke’s use of habit as
conformity has been used as the mainline of his pedagogy. Koganzon notes that Locke’s use of
habit is to counter conformity and vice, not to create automatons within society. She theorizes
that Locke “requires a will strong enough to resist the importunities of both nature and society.”52
Given Locke’s entire body of work, not only Some Thoughts Concerning Education, it is
probable that Locke did not want indoctrination as his means of educating children on morality
and reason. When Some Thoughts Concerning Education was released in 1693, it is Locke’s
most widely read document. Parents are more concerned with his pedagogy than his other
treatise.53 Much of what Locke believes does not make it into his pedagogical writings. Mary
Clarke’s concern is warranted as Some Thoughts Concerning Education reads as an educational
manual and not an aid in shaping a child’s mind. Locke is so strongly opinionated in what
parents should and should-not do, that the child is left as a malleable mass-in-waiting. Koganzon
speculates that what Locke really wants was for young boys to grow into adults who would not
be so easily swayed by the world around them, nor their own vices.54 That upon these young
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boys becoming men, they will be able to turn to reason and inquiry.
Rousseau
Émile
The Romantic Child
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a philosopher, writer, thinker, and revolutionary of the
eighteenth century. Born in Geneva in 1712, he was raised by his father after his mother’s death
during childbirth.55 Eventually, after his father flees Geneva, Rousseau finds himself indebted to
individuals such as Baroness de Warens and Denis Diderot.56 It is with the help from such
individuals that Rousseau is able to develop into a most creative thinker. Rousseau is arguably
one of the most important philosophers of the modern period. It is during this time in France that
Rousseau penned his great work on education, Émile.
Émile becomes a success not only amongst those seeking a renewed interest in
pedagogical methods, but those interested in Rousseau’s underlying political revolutionary
message. In fact, there are some scholars who believe that Rousseau’s purpose in writing Émile
is not one of pedagogy at all, but only a philosophically disguised political message. Rousseau
only uses his pupil Émile as a means to disseminate a strong political agenda.57 Émile is not the
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driving force behind the work Émile at all. While reading the work, the reader is drawn to the
narrator, Rousseau, and his voice as the tutor.58 Rousseau uses the character Émile as a foil to his
own voice of moral teaching.
Rousseau's discussion of examples as instruments of moral education follows
immediately on a passage which deals with lies. This passage appears at a crucial
moment in Book II, when Rousseau seeks to distinguish the moral world of adults from
the (still) amoral world of the child.59
While Coleman is not going so far as to say that the motivation of Émile is to stage an uprising
against societal norms of the eighteenth century, he does say that it is a work of morality and not
necessarily of pedagogy.
Indeed for the purpose of this research topic on children, childhood, and pedagogical
methods, Émile is investigated as a book on the growth of the child, moral teaching, and
education. To begin, similarly to Clement, Augustine, and Aquinas, Rousseau seeks to explain
the development and growth of the child. He seeks to answer questions such as how to educate
the child properly. He wants to allow those reading Émile to understand the importance of being
a child. He begins his treatise by stating,
People pity the lot of the child; they do not see that the human race would have perished
if man had not begun by being a child. We are born weak; we have need of strength: we
are born destitute of everything; we have need of assistance: we are born stupid; we have
need of judgment. All that we have not at our birth is given to us by education.”60
To think that Rousseau believes that infants are born “stupid” may be a misnomer. In terms of the
word as Rousseau uses it, it holds a connotation that distinguishes a lack of formal societal
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knowledge, not an inferior being. Infants are unskilled in the ways of society or cultural thinking.
Rousseau continues to explain that children are
… born sensible, and from our birth we are affected in different ways by the objects
which surround us. As soon as we have the consciousness, so to speak, of our sensations,
we are disposed to seek or to shun the objects, which produce them…61
Children are malleable both physically and mentally. As such, they are more adaptive to
situations, climates, and elements, which as an adult would have a greater hardship enduring.62
Due to their adaptive nature, children should not, according to Rousseau, be treated as little
adults. Children have their own stages of development and several phases within those stages.
“Rousseau’s insistence that childhood is a separate stage in the human development would have
profound ramifications in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture and society in
France.”63 Prior to the eighteenth century, stages of development for children are neither
important nor noted. Even historical accounts of the child are few and far between; the growth of
the child was not of particular interest.64 It is rare to find philosophers discussing the child in a
positive way. Rousseau not only takes a step in discussing the child, but also to describe the child
as born good.65 This harkens back to Thomistic ontological discussions in which Aquinas states
that the human is born good and oriented towards the good.66 The picture of the good infant
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contrasts starkly to earlier concepts of the child, which present the child as animal-like,
grotesque, creatures lacking in all intelligence and sense.67 Many of these conclusions are drawn
from medical journals, orthopedic literature and based on the postlapsarian Christian idea of a
child born in sin.68 Even Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that, though good, children are simply
waiting to become.
The Child as a Person
For Rousseau, the child is good. The child is pure. Once an infant begins to walk, learn,
and talk, they begin to have preferences. These preferences are dictated by what the child finds
pleasing by means of their senses. Rousseau states that the progression of knowing is finding
likes and dislikes, learning if an object is good or needed, and finally understanding how objects
relate to happiness through the use of reason.69 This is a natural progression that takes place in
children. Infants and toddlers who are coddled excessively are destined to become inept adults.70
Rousseau writes that being left to Nature allows the child the freedom of true growth.71
Observe Nature, and follow the route which she traces for you. She is ever exciting
children to activity; she hardens the constitution by trials of every sort; she teaches them
at an early hour what suffering and pain are.72
Rousseau is not suggesting that an infant should be dropped outside and left to the wolves. He is
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insisting, however, that a balance be struck between doing for the child and allowing the child to
know the struggle of doing for her or himself. Rousseau suggests that even infants in their state
of needing care are constantly developing and learning without any indication to their caretakers.
The goodness of Nature matches the goodness of the child. Rather than being taught the
corruption of society, Rousseau holds that leaving the child to the goodness of Nature is the
better option.73 Good children become corrupted children through society, the city, and the whim
of the adults around them.74 “I repeat it, the education of man [sic] begins at his birth. Before he
can speak, before he can understand, he is already instructing himself. Experience precedes
lessons; the moment he knows his nurse he has already acquired much knowledge.”75
Children learn from birth. A person’s knowledge is gained cumulatively throughout their
lives, by the time they are young adults, they do not remember at what time they had learned all
of their prior knowledge.76 For the time of infancy and, what we now call the toddler phase, the
life of the child focuses on walking, talking, and eating.77 These milestones are the focus for the
child’s first few years of life. Rousseau notes the difference between the words “infans” and
“puer” are greater than some may think.78 By the time the child reaches the ages between five
and seven, they have moved out of infanthood, “infans,” and into childhood, “puer.” For
73

Dorothy Johnson, "Picturing Pedagogy: Education and the Child in the Paintings of Chardin,"
Eighteenth-Century Studies 24, no. 1 (1990): 48.
74

Ranjana Saha, "Children in the Mind: Paginated Childhoods and Pedagogics of Play," Economic and
Political Weekly 46, no. 48 (2011): 54.
75

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile: Or a Treatise on Education (Buffalo: Prometheus, 2003), 25.

76

Ibid, 26.

77

Ibid, 40.

78

Ibid, 41.

96
Rousseau this is indicative of moving from this stage of taking in sensory information and
beginning to make judgment on that information through reason.79 Rousseau, however, does not
believe children have reason enough to make moral decisions until the age of twelve. “Memory
diffuses the feeling of identity over all the moments of his existence.”80 The child has the ability
now to remember moments in life, including choices, reactions, and causation. Rousseau,
however, does not use the term “age of reason” for this grouping of children. Rather, they have
the ability of self-control, exercised through an increase in knowledge and thought. Rousseau
staunchly argues that children are not lacking in reason. Even infants have a sensory reasoning.81
On the contrary, I see that they reason very well on whatever they know, and on whatever
is related to their present and obvious interests. But it is with respect to their knowledge
that we are deceived. We give them credit for knowledge which they do not have, and
make them reason on matters which they cannot comprehend.82
The child can make moral decisions only concerning what the child has capability of knowing.
Rousseau warns against pushing too much information onto the child; it is acting in haste. The
child needs knowledge and information of situations that are applicable to them. If the child has
to learn extraneous information, then they become responsible for making decisions that are
inapplicable to their context. When a child makes decisions based on the convictions of an adult
or based on social situations beyond their understanding, their decisions are empty and lacking
any moral foundation.83 This is not to say that when children act they act immorally due to a lack
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of reasonable understanding. It only means that children requested to act in a context beyond
their stage of life are unable to make decisions that reflect a moral understanding of the situation.
Similarly, it can be argued that when a child does make a decision beyond her or his own
conventional stage, and the decision is a mistake, that child is not morally responsible for the
mistake made.84 Depending on the age of the child, the only time that exists is the here and now.
The child does not have a grasp on dimensions of time. Any action, relationships, or social
context only exists in present time.85 For example, a parent may say to a three-year-old child,
“You need to behave!” In the next moment the child responds, “I did it!” The concept of the
child as a self that has to perform an action over an extended period in time is absent.
Rousseau is cognizant that time for a child differs from that of an adult. He also
understands that as the child grows older, the concept of time changes with the child as well.
Once the child, a young adult, is able to understand their own being as a being that is fluid in
time, they are then responsible for moral decision making.
Pedagogy of the Child
Rousseau is greatly concerned not only with whom the child becomes as they grow into
adulthood, but also the pedagogy by which the child is taught. Scholars, such as Harari, argue
that Rousseau the philosopher inserts his own voice as Rousseau the pedagogue; they are
correct.86 Rousseau is wholeheartedly committed to describing how the teacher should inform,
engage with, and teach the student. In his case, the first teachers of the student are the parents.
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His dislike of nurses and nannies stems from, in his view, an inadequate care of allowing the
child to discover knowledge. In his esteem, nurses and nannies over-do for the child.87 Rousseau
presents four main maxims that the instructor should abide by when teaching the child.88 The
first is to allow the child to use their strengths, as they would be found in Nature. This maxim is
designed to allow the child self-discovery and the ability to learn freely. Second, it is any
instructor’s duty to offer the child the tools that they need, including lending intelligence or
strength to the situation. The third maxim, however, is aimed at keeping the second maxim in
check. The third maxim would have the instructor not give the child anything other than what is
necessary. Rousseau believes that there was a fine balance between giving the child what they
need and being indulgent. Coddling is reproachable, but so is abandoning.89 Finally, the last
maxim is to know the child well enough to understand their opinion and personality. When an
instructor, be it a teacher or parent, gets to know their child, they are better accustomed to
knowing what they need versus being indulgent in non-essentials.
Balance is certainly a necessary word when discussing how Rousseau thinks of educating
and raising children. Rousseau’s goal is to focus on the child and do what is right; indulgence
and apathy are chief concerns. Rousseau is also against over-teaching the child. His belief is that
over-teaching leads to the adult indoctrinating the child rather than allowing them selfdiscovery.90 Since Rousseau believes that the child is born essentially good, the child grows in
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goodness when allowed self-discovery. Rousseau suggests that learning is life-long, beginning at
birth. Though a newborn does not have the same capability as a child, they are nevertheless a
learning being. Johnson argues that Rousseau’s Émile purposefully focused on disseminating
popular ideas that the child was born imbecilic or unnaturally slow to mental growth.91 I agree
with Johnson. Rousseau shifts the anthropology of the child in a positive way. The child is an
individual. Rousseau, unintentionally, hearkens back to Clement of Alexandria’s appreciation of
the child as a being with autonomy.92
Rousseau’s agenda in Émile is a part of a renewal of pedagogy and understanding of the
child. He, alongside his contemporaries, makes claims that turn away from the thoughts that the
child is a globular mass or more akin to an animal. It is important not to dismiss this turn.
Educational systems and parenting ideologies right through the twenty-first century are built
upon the theories of Rousseau. In chapter Four I discuss examples of this in Montessori and
Cavalletti. As for Rousseau’s maxims, each of them are essential to the whole pedagogy. The
first maxim is the foundation to the rest. Rousseau believes that it is necessary to strip away the
structures and norms created by society so that the child can find a place of pure learning.
In Nature, the child is able to find their inner strength without interruptions. Rousseau
acknowledges Nature can guide them in learning the basic principles of the world. Nature’s
classroom transcends the traditional classroom. Educational activities are found to be authentic
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when a student is able to use interior knowledge to engage in real-world meaningful tasks. For
93

Rousseau, this is why traditional assessments in the classroom, such as written tests, fail.
Traditional assessments only indicate if the students are able to find the correct answer, not if
they possess knowledge that can be used in authentic situations.94
Observe Nature, and follow the route which she traces for you. She is ever exciting
children to activity; she hardens the constitution by trials of every sort; she teaches them
at an early hour what suffering and pain are.95
Rousseau makes it clear time and again that children are naturally more adaptive to natural
changes in situations, climates, and elements. They are malleable both physically and mentally.
Rousseau likens cities to graveyards.96 He stresses that in this impressionable state, children must
stay away from society. Ultimately, children require the freedom and free movement of being let
loose in Nature. “Our pedantic mania for instruction is always leading us to teach children things
which they would learn much better of their own accord, and to forget what we alone are able to
teach them.”97
What is the instructor’s task during this time? If the child’s parents are their first
instructors and Nature their second, why should the child require a formal instructor at all? In
Rousseau’s second maxim, he suggests that the instructor’s task is to acquire any external tools
the child might need in their education. The instructor sets the stage for the student so that they
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may live their own experiences. Wollstonecraft and Macaulay are both critical of Rousseau for
this decision. When Rousseau suggests leaving the child to Nature, he actually means a crafted
pedagogy that directs the child in Nature. The child believes that they have ultimate freedom,
which aids them in personal growth. A successful instructor, however, will not get in the way of
this growth. They will merely aid the student in engaging in authentic activity. The instructor has
control of the environment in which the student learns. Does Rousseau provide enough of an
authentic experience with his pedagogy?98 Is freedom for the child, that is ultimately planned by
the instructor, allow to find authenticity? If so, the instructor has done their job in lending the
student the proper tools for experiences in education. The instructor needs to use the student’s
attention as a tool for crafting their mind to these authentic situations.99 Rousseau writes of the
child’s restlessness as a student. A good instructor will take this restlessness and turn the
student’s attention to engaging situations. Attention becomes a tool of the instructor. It aids them
in molding the student’s mind to a particular course of education.
Attention can also be a difficult tool for the instructor to use. If the student’s attention is
diverted, it becomes a liability. Rousseau’s third maxim is that the instructor should not give
anything to the student other than what is necessary. Frivolous fancies are a distraction to
authentic experiences in education. Rousseau agrees here with John Locke, whose own treatise
on education precedes Rousseau’s. Rousseau stands staunchly against the indoctrination of the
student. Indoctrination, or over-educating, the student only leads to puppetry of ideas, not
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authentic learning.
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Again there is emphasis that the student’s attention is turned toward what is

necessary, not what is frivolous.101 The instructor must leave behind lessons where the student is
having information engrained entirely. Education as an experience allows the student to master
their skills and tools before acquisition of knowledge.102 A student has an authentic educational
experience when they are able to make inquiries regarding the standards and mastery levels of
their disciplines.103 The student is successful when they can reflect upon the principles guiding
their own experiences. This acquisition can only happen if the instructor does not insist on
engraining information rather than providing tools for self-discovery.
The instructor’s job, and Rousseau’s fourth maxim, is to know the student’s personality
and opinions. The student is becoming and growing into adulthood. Their identity is forming
with each of these authentic educational experiences. The instructor needs to understand their
student in order to assist them in finding tools for education and leaving aside frivolity. If
students are able to understand their work and identity as having application in the real world,
they are more likely to understand themselves to be authentic.104 “Memory diffuses the feeling of
identity over all the moments of his existence.”105 As the student gets older, their reflections upon
their work begin to form their identity.
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Rousseau provides a clear methodology beginning with his thoughts on the child’s
personhood through their education into adulthood. For Rousseau, the child is not an object. The
child is pure, important, and malleable. The child is inherently good due to their lack of
corruption. It is because of this identity that the education of the child and the pedagogy used to
educate the child is so very important. If as instructors, we are given not a blank slate, but a pure
and good being to educate, then it is our job to assist them well. The ultimate crime for Rousseau
is to take this good child and have them become another object in a corrupt system to become
corrupted. If we are to take Rousseau seriously, that means when we educate a child, we need to
address them as persons with a growing identity of their own. We need to address them as beings
with their own special type of reasoning. We need to cherish their pure, uncorrupted minds.
Pedagogical Refutes
The Issues of Enlightenment Pedagogy
Rousseau and Locke are undoubtedly two of the most read pedagogical theorists of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They critique each other, however, just as other
notable thinkers and writers critique them as well. Locke and Rousseau differ greatly in their
approaches to educating and raising the child. Locke turns to nurturing the tabula rasa as a
means to educating the child through proper habit and reason, while Rousseau sees perfection in
the child’s natural state.106 This provides the thinkers of the eighteenth century with two different
views of the child. Locke determines that the child’s inclinations will only turn toward vice via
want and desire. Locke is determined to stamp out ill-bred habit. Rousseau determines that the
child’s inclinations are indicative of a pure form of human being. The natural child is free of the
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stink and savagery that society will teach him. With these differing anthropologies of the child,
the pedagogies that follow are also quite different. “ … The role of parents, the proposed method
of education, and the duty of the educated man in society …” are all concepts that contrast
between Locke and Rousseau.107
What does this mean for the child? Do Locke and Rousseau propose fundamentally
different accounts of the basic nature of the child? While the child is anthropologically good for
Rousseau, does Locke suggest that the child is born completely neutral? Locke and Rousseau see
the inclinations of the child as dangerous and pure, respectively. In fact though, they both agree
that the child has inclinations even if they differ on their meaning. Locke and Rousseau also
diverge on the child’s ability to reason. Locke puts the parents in the forefront of the child’s life
as educator because the child will follow the parents’ moral lead. While Locke doesn’t believe
the child has the capability to reason on their own, he does believe that they can come to
understand reason through example. Rousseau does not believe that the child is capable of
reason, particularly moral decision making, until the age of twelve.108 The child does possess a
sort of sensory reasoning from birth. Due to their delay in ability to reason, the job of the parents
is to keep them away from society at large and in Nature. In this natural setting they will follow
their pure inclinations and eventually make and understand moral choice. Locke and Rousseau
would agree that the child is important, as is their development. They also agree that educational
institutions are highly problematic as their teachings are impersonal and agendized. Despite any
difference, each thinker highlights different needs and importance of the child. This is quite
different from the treatment of children just a century before. It is suggested that by the
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eighteenth century there were three different types of anthropology for the child, as she/he exists
at birth.109 The first coming from the theological anthropological Augustinian view that the child
is born corrupt and in sin.110 The second, favoring Rousseau, is that the child is innately good.111
Finally, the Lockean view that the child is tabula rasa.112 Though these are certainly three neat
examples of the understanding of the child during the eighteenth century, it is overly simplified.
Augustine, though certainly read more than other theological thinkers, is not the only position on
the anthropology of the child. Locke also sees the goodness of the child, but believes it needs
more nurturing than Rousseau. The child’s being, personhood, autonomy, is not so finely defined
by the seventeenth century, let alone the eighteenth century. Rousseau and Locke are leaders in
coming to understand the child in a more favorable light, but they are not alone.
The Women
Mary Clarke, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Catharine Macaulay, are three women who are
determined to understand children and their pedagogical needs. Mary Clarke, as discussed,
provides a practical example of a mother at home with her children. Her critiques of Locke to
update his pedagogy to fit her and her children’s needs are, at times, unanswered. Nevertheless,
she continues with their home education by altering his pedagogical method as she tries to fit it
to her different children.113 Unfortunately, as with her son Ward, this is not always successful.
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She is not the only woman who took the time to study pedagogical methods. Mary
Wollstonecraft, feminist, philosopher, writer, and mother to Mary Shelley, is highly concerned
with education for girls. As noted, how to educate female children is not mentioned in the
writings of Locke. Rousseau writes on the education of Sophie, but only to provide a needed
counter-part to her husband, Émile.114 Both Wollstonecraft and Macaulay do not approve of the
female pupil being disregarded in pedagogical theory. Yet, there is no standard instruction for
educating a girl at this time.115 This is a problem for both Locke and Rousseau. They did,
however, side slightly more so with Locke in that he did not see a difference in the early
education between male and female students.116 Wollstonecraft appreciates Locke and
Rousseau’s theories that link education and childrearing to the good of society, but that well may
be where her affinity for male Enlightenment thinkers ends.117 Wollstonecraft’s focus on the
female child should not be taken lightly. It might seem narrow to not consider the male child, but
her argument is that the female child is not allowed to be a child at all.118 Rousseau’s view of
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women, young women, and girls was highly romanticized and based on male need.
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“Historians

of childhood and youth would do well to consider Wollstonecraft’s assertion that the fundamental
barrier to sexual equality in the eighteenth century was not women’s confinement to a particular
“sphere” but rather the lack of any clear transition between dependent girlhood and independent
womanhood.”120
Wollstonecraft surmises that young girls are taught to run a household, but upon
becoming women are asked to be more pleasing by maintaining girlish attributes. Having women
act girlish does not afford them the ability to actually transition into a role where they are using
their faculties. In addition, and important to later research in this body of work, there is a danger
in sexualizing the young girl. As men prompt women to act as young girls, it is perpetuating a
cycle of objectification. Objectification of children is highly problematic.
Wollstonecraft also critiques Rousseau on writing of women in a way that not only
sexualizes their girlishness, but also their lack of intelligence or thought. “‘Rousseau,’
Wollstonecraft wrote, ‘is not the only man who has indirectly said that the person of a young
[sic] woman, without a mind … is very pleasing.’”121 Wollstonecraft asserts the men of that
period prefer having women who hide their intelligence or are never even allowed to explore it.
As girls become women, they are taught by society to act as decorous embellishments for their
husbands. As an adornment or ornament, and not autonomously thinking women, they become
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objects. Women’s objectification and sexualization rely on turning them back into children. They
are stripped of their personhood, growth, and achievement. This is a danger to children.
Wollstonecraft maintains that children should remain innocent.122 If women, however, are
desired to be innocent, sexual, and child-like, the same is too easily desired of children as well.
Meaning, there is risk of increased sexualization and objectification of children. Macaulay also
highly criticizes Rousseau for his theory that women need to be truly feminine, coquettishly
feminine, in order for a man to achieve his true masculine state.123 Men are dependent on
submissive women to feel like men.
Aside from their stance on educating girls and women, Wollstonecraft and Macaulay both
stand for pedagogy based on moral truth. Each dissent from any educational instruction that
involves manipulation, coersion, conniving, or convincing.124 In different ways, this includes
both Rousseau and Locke. A critique of Rousseau is that the pedagogy he proposes including
moving to the country and allowing the child to be free, is actually highly controlled by the
intentions and directions of the tutor. Locke, to a lesser extent, still insists that the parents control
their child’s habits. Wollstonecraft and Macaulay have a lesser problem in general with Locke
than Rousseau. Though their goal is to seek out community, not control.
Perhaps most importantly, both Wollstonecraft and Macaulay ground their pedagogy in
practical application of a household that teaches the lessons of reason and morality. Every day
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moments in the household should be used as teaching moments and invaluable lessons.

125

Familial conversation, as well as structured conversations with guests and visitors, become very
important to developing critical thinking, moral decisions of the community, and friendships.126
Children are able to learn not just facts, or standard habits, or how to feel free, but how to live.
Macaulay feels that friendship, particularly, is important, as it is foundational to learning.127
Friendship is a moral good that requires communication and responsibility to another. Isolated
children, perhaps even Rousseau’s Émile, are raised singularly, responsible only for themselves
until the prescribed age of reason. Macaulay finds a space for the child between isolation from
the community and objectification by the community; a respected friendship. Wollstonecraft uses
stories, fables, and conversations as a basis for critical-thinking and exemplifying virtues.128
Both Macaulay and Wollstonecraft believe that in truth children can be taught virtue.129 Their
pedagogies are both based on the belief that God is truth. Reason and rationality are innate to
human beings. We teach children to act and think virtuously by leading them in reasoning
through moral principle.130 They see, better than their contemporaries, that children are not
without reason or rationality. Children do, however, need to be guided and aided in learning to
navigate their world so that they can be moral decision makers.
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Conclusion
Rousseau and Locke dominate as pedagogical theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, respectively. Many pedagogical theories are born out of Rousseau’s liberation of the
child and Locke’s emphasis on self-reflection and control. Though their pedagogies differ in
method and means, they each begin with a positive view of the child. The child is essentially
good. Locke understands the child to be tabula rasa, but that does not have a negative
connotation of a child born in sin. Their anthropological views differ so greatly from the thinkers
who wrote pre-Enlightenment. Society has changed. The Enlightenment writers assist in
changing their world as they also change with the world. Education becomes an unavoidable
topic amongst parents. In order to create a better society, citizens need to educate their children
bearing in mind the outcome desired. If you want citizens who make moral decisions, then you
have to teach children how to make moral decisions for the good of society and themselves.
Many thinkers, such as Wollstonecraft and Macaulay, understand the risk of objectifying
children, particularly female children. Objectified human beings are stunted in their ability to
become or to act as autonomously reasoning adults. Wrongs and degrading acts that are
committed against children who are objectified are atrocities to humanity. While Locke and
Rousseau are able to change the anthropological view of the child, it was Wollstonecraft,
Macaulay, and even Mary Clarke, who are able to understand how to work with the child. They
have an understanding of how to take these innocent lives and help them navigate a sometimesunforgiving world. If Wollstonecraft or Macaulay were to have a chance at working with Ward
Clarke, would he have had a different life? It is, of course, impossible to say for sure. We can
surmise, however, that conversations, stories, and allowing Ward to learn on his own terms, may
have eased his tension. Wollstonecraft writes of her vision for education being a system where
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both male and female students would learn together not only in academic pursuits, but also
practical ones.131 Her vision is not one of class or wealth, but of understanding what each
student’s needs were and helping them.
Moving from this Enlightenment period into the present, the influence of some of these
thinkers becomes evident. Major strides have been made on behalf of the child at this point in
time. Unfortunately, not all of them are universally accepted. The poor in society certainly have a
more difficult time being able to educate and allow their children space and time to grow.
Education is privilege. Over the course of time schools of thought, philosophy, and religion that
did not adopt some of the theories set forth by these thinkers, have been a hazard to the
educational system. Even into the contemporary era, children are objectified or not given their
proper place as rational autonomous persons.
There are pedagogists, however, who take the lessons learned by our Enlightenment
thinkers to heart. In chapter four, it will be evident that some of the best pedagogical methods
available for education, religious education in particular, are born of principles set forth and
founded during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If we continue to build our pedagogical
methods on poor anthropology, our children will remain things that are treated as such. By taking
up the theories that uphold the child’s personhood, they can be educated well to have fulfilling
lives for themselves and in community.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REVERSING THE AGENTS: PEDAGOGY THROUGH THE CHILD’S EYES
The Enlightenment brings about various changes regarding how the person thinks about
themself in the world. For the first time, thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft
suggest that the person be considered an agent who acts for and on behalf of a greater
community of individuals. This turn to the self does not suggest that communities should be
abandoned in search of an individualistic society. Self-reflection allows the individual to
understand themselves in light of their context, their environmental situation, their family unit,
and in their lived communities. Each individual works, plays, and lives daily in their community.
A healthy individual, according to Locke, is an asset to their community and to society as a
whole. For Rousseau, self-reflection leads to an organic understanding of goodness and morality.
Wollstonecraft asserts that an individual must consider their own agency in order to recognize
the rights of another person.
In chapter Three, I examine these and other thinkers to determine their views on
childhood and the pedagogy of education for children during the Enlightenment. Locke,
Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft each develop comprehensive pedagogical methods. How is their
knowledge fundamental for foundations in religious pedagogy for children? How do the
anthropological ideas of Locke, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft form Post-Enlightenment views of
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the child? Chapter Three highlights the secular changes at work in the field of education and in
1

society. Chapter Four complements chapter Three by turning to Post-Enlightenment Christian
thoughts on childhood and the dignity of the child under the conditions of modernity. The
Roman Catholic Church, pastorally and theologically, has not formally adopted any revised
anthropology of the child or universal pedagogical methods for children’s religious education.2
The nineteenth century is, among others, characterized by the Industrial Revolution that
radically transforms parts of the Western World. Europe experiences several revolutions,
beginning with the French Revolution, as well as large-scale wars such as the Napoleonic Wars
or the German-French War, while the United States survives the Civil War. Due to hardships
faced by lower to lower-middle class families, including many immigrant families and families
suffering slavery in the United States, there are two different portrayals of childhood in the
nineteenth century. Some writers portray the realism and violence that harms children’s lives.
Other writers are part of nineteenth century Romanticism, a discovering in childhood movement.
This movement, which portrays the happy nature of the child’s life, presents childhood as a relief
from societal ills. Christian scholars of this era rarely address the hardships of children living in
poverty. They do write about the child as a person, as an intrinsically valuable person, which is
the basis for creating an equitable treatment of all children.
Post-Enlightenment Christian scholarship takes a different approach to thinking about the
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child. It assumes a complicated but essential role of bridging early Christian teachings, Scriptural
writings, and the Enlightenment philosophical and pedagogical insights about the child. The new
approaches must consider both the assumed corruptible nature of the child from Early Christian
thinkers such as Augustine, but also the philosophical anthropology of the Enlightenment. Is
there space in a Christian ethics of the child that retains the Christian theological identity but
acknowledges the child’s dignity as seen in modern ethics? This chapter discusses this
possibility.
During the nineteenth century, Protestantism begins to flourish with thinkers like
Schleiermacher. They garner a new era of progress. By the twentieth century, the works of
Schleiermacher are used in pedagogy and anthropology for the child.
The subject of children and their experience is not a regular dogmatic commonplace, and
the sources for retrieving children’s experience seem either nonexistent or at least
relatively difficult to recover. Moreover, among the ideas about children that one can
retrieve from traditional theological texts, very little is directly helpful for a
contemporary theology of childhood; any of our Christian forbears’ ideas and practices
demand critical exposure, not triumphant reprisintation [sic.]3
Romanticism is a period in which Christian theology strives to capture the essence of the
child and childhood, while attempting to work within established theological doctrine. Similarly
to Clement of Alexandria, Schleiermacher turns to the Gospels as having the authoritative view
on children. In addition, however, he acknowledges the child’s subjectivity as dignity, based on
Enlightenment anthropology. Schleiermacher also elevates the goodness and essential nature of
childhood.
Philosophies of the child that indicate the child has intrinsic value, i.e. dignity, catch the
attention of an Italian physician at the end of the nineteenth century. Dr. Maria Montessori is not
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only a medical doctor, but also the founder of the pedagogical method, the so-called Montessori
Method. Starting from Schleiermacher’s framework for the intrinsic value of the child,
Montessori and Montessori interpreters put Schleiermacher’s framework into action. From the
nineteenth century into the twentieth century, children are more and more recognized as having
intrinsic value in child development and education scholarship. Many of them experience the
trauma of hard labor and war as they try to have a childhood. While Schleiermacher affirms the
child’s intrinsic value via the Gospel and theological anthropology, the Montessori scholars give
shape to this concept by using the intrinsic value of the child in relation to their relationships,
their being, and education. Other than the Romantics, the Realist novels of Charles Dickens, and
others, paint a much darker picture about the realities of children in the nineteenth century,
highlighting the importance of pointing to children’s own subjectivity and dignity.
The Subjectivity and Dignity of the Child - A Nineteenth Century Transition
In the little world in which children have their existence, whosoever brings them up, there
is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt, as injustice. It may be only small
injustice that the child can be exposed to; but the child is small, and its world is small,
and its rocking-horse stands as many hands high, according to scale, as a big-boned Irish
hunter.4
The Industrial Revolution is a dangerous and damaging time for children in Western
History. Charles Dickens, heralded as one of the finest writers of the nineteenth century, often
writes about the lives of children. Born into the period of the Industrial Revolution, he
experiences, witnesses, and lives the hardships that burden children during this time. During his
lifetime, the Industrial Revolution reaches its peak, and the scars that mar the children of Great
Britain are indelible. Meanwhile, the United States of America also experiences the effects of the
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Industrial Revolution. Just as in Great Britain, the children of the United States work in factories,
doing hard labor alongside their families. Children, brought and born into slavery, labor in fields
under horrific conditions. Children as young as three are documented as working in coal mines,
shucking oysters, and picking cotton.5 The Industrial Revolution in the United States continues
longer than in other countries due to the effects of the Civil War.6 Children face unprecedented
dangers in their work during this time in United States history.7 There are few labor or
educational laws in the United States during this period. As a result, decrees and laws, to
be discussed in chapter Five, are enacted to ensure the safety, welfare, and prosperity of children.
The Industrial Revolution, though potentially the most dangerous, was not the first time in
history where Western children are exposed to hard lives.8 The Industrial Revolution brought to
the forefront the experiences of enslaved children, marginalized children, and immigrant children
who are seen as objects in an exploitational system. The reality is that children are continuously
at risk, even in the twenty-first century, to being exploited through labor and trafficking
conditions.
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Authors like Dickens, Sinclair, and Hugo each write about children’s lives as they
witness them. The works of these writers are contrary to the works of Enlightenment writers like
Locke and Rousseau. Even Locke, whose description of childhood is more austere than
Rousseau’s, understands childhood to be a time of education and development, not of peril. The
nineteenth century conditions under which children labor are so horrific that they garner much
criticism. Not all authors, however, shoulder this responsibility. Formidable nineteenth century
authors such as Longfellow, Wordsworth, and Twain take up the banner of Romanticism when it
comes to childhood.9 They write optimistic visions of children’s imagination, play, the beauty of
youth, and happy lazy afternoons on the river. While these certainly encapsulate elements of
childhood, they are not universal experiences of children. They do not represent the lives of all
children coming of age during the Industrial Revolution. What the Romantic period authors
provide is an idyllic vision of childhood that they believe every child should live. In a very
Platonic sense, the perfection of childhood extends just beyond human reaches, but remains
visible.
Germany in the early nineteenth century sees a shift from the Enlightenment thinkers to
the Romantic writers. This shift, however, is not sharply defined. In addition to the shift in
philosophical views, Germany also experiences a shift in social structure between
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.10 The separation of the nuclear family shifts from civic
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society and political life. For children – especially those of the bourgeois households – this shift
means that parents, particularly the fathers, are responsible for their upbringing and education.
The roles of parents are defined within the family and institutional structures. For men it means
participating in governance. Women are mostly relegated to the sphere of the home, but may also
own small businesses such as fashion shops. With this social transformation, there are changes in
religious and faith structures as well. The nuclear family is a church within a Church, at least in
the Protestant faith groups.
Schleiermacher’s Dialogue on Children
Schleiermacher is a Romantic thinker and writer.11 Some scholars, however, see remnants
of Enlightenment thinking in Schleiermacher’s writings. Schleiermacher, like many other
Romantics, writes literature in addition to lectures and sermons. His writing is therefore also a
critique on rhetoric and a turn to the didactic, both notable in Kantian thought.12 Kantian reason
does not stand alone in Schleiermacher’s dialogue. He turns to feelings of dependency,
relationality, and essence.13 For Schleiermacher the question becomes, “How do I raise a
Christian family?”14 The teaching authority resides with the children’s parents. As a pastor, and
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the son of a pastor, Schleiermacher knows the importance of keeping faith alive within the
household, particularly amongst its youngest members.
The turn to the subject that begins with the Enlightenment is a central motif of the
Romanticism writings. Apart from acknowledging the subjectivity and dignity of the child,
Schleiermacher’s love of the Gospel becomes the cornerstone for his philosophy of the child and
childhood. Applying the Gospel, he understands the child as a subject having intrinsic value, i.e.
dignity in Kant’s sense. “Children are born endowed with a basic dignity.”15 Kant believed that
this happened in large part through education.16 The child hears narratives of morality and at the
same time reflects upon their interior moral capability. They begin to associate the moral motive
with their own dignity as a moral do-er.17 Both Schleiermacher and the Montessori scholars use
the Gospel as moral narrative, which fits well in conjunction with Kant’s development of dignity
through education.
Childhood does not exist in a vacuum. Childhood and adulthood are quite
complementary. Each thrives because of its relation to the other. Their intertwining reveals that
the child-adult relationship is dynamic and must aim at mutual respect. The relationship is not
about one side affirming the other, but a constant tension between the two. Scholars, child
psychologists, and theologians take until the twentieth century, however, to explore children’s
subjectivity, their dignity, and the child-adult relationship.18 Schleiermacher does not have this
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knowledge available, and so he expresses his own insights and experiences, contributing to the
growing literature on the child and childhood during his lifetime.
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children
were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with
affection for children: it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of
childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the
young adult.19
Ariès affirms that concepts of childhood were missing altogether through the medieval era. In
theology, until Schleiermacher, concepts of childhood and the essential child-adult relationship
are missing in theology altogether.
The Gospel
In chapter One, I noted that Clement of Alexandria is one of the few theologians who
centered the adult pedagogy on the Gospel passages on children. Clement was a teacher and a
pastor. As a teacher, as a theologian, and as a pastor, Clement explains the Gospel through
sermons to catechumens. Schleiermacher, similarly to Clement, does the same. He understands
that the Gospel message about children is particularly valuable. It is not the adults who Jesus
calls to himself but the children. Schleiermacher turns specifically to Matthew, chapter 18 as
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well as the Nativity narrative to examine children’s place in creation. In Matthew 18:1-5, Jesus
20

says to the disciples,
‘Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter
the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever takes the lowly position of this child is the
greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoever welcomes one such child in my name
welcomes me.’21
There are at least five ways Jesus interacts with children throughout his Gospel teachings, which
Schleiermacher adopts.22 First, Jesus blesses children and hands them the reign of God. Second,
Jesus makes children the models for receiving the reign of God. Third, Jesus shows children to
be exemplary in receiving the reign of God. Fourth, Jesus asks all to be called to the service of
children as a sign of God’s greatness. Fifth, Jesus tells his disciples that service to children is the
ultimate way of receiving himself and God. In the Matthean passage quoted above, Jesus
explains to the disciples that unless they become like little children, they will not receive the
kingdom. Children are not subordinate to their parents in their being or personhood; instead they
are held up as the standard of being. Jesus’ Gospel message in Matthew is the foundation for
how children ought to be treated according to Schleiermacher.
Schleiermacher singles out Jesus’ message in Matthew. While some scholars argue that
Jesus’ message in Matthew is a message of humility, Schleiermacher sees it as more.23 He is
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surprised by the call for the adult disciples to become children once more. To become a child
24

again is to step into a different stage in life. The child’s humility in Matthew 18:1-5 is evidence
of the child’s acceptance of each moment. The child does not see themselves as who they will
become, but as-they-are. Children’s ability to exist within a different mode of temporal
consciousness than adults allows them to exist in each moment. Many adults lose this ability as
they develop, leaving children as models with this capability to live in the “here and now.”
Schleiermacher understands the Matthean passage to reveal the intrinsic value of childhood, and
he emphasizes the dignity of children in their own right: children are no longer merely an
analogy, held up for didactic purposes as in Clement. Rather, children’s own subjectivity
becomes the center of interest.
Being
Expression of Feelings
Matthew 18 is not the only passage of the Gospel where Schleiermacher finds inspiration.
He develops Christmas Eve Celebration: A Dialogue, which is based on the Nativity accounts in
the Gospel.25 Christmas Eve is Schleiermacher’s first published dialogue. It is written at the turn
of the century in 1805.26 His purpose is to engage the reader with the love and joy of Christmas,
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but also to examine feelings of rebirth through the living Word as Schleiermacher recognizes
them in children.27 As the dialogue unfolds in Platonic fashion, Schleiermacher introduces each
of his characters.28 Immediately we meet Sophie, the gregarious child of the household. Sophie is
the focal point of the dialogue. “…it all centers in the dancing eagerness, the honest
enthrallment, and the tenderness of a child.”29 In parts two and three, respectively, there are
speeches from three women and three men at the party.30 It is Sophie, however, who mirrors
Christ in the Nativity.31 Schleiermacher deftly reaches deeper into the Gospel message and into
the Nativity story to discuss the ontology of the child. Sophie is very open with her feelings and
her love of God. She draws ire from another guest, Leonhardt, because she so remains sincere in
her feelings about her faith.32 Schleiermacher uses Sophies’ openness to further examine the
being of the child. Leonhardt, in contrast, represents strict reason. His need for reason alone
makes him suspicious of a child who connects with her faith by any other means. Schleiermacher
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critiques Kantian reasoning through the character of Leonhardt. Although there are many traces
33

of Rousseau’s view on emotions, Schleiermacher also critiques him. For instance, Rousseau is
highly critical of community as the foundation for a child’s upbringing.34 Schleiermacher,
however, situates the child directly in the community as an extension of Church. He indicates
that both Leonhardt’s Enlightenment skepticism and Rousseau’s turn to nature can corrupt the
child. For Schleiermacher, the child’s being means something else entirely. The child does not
let reason dominate their relation to God. The child is open to sense, feeling, and response.35 Nor
should the child be left isolated from a faith community. The child not only receives guidance
from the community, but also gives to the community. As exemplary blessings, children help
lead adults in sanctification. They are models of a life in the present, shedding the obsessions
with work, and bringing back into focus basic human relationships.36
Acceptance of Feelings
Just as Sophie is open with her feelings about her faith, she is also open to acceptance of
her feelings in the moment. Schleiermacher marvels at a child’s willingness to express how they
feel, and to accept these feelings. Like living in timeless communion with God, the child accepts
whatever is in the immediate present.37 Adults are not able to do this with such ease. For an
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adult, it is difficult not to think of time and action as dependent on the past and future. Adults
work to control the present through actions both backwards and forwards in time. As a result it
becomes very difficult to be in communion with God in the way a child is in communion with
God. A child is able to be, without reflecting on the actions that take them to the present or what
they need to do to become. Schleiermacher, through his character of Karoline, suggests that
when adults are in the presence of children, the children are able to draw the adults back into the
present time of being through play and joy.38 Throughout the dialogue, Schleiermacher focuses
thematically on the difference between men and women as Christians. The adults discuss that
men have to shed off their rough character of youth in order to convert back to Christianity. One
party-goer, Eduard, notes that the child is not in need of conversion at all, because they are with
the Christ-child in the moment. “‘… what is the celebration of Jesus’ infancy but the distinct
acknowledgment of the immediate union of the divine with the being of a child, by virtue of
which no conversion is further needed?’”39 The child is unique in their position to identify with
Christ because they are not adults. The child feels and accepts the presence of God wherever and
as-they-are.
Utter Dependence
Schleiermacher teaches that children are held in highest regard by God. They are the
examples by which adults may enter the kingdom of heaven within God’s holy reign. Children,
however, are not mini-deities. They are not omnipotent or omniscient. The child’s openness of
expression, acceptance of their present being, and dependence on those around them, make them
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God’s favored amongst humans. Yet, the child’s greatest gifts are also what make the child the
most vulnerable.40 When we hear dependence in contemporary culture, it can carry a negative
connotation. We do not like to think of ourselves as dependent on others. Perhaps it is likened to
being childish; not living as an adult. Schleiermacher sees dependence in a different way. When
he discusses the child that is dependent as a gift, he likens it to humanity’s dependency on God.
“…children qua children possess a spiritual perspective that is necessary for Christian faith. In
their utter vulnerability and dependence, children mirror the relationship between God and
humanity.”41 Children are born vulnerable. Though they possess sharpened instincts and
proportional means of reasoning, children are dependent on adults to live. Schleiermacher
understands this state of dependence to also be indicative of openness to God.42 Parents and the
community are responsible for teaching the child and developing a sense of higher
understanding.43 Similarly, humanity is utterly dependent on God for God’s in-dwelling in the
soul, and for communion with God, as Augustine has already laid out in his Confessions.
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Schleiermacher accepts that adults are hesitant to acknowledge their dependency, even in their
relation with God. Children, on the other hand, are ready to accept their dependency, which is
already part of their experience, making the communion with God and the in-dwelling of Christ
in the soul easier to welcome imminently.44
Schleiermacher holds that fostering a trust of dependence in the child requires parents
and communities to make their love a self-sacrificing act.45 Parents must have the best interest of
children in mind. If they lose the child’s trust, fail to respond empathetically to their emotions, or
harm the child, the child becomes at risk of being exposed in their vulnerability.46
Schleiermacher indicates in the Christmas Eve that the relationship between the child and the
parents needs to be healthy. Sophie states that she can see Mary, the mother of Jesus, in her own
mother. When Ernestine, Sophie’s mother, is questioned about this, she replies,
‘I truly feel that she did not say too much when she thought that I might well be the
mother of the blessed child, because I can in all humility honor the pure revelation of the
divine in my daughter, as Mary did in her son, without in the least disturbing the regular
relation of mother to child’47
The relationship between parent and child, this means, must aim at mutual love.
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Childhood and Children’s Pedagogy
The Good of Childhood
Through this project one could see that Schleiermacher develops a theological
anthropology of the child that is unique for the nineteenth century. He challenges the
philosophical ideas of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, for instance, regarding the child’s
development and the nature of the child’s being in the world. He also makes a case for the
deepened connection between the child and God.
Sophie herself joined in appraising this with evident satisfaction as her masterpiece. She
had imagined herself a second Corregio in doing it, and she now kept her craft a tight
secret. Only she did admit that as yet she had schemed in vain over how she might bring
in a rainbow too, which she had very much wanted, she explained, for Christ is the true
surety that life and pleasure will never more be lost to the world.48
He is attentive to the Enlightenment turn to the self, while opening up to the potential of spiritual
feeling and experience. He is not entirely steeped in Enlightenment reasoning, but he does not
entirely romanticize the child either. Schleiermacher understands childhood as a stage with
intrinsic value.49 If childhood has only potential value, Schleiermacher’s position would not
differ from scholasticism. Childhood’s intrinsic value means that it has its own set of rights and
responsibilities along with corresponding value and worth.50
Adults often view childhood merely as a stage in life on the way to adulthood. Yet for
Schleiermacher, adults search for the irretrievable joys of childhood throughout their adult lives.
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Adults often reminisce about their childhoods looking to turn back time as they approach the
ends of their lives. In Christmas Eve, Schleiermacher emphasizes this point: while Sophie is in
the midst of basking in Christmas joys, the adults are in other rooms conversing about
Christmas’ past, what they like, the issues, and the meaning of Christmas. It is not until the last
adult enters, Josef, that the other adults stop thinking about Christmas and begin living it.
‘So, I have roamed about the whole evening, everywhere taking part most heartily in
every little happening and amusement I have come across. I have laughed, and I have
loved it all. It was one long affectionate kiss that I have given to the world, and now my
enjoyment with you shall be the last impress of my lips, for you know that you are all the
dearest to me’51
Josef implores his friends to be with Sophie and to sing in joy. Schleiermacher suggests through
his writing that adults are able to regain childhood experientially. It is not a time of life that is
entirely forgone. Childhood and adulthood are complementary; each gives the other what it
needs.52 None of them exist in a vacuum. Adults are able to assist children in developing for the
future, while children bring the joy of the moment back to adults. Each role is as significant and
needed as the other. Each dimension of personhood creates humanity as a whole. Without one,
humanity is lacking in substance on the whole.
The Good of Pedagogy
We can build upon Schleiermacher’s theological anthropology of the child and his views
of childhood. Schleiermacher creates a solid framework for a child pedagogy. He is able to use
his theological knowledge, his belief in Christ, and his Enlightenment understanding to construct
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pedagogical methods that focus on child-centric learning. Pedagogy for children can have its
own intrinsic value. Schleiermacher does not teach children only for the good of society. He
teaches children as beings that are ends in and of themselves. This is unlike Locke who views
children as instrumental to society. In order to foster pedagogy for the child, adults need to be
sincere in their relationship and efforts to help the child. As is the case for Wollstonecraft, for
Schleiermacher, too, the child has its own subjectivity. Therefore, the methods of teaching them
must change as they do not meet the standards of dignity and subjectivity.
Schleiermacher is highly critical of traditional religious education. As his education is in
the Pietist tradition, Schleiermacher has difficulty with the religious education of the Magisterial
Reformers.53 The Magisterial Reformers have the support of the governing authorities. A few of
these reformers include John Calvin, Martin Luther, and Ulrich Zwingli. The Magisterial
Reformers, according to Schleiermacher, have a cold and legalistic way of teaching religious
education.54 Their religious pedagogy turns to catechisms rather than religious experience and
interaction with children. The Pietist tradition develops a church-in-home approach. This means
that they teach living the Christian faith within households.55 For children to experience the indwelling Christ, they have to be able to interact with Christ in their own living environment.
Memorization, catechisms, and formal doctrinal training teaches them about their religion, but it
does not help them to experience their faith.
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Schleiermacher holds a radical view within his own circles, arguing that children’s play
brings them closer to Christ.
The difference between adults and children, he said, is that children play and adults
practice. Play is an activity that is done for its own sake, for the present enjoyment of the
activity, without regard to future outcomes. Practice, by contrast, is the arduous repetition
and development of skills for the purpose of mastery and perfect execution of some
future production or artifact.56
Children practice and memorize religious elements such as prayers, but this shouldn’t be the
focus of their education as play helps them interact and experience their love of God.
Schleiermacher is indeed ahead of his time. He asserts the essential role of Christ’s
Gospel is recognizing the intrinsic value of children. He affirms not only the goodness of
children, but that their very being holds privilege. Only children are able to express and accept
their feelings in the moment. These specials times allow them to understand their utter
dependency as communion with God. Schleiermacher develops parameters that define
pedagogical methods for children to live and learn.
Turning toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, scholars
begin to look more closely at the subjectivity of the child. They want to understand the
theological anthropology of the child in a new way that involves the child’s lens. Using the
child’s perspective, they form pedagogical methodologies that guide children in developing their
relationship with adults, learning capabilities, emotional capabilities, and their relationship with
God. John Dewey, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg all influence thinking
on child development from the psychology/child development field. Scholars, such as Maria
Montessori, use their work in child development to begin their own studies on pedagogical
methods for children. While the field of psychology has much to contribute to this project, it is
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not the main focus. In the next section I will turn to three people working in the field of
education. Their first-hand experience guides how we should work with the child.
From the Child’s Perspective; Montessori, Cavalletti, and Berryman
Theology and philosophy develop concepts that determine the moral status of the human
being. Theology through the Enlightenment seeks to understand human beings as seen in the
imago dei. How are human beings created to be creators? As scholasticism becomes enthralled
by the great chain of being, theologians turn toward questions of sentient beings, rationality, and
will. Aquinas elevates his knowledge of Greek philosophy into natural law metaphysics.
Philosophy aims to understand the human being through concepts of the person, their capability
to reason, and their abilities to live within environments or communities. In various ways, these
two main disciplines of method and thought guide the concepts about what the human being is
and how the human being functions. As these concepts in theology and philosophy change over
time, so does how people think about their own being as humans. Self-reflection, for instance, is
the apex of the Enlightenment. This is a point in time that highlights changes in thinking about
being human and being a self. All of this, however, is accomplished through two broad channels;
theology and philosophy. Referring back to chapter One, we see that Aquinas develops an idea
of the person that is moving always from potentiality to actuality, and from imperfection to
perfection. Philosophically, the person achieves the state of personhood as they become a
rational being with the capacity to higher thought processes. While these are indeed broad
strokes, the previous chapters outline the progression of these two main disciplines, theology and
philosophy, up until the nineteenth century.
For an ethicist who wants to understand and explore the subjectivity of the child,
problems arise from these main sources of understanding. Neither framework, describing what it
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means to be a human being, takes human beings in their early stages into consideration. In
theological terms, the child’s moral status rests upon the potential for becoming a rational,
reasonable, cognitive, good adult. In philosophical terms, similarly, the child’s moral status is
determined by their capability to function morally as a rational being. That is why the
counterpoints, exemplified by Clement on the one hand and Schleiermacher on the other,
spanning almost the whole history of Christianity, are so important. If we, as theologians and
ethicists, take the Gospel message of Matthew 18 seriously, neither the theological nor the
philosophical anthropology is adequate to understand children, explicitly blessed as God’s
favored state of being. Most of theology and philosophy until the nineteenth century, if it studies
the child, follows the biblical understanding. The child is conceptualized and understood in a
world of adult norms. Very few thinkers create the space to discuss the child through a different
lens. Even using the term “anthropology” is not quite adequate in understanding the child. The
adult sense of anthropology means understanding the child, as the adult sees the child in society
and the world, not as the child sees herself. If no space is made for the child to experience being
a human being, being a person, being an agent, and being autonomous on their own terms, what
do we stand to lose as part of our overall humanity?
Beginning with the new interest in the child in early nineteenth century, the methods that
explore the childhood and the child's autonomy and agency are more and more based on careful
observation of children in particular environments. Whether we turn to Schleiermacher,
Montessori, Cavalletti, or Berryman, the method is similar: they all aim to elevate the child’s
perspective and elevate their agency and autonomy.
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Maria Montessori
There is also much that is unknown about a child. There is a part of a child’s soul that has
always been unknown but which must be known. With a spirit of sacrifice and
enthusiasm we must go in search like those who travel to foreign lands and tear up
mountains in their search for gold.57
Montessori develops an alternate method for learning about children. Rather than
imposing her knowledge and her environment on children, she takes the role of the cautious
observer. Montessori’s name lives on in her method that produced many schools throughout
Europe and the United States. While her pedagogical method is important, her writings about the
child-adult relationship, the psychic development of the child, and the child’s place in the world
are of equal importance.58
The Secret of Childhood, by Maria Montessori, is published in 1936 in Italian. Over the
next fifty years her book is republished in countries all over the world. Montessori seeks to enter
into the child’s “psyche” and reveal it.59 She does not choose to interview or work with children
from privileged homes, but rather those living in marginalized neighborhoods.60 In The Secret of
Childhood, Montessori begins by explaining the child-adult relationship. She notes how
important the relationship is to the development of both the child and the adult. She also includes
her own thoughts on the development of child psychoanalysis. At the time Montessori writes The
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Secret of Childhood, psychoanalysis is a new science. Montessori is deeply interested in the
alternative understanding of the child’s being and growth. Her pedagogy is based on the
knowledge she gathers in the areas of psychoanalysis, observation, and theology. “If
psychoanalysis had not sounded the ocean of the subconscious, it would be difficult to explain
how a child’s mind could give us a deeper understanding of human problems.”61 We must
acknowledge Montessori’s judgment of psychoanalysis. While she is excited and fascinated by
new academic work, particularly by Freud’s work, she hesitates as the work does not express
what is at the heart of a child. Psychoanalysis lends insights into child development, but not to
Montessori’s understanding of the child’s relationship to God. Her pedagogy is a reflection of
whom she believes the child to be. Perhaps her most valuable pedagogical insight is the
relationship between children and adults.
Twentieth Century Child Psychology in Pedagogy
The most notable studies from Piaget to Kohlberg to Gilligan emerge in the 1950s to the
1970s, heralding a new era for the study of children. These studies are helpful to understand
child development through different lenses. They do not, however, bridge the gap between the
child’s ontology, theological anthropology, and societal conventions. They are helpful as they
indicate the importance of studying children and childhood issues at all. If the child is uncared
for, misunderstood, and ill-treated, they will become a suffering adult. Is the child’s prospect in
their adult life all there is to worry about? No. It is of utmost importance to know the child as
they are as a child. It is of utmost importance to wrestle with the concepts of theological
anthropology, autonomy, and agency for the good of the child. These areas of study must be
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addressed before developing any pedagogical method.
The foundation and framework of any pedagogy is to know the needs of the children
whom one is teaching. A good pedagogical method takes into account not only what the child
must learn, but how, and why. It is easy to give textbooks, workbooks, and lessons with the
expectations that the child needs to work and learn the content of faith. It is more prudent to want
to know how they will best come to understand the essence of the material. For children, their
pedagogical foundation begins with how their earliest relationships develop. If they have
supportive mutual relationships, then they will be able to exercise their intrinsic capabilities to
learn freely. If they are given that chance, along with a proper learning environment, they can
thrive. Montessori writes, “In reality a child is isolated from society; if an ‘adult’ influences him
[sic], it is a specific adult, the adult closest to him [sic]. And ordinarily this would be first his
[sic] mother, then his [sic] father, and finally his [sic] teacher.”62 The adults in the child’s life are
the environmental stewards as they are the adults who foster the child’s journey via their intimate
relationship, providing them with the proper space to learn, and implementing pedagogy wherein
the adult takes a passive role.
Montessori’s Child-Adult Relationship
The first encounter that a child has as they arrive in the world is with adults. Depending
on the kind of birth, a child may encounter a doctor, nurses, and then the parents. Montessori
understands that children are born into an alien environment that is manufactured and crafted by
adults.63 They are essentially isolated from society because they are not born with the tools to
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understand an adult environment. As children grow, in their earliest stages, they develop bonds
64

with the adults closest to them. In, perhaps, most cases this is their parents. Bonds are formed
with other adults as well who are consistently in the presence of a child as a family member or
caretaker. As a newborn who is utterly dependent on the adults in their lives, they have no choice
but to form a relationship with the adults. In order to survive, the child has to rely on the bonds
of these relationships. It appears, at first glance, that the child is a passive receiver of attention,
care, love, and support based on their helpless status. On the other side of the relationship is the
adult. The adult has brought a child into the world or accepted the responsibility of caring for a
child. Adults have autonomy and agency that are linked to their ability and capability in
rationality and reason. Adults are helping, caring for, teaching, loving, and supporting the child.
These are, seemingly, active roles. The adult acts upon the child in a way that presents them with
goods both physical and emotional. If this is always the lens by which we see the child-adult
relationship, then it might be tempting to think that it is impossible for the child to possess
subjectivity in the relationship.
Schleiermacher, however, already argues that the child-adult relationship is not only one
of presenting and receiving. The relationship, to be a relationship, must exist in a complementary
manner. The adult has very much to give to the child, but the child has something very precious
to give to the adult at the same time. Montessori happens to agree: “The child can change the
hearts of men; in the midst of children their hardness disappears. The child can annihilate
selfishness and awaken the spirit of sacrifice. This happens every time a child is born in a

64

Maria Montessori, The Secret of Childhood, trns. M. Joseph Costelloe, S.J. (New York: Ballantine,
1972), 13.

138
65

family.”

Disproportionate Relationships
The child’s actual state of utter dependency changes the adults around them.66 Meaning,
adults do not perceive children as acting, but nevertheless the child’s mere being is a causation of
change in the adult life. In chapter Five I will discuss how this reciprocal relationship can deepen
in mutuality to the benefit of both children and adults.
The child-adult relationship is not without its share of problems. The relationship burdens
an inherent disproportionate structure of power in favor of the adult. To reiterate, the person of
the newborn, of the toddler, even of the adolescent child is one of dependency. Adults have it
within their power to treat the child as they see fit. They could treat the child well with care and
love or they could treat the child as an object of abuse. But it is crucial to understand that
dependency and vulnerability, particularly moral vulnerability, differ. Where children experience
dependency as a lack of ability, not capability, as do-ers, moral vulnerability is an experience for
both the child and the adult to be open to the other. This will also be discussed in chapter Five. In
the case of abuse, the child does not become an object because they lack agency. The child
becomes an object because the adult has stripped the child of their means of agency. The adult
has the power to damage the relationship, to break the mutual relationship, in order to ensure
their power over the child.
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Adults have not understood children or adolescents and they are, as a consequence, in
continual conflict with them. The remedy is not that adults should gain some new
intellectual knowledge or achieve a higher standard of culture. No, they must find a
different point of departure. The adult must find within himself [sic] the still unknown
error that prevents him [sic] from seeing the child [sic] as he [sic] is. If such preparation
is not made, it the attitudes relative to such preparation are not acquired, he [sic] cannot
go further.67
The child may then lose their inherent agency as they lose their importance in the world as
children. “The child has almost disappeared from the thoughts of the adult world, and the adults
live too much as though there were no children who have the right to influence them.”68
This relationship must maintain a balance between each side. Each side feeling the pull to
give and receive from the other. In terms of Christian types of love, it is not an entirely selfsacrificing agapic love, nor is it an erotic or philia love.69 Arguably there is a medium between
agapic love and erotic love where a love of “equal regard” exists.70 Scholars, such as
Montessori, addresses the child-adult relationship in terms of love. She feels that love is the
connection between these two stages in life. A distorted sense of relationship is destructive not
only to the relationship, but to the child’s development long-term. Montessori states,
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In their dealings with children adults do not become egotistic but egocentric. They look
upon everything pertaining to a child’s soul from their own point of view and,
consequently, their misapprehensions are constantly on the increase. Because of this
egocentric view, adults look upon a child as something empty [sic] that is to be filled
through their own efforts, as something inert and helpless [sic] for which they must do
everything, as something lacking an inner guide [sic] and in constant need of direction.71
The problem in the relationship does not begin with the child, though it is the child who will feel
the brunt of the burden from an imbalanced relationship. While Locke’s summation of the
child’s being as tabula rasa was astounding for its time, the child is not a blank space waiting to
be filled by someone with ideas. The child is. The present tense of the verb to be indicates that
something already exists when the adult initiates the child-adult relationship. Adults tend to be
preoccupied with their own environment and the issues that come along with it.72 Montessori
writes in both The Secret of Childhood and The Child in the Church that it may be hard to
counter this tendency of egocentrism. Humans tend to view things from their own perspective.
Adults need to acknowledge that they are coming to the child-adult relationship with their own
bias. Their initial thought, reaction, interaction, and response to the child is going to be skewed
in favor of the adult rationale. Montessori writes, “An adult who acts in this way, even though he
[sic] may be convinced that he [sic] is filled with zeal, love, and a spirit of sacrifice on behalf of
his [sic] child unconsciously suppresses the development of the child’s own personality [sic].”73
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This is not mutual or of equal regard. If the adult is able to acknowledge that they are inherently
approaching the relationship with bias, then they can work to correct their bias. To reference
Matthew 18 once again, adults must come to the relationship as little children. How can adults
come to the relationship taking the child’s perspective into consideration if they don’t understand
who the child is in the first place? They can’t adequately address a situation that they do not
understand. To participate in the child-adult relationship, which ultimately leads to being able to
assist in the child’s development, the adult first has to understand what it means to be a child.
While Montessori seems to admonish adults for their lack of perspective concerning the child’s
needs, she does not see the relationship as inherently negative. Her chapter in The Secret of
Childhood is titled “The Accused.”74 The accused are adults, all adults, as adults are responsible
and obligated to the care of children.
All those who speak out on behalf of children should make this accusation against adults,
and they should do so constantly and without exception. Then, suddenly, this accusation
becomes an object of keen interest, for it does not denounce unwitting errors, which
would be humiliating, in as much as this would imply some personal failure, but
unconscious [sic] errors. Such an accusation leads to self-knowledge and an increase in
stature, for every true advance comes from a discovery and utilization of what was
unknown.75
Montessori does not see being accused as having an indelible evil. She wants the reader to know
that being accused makes way for the possibilities of addressing the issues at heart.
Stages of the Child, According to Montessori
“Children are small adults.” “Children are human beings who are born helpless with the
potential of becoming an adult.” “Children are a blank slate.” Each of these definitions is true.
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Children in each of these definitions, however, are defined from the perspective of an adult. The
essence, being, or personhood of a child is not definable contingent upon the essence, being, or
personhood of being an adult. Children are children as children. Montessori examines distinct
phases that, for her, establish subjectivity in the child. As a physician, Montessori is
knowledgeable in the creation of life from a scientific a perspective. She examines the forming
and splitting of cells through the process of fertilization of an egg.76 Being familiar with the
biological sciences, she is capable of establishing that, for humans, there is a physical element to
our existence. Montessori, however, as an educator and even a theologian, questions whether a
child’s subjectivity begins and ends there.
But the being that is born is something more than a mere physical body. It is like the
germ cell in that it has within itself predetermined psychic principles. Its body will not
function merely through its various organs. It has instincts which are not to be found in
the individual cells but within a living body.77
Montessori believes that the psychic development of the child begins in utero. She likens the
development of the psyche to having innate principles within the self. “When a new being comes
into existence, it contains within itself mysterious guiding principles which will be the source of
its work, character, and adaptation to its surroundings.”78 Montessori does not directly refer to
any theologian, Church document, or Scriptures in her examinations of the child’s being. Her
understanding is steeped in a reflection of an ordered universe in the natural world. It is my
belief that she has a simplistic Thomistic understanding of how humans become ensouled. She
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criticizes science for not looking deeper beyond physical being.
Science prescinds from a child’s ‘incarnation,’ and simply regards the newborn infant as
a complex of organs and tissues that make up a living whole. And yet even this is a
mystery. How could such a complicated living being ever have come into existence?... If
we understand by ‘education’ a child’s psychic rather than just its intellectual
development, we may truly say, as it is said today, that a child’s education should begin
at birth.79
Montessori does not believe that the child is ever entirely idle in their psychic development. She
also writes that, “The child’s psychic life is independent of, precedes, and vitalizes every exterior
activity.”80 The term that Montessori uses to explain this stage of development is “spiritual
embryo.”81 The spiritual embryo indicates that the child is not just physically a human being, but
possessing of internal “sensibilities” that develop over long periods of time.82 During this time
the child experiences an incarnation through which the spiritual embryo will grow.
The child becoming incarnate is a spiritual embryo which needs its own special
environment. Just as a physical embryo needs its mother’s womb in which to grow, so the
spiritual embryo needs to be protected by an external environment that is warm with love
and rich in nourishment, where everything is disposed to welcome, and nothing to harm
it.83
For Montessori, the manifestation of this spiritual embryo is sacred. In her understanding of the
sacred we find the child as a subject, as an “I”, already spiritually connected to God. Montessori
creates a space for the child that tends to the needs of their psychic and spiritual development. As
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the child grows, Montessori turns to a concept called “sensitive periods.” The sensitive period
84

is originally conceived by a Dutch scientist, Hugo de Vries.85 Though de Vries uses this method
of sensitive periods to understand the growth of animals, Montessori takes his principles and
extrapolates them to understand the development of children.86 Montessori defines her
understanding as being,
A sensitive period refers to a special sensibility which a creature acquires in its infantile
state, while it is still in a process of evolution. It is a transient disposition and limited to
the acquisition of a particular trait. Once this trait or characteristic, has been acquired, the
special sensibility disappears…Growth is therefore not to be attributed to a vague
inherited predetermination but to efforts that are carefully guided by periodic, or
transient, instincts.87
A child may repeat an activity that heightens their sensibility of growth in a particular area. This
manner of repetition makes way for cognitive adaptation and functioning. Montessori asserts that
the child may focus on one sensibility at a time, very intently, while shutting all others out.88 In
time as the child grows they continue to develop until they reach the pivotal age of
approximately five years old.89 Montessori’s primary interest is within this stage of early
childhood. I would agree with her that these early years are written about the least in theology as
well. What Montessori provides in scholarship is assertion that the child is not a passive object,

84

Maria Montessori, The Secret of Childhood, trns. M. Joseph Costelloe, S.J. (New York: Ballantine,
1972), 37.
85

Ibid, 38.

86

Ibid.

87

Ibid, 38.

88

Ibid, 42.

89

Ibid, 60. Note that age for Montessori is not firm. Five is an age where a majority may be beyond the
age of sensibilities, however, all children are on a different timeline that is very personal to them, their
needs, and their developmental state.

145
but an active subject. Even during period of quiet, or inner sensitive periods, the child is
extremely active and at work. Children need a suitable environment, not an adult environment, in
which they can make these giant strides in development. Montessori creates her method to aid
parents and teachers as they work to provide the best environment for their children to thrive.
Montessori does not insinuate in her work that children can or should reason or have
autonomy as adults. Many of the thinkers in this study state that the child cannot reason until a
certain age. The child should not have to reason as an adult to be a subject with dignity. The
norms of the adult world are not part of the child’s environment. Montessori’s description of the
adult world as an alien world to newborns is appropriate.90 What Montessori and Frierson, on
Montessori’s behalf, argue is that given the appropriate child environment, the child can make
choices that are proportional to their development in these sensitive periods “Montessori shows,
in contrast to many ordinary and philosophical assumptions, that children’s incapacities for
autonomy are best understood as due to an absence of adequate external conditions, rather than
intrinsic limitations based on their stage of life.”91 Critics of this may say that children inherently
make bad choices, are unruly, are prone to a lack of rationality.92 These critics are only viewing
the children in an environment created for adults and understood only by adults. To see and
experience the child’s autonomy means kneeling, listening, and working in an environment that
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is sensible, reasonable, and normative for them.
Critics of Montessori
Subjectivity is a primary part of Montessori’s understanding the child. Theologically
speaking, the status elevation of the child that takes shape under Schleiermacher cannot be
ignored. Montessori, however, in continuing Schleiermacher’s line of thinking is not thought of
as a theologian. Her books are, however, steeped in theology, spirituality, and religious imagery.
The Child in the Church is entirely about the place of the child within the sphere of religion.
Scholars are quick to dismiss her because she was not a theologian by trade. Her method was
picked up secularly, and she, supposedly, had a romanticized Christology of the child. The first
two in that list are entirely true. Montessori was primarily a physician who began research and
studies on child development. From there she founded schools for all different types of children
throughout Europe. The Montessori Method, particularly in the United States, was picked up by
secular schools as a pedagogical method that allowed children to use their environment to work
and learn. Montessori’s romanticized Christology is both a simplification and exaggeration of the
beliefs she writes in her texts. Looking back to her language of “incarnation” it may seem that
she is insinuating that the child is incarnated as the Divine. This is not her approach or her
Christology. As she writes about the “spiritual embryo” she states,
One of the most profound mysteries of Christianity is the Incarnation, when ‘the Word
was made flesh and dwelt among us.’ Something analogous to this mystery may be found
in the birth of every child, when a spirit enclosed in flesh comes to live in the world.93
Montessori explains that the language of “incarnation” describes the animating force that helps

93

Maria Montessori, The Secret of Childhood, trns. M. Joseph Costelloe, S.J. (New York: Ballantine,
1972), 28.

147
94

the child grow. She is also not the first to be accused of romanticizing the lives of children.
Karl Barth argues that Schleiermacher comparing children to the Christ child elevated them to
the status of quasi-deity.95 Understanding goodness in the child, as Wall would suggest in a
bottom-up theology, does not necessarily indicate a romanticized nature of the child.96
Montessori’s decades of careful observation of the children in her care teaches her equally about
the poor child as it does about the affluent. She writes about children from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Montessori does not delude herself into believing that all children
behave in the same manner, come from the same background, or will live the same lives.
Understanding the child as a child means that those adult constructions are not prevalent in the
same way as they are for adults.
The Doctrine of Original Sin is another problem for critics of Montessori and
Schleiermacher. Is it possible to reconcile the child as being essentially good, but steeped in
original sin? Montessori does not deny the idea of original sin in terms of broken humanity.
“Original sin, for her, is not passed through semen. It is not bequeathed through sex nor any
other biological process. It is passed through our inescapably damaged environment.”97 Original
sin can be passed down through generations of humans, but perhaps not quite in the Augustinian
manner. Montessori attributes tantrums and anger in the child as frustration with their
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environment or having a sensitive period broken or interrupted. “The tantrums of the sensitive
periods are external manifestations of an unsatisfied need, expressions of alarm over a danger, or
of something being out of place.”98
Children are not only small adults. Children are not only human beings that are born
helpless with the potential of becoming an adult. Children are not a blank slate in need of
definition. Children are embodied, full, emotional, capable, unruly, developing, sensible, people.
They are born into a world not of their choosing. They are dependent upon good mutual
relationships to develop. They can develop well if the adults in those relationships foster an
attitude of mutuality. They also need the expectation that in order to truly understand the child,
they need to do it from the child’s world.
Pedagogy
In 1916, Pope Benedict XV asked Maria Montessori to write a general syllabus for
Catholic Schools.99 Montessori, who identified her work as Catholic in foundation, could have
easily written a syllabus to teach religious education to parochial school students. Unfortunately,
Pope Benedict XV passed away before he was able to see his wish come to fruition. Subsequent
popes do not pick up the mission of having a universal syllabus for Catholic Schools based on
the Montessori Method. Pope Benedict XV was unique as a leader of the Roman Catholic
Church who sees the potential in Montessori’s work. Right now, in 2021, there is not a
consensus amongst Church leaders in the United States of America about religious education
pedagogy. In the United States especially, not only does the pedagogical method, material, and
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training vary from diocese to diocese. Within a diocese it differs from parish to parish. Children,
who need a reliable method of learning about their faith, continue to go without. It is hard to
believe that as One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church, the hierarchy does not appear to be
concerned with the education of its children. If Pope Benedict in 1916 was able to seek a
syllabus that can be used in all Catholic Schools, why is there not a prescribed pedagogy today?
Seen from an ethical perspective, any pedagogical methodology requires a mutual childadult relationship and an understanding of the child as a subject. You cannot educate if you do
not know your pupil or do not have a relationship with them. Pedagogy is not entering a
classroom and teaching, it is a method that asks the teacher, “How should you teach?” Three
components come together as the infrastructure of a pedagogical framework to teach children
religious education. Children need the proper environment in which to learn. Proper environment
in learning is not a new concept. One of the big reforms that Montessori promotes is the attention
to the environment in which children can learn. Hence, any good pedagogical methodology
discusses creating an appropriate environment. For religious education, the children need a
specific type of environment in their own space so that they can grow. In addition to a proper
environment, the pedagogical method should address how the children learn. Children have
cognitive needs so they can learn. How they learn can be as important as where they learn.
Finally, what is the role of the adult? What is the interaction between the teacher and pupils? The
teacher in Montessori’s model needs to take the child-adult relationship seriously, but with a
surprising twist: a teacher should be a mostly passive guide. This structure changes the
classroom into a learning environment optimized for growth. Passivity, according to Montessori,
is an important part of the child-adult relationship for the adult. Montessori writes about the
teachers in her schools, but this also applies to the relationship that adults have with their
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children at home,
The role of the teacher in our schools has been an object of interest and discussion. By his
[sic] passive attitude he [sic] removes from the children the obstacle that is created by his
[sic] own activity and authority. The children can thus become active themselves.100
A passive teacher who is guiding rather than leading ideally makes space for the child. In chapter
five, I will discuss how this concept of passivity is important when we turn to hierarchical
structures within canon law. The constant drive of “activity and authority” on the part of the
adult leaves little to no room for the child in the relationship.
Environment
Stepping into a Montessori classroom is like stepping into a world geared entirely for
children. The word “classroom” does not do justice to the environment that is created by
Montessori teachers. Many school systems in the United States have not considered altering the
traditional classroom in favor of a Montessori classroom. Approximately only one in eight
schools have Montessori programs for children over the age of nine.101 In terms of religious
education programs in the Roman Catholic Church, it is even more rare to find consistent
Montessori programs that support the use of dedicated environments for learning. If the child is
not able to learn well or explore sensitive periods in an adult or adult-centered environment, then
why are more religious education programs not adjusting the environment to suit the needs of the
child? “An adult environment is not a suitable environment for children, but rather an aggregate
of obstacles that strengthen their defenses, warp their attitudes, and expose them to adult
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suggestions.”

Children in an environment suitable to their needs are able to act freely, without coercion,
to make choices about what they wish to work on. When children act freely in their own
environment they are able to grow in attentiveness and self-direction, cultivate self-discipline,
find social cooperation, and even recognize legitimate authority.103 Children, by nature, will not
choose anything to work with that is too complex or superfluous to them or their needs.104 Sofia
Cavalletti applies the Montessori method to religious education in pedagogy. In doing so, she
creates an environment for the child in which they can thrive spiritually.
Religious Education according to the Montessori Method: Sofia Cavalletti
Sofia Cavalletti, a third generation Montessori interpreter, dedicates her life to
transforming the Montessori Method into religious education classrooms. The Catechesis of the
Good Shepherd (CGS) program contains atriums for the children to work, experience the
Christian mystery, and fall in love with God.105 An atrium is likened to a classroom, but different
in execution and design. “The ‘atrium’ is the name that Maria Montessori gave to the
environment dedicated to the child’s religious life, recalling that space in the ancient Christian
basilicas which served as the anteroom of the church, both in the material and metaphorical sense
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of the word.”

The atrium is not meant to be a place of learning, but of growth and living religious
life.107 In this space the children should be free to pray, meditate, work, and discover their
religious faith. Manipulatives, that are appropriate for each age group, are organized in the space
at stations that are intuitively designed for children to access with freedom.108 The lead CGS
catechist that is designated for a particular level will give a presentation to the group. One such
presentation could be using the parable of the mustard seed from Mark 4:30-34 in which the
catechist would assist the children in planting their own mustard seeds to watch them grow.
Another presentation may be to dress a doll in different colored vestments or set the altar. All the
presentations are brief to allow the children free time to move and work with whatever
manipulative calls to them. Their environment is familiar to them. It does not change from class
to class or week to week. Each atrium most commonly has one set of a type of manipulatives per
class.109 For instance in the case of the vestments, if an atrium has ten children, there are still
only one set of vestment manipulatives. The children have to learn how to parse out resources,
how to be flexible, and find work in various places. As the children become older they move to a
different atrium. Each atrium has new presentations for the children alongside new manipulatives
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for their age. You would not have twelve year olds necessarily planting mustard seeds, but you
may have them drawing the passage in a meaningful style to them.
Each part of the children’s environment is interwoven with the workings of the mass
from Liturgy to Eucharist. In addition, the name Catechesis of the Good Shepherd is not just a
nice sounding name for a religious education program. The parable of Christ as the good
shepherd, working always to tend to the flock, is central to the teachings in CGS. Looking back
to Schleiermacher once again, Sophie’s use of manipulatives in his Christmas Eve is astonishing.
One of the first activities that Schleiermacher gathers the friends together is to view the nativity
that Sophie has created by hand. The text describes, however, not only the birth of Christ, but
many other significant religious events as well.110 The adults looking upon Sophie’s Nativity
have a hard time finding the Christ child. While Sophie understands all these events as
representative of the living Christ, the adults are looking only for the physical child in front of
their eyes.111 Schleiermacher describes Sophie’s interaction with the Nativity,
Now, among all these highlighted objects one sought for a long time in vain for the birth
scene itself, for she had wisely contrived to conceal the Christmas star. One had to follow
after the angels and after the shepherds gathered around a campfire, then open a door in
the wall of the structure – the house having been given only a decorative function – and
there in an enclosure, which actually lay out of doors, one looked upon the holy family.112
The environment and manipulatives that Sophie creates for herself have meaning beyond what
the adults are able to see.
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The religious education environment creates a world for the child to live their faith, not
only learn about their faith. One of the best features of CGS is the focus on the environment.113
While the environment is a marvelous and essential way to guide children in their religious
education, it also poses problems. In Roman Catholic Diocese in the United States, it is up to the
parish to facilitate their catechesis program. While some diocese may help shoulder the financial
burden of a religious education program, the funds come from the parish itself in the majority of
cases. In CGS, though many of the materials are made and kept for years, there is still a cost
associated year to year for the program. In addition to the materials, there is also a need of space.
The atriums, which are best kept set up and in place, have a large physical footprint. Many
parishes do not have the space available for a program with multiple atriums in addition to any
high school programs. The cost of CGS can increase if space needs to be rented or obtained.
Finally, the training for CGS catechists is extensive. The training modules are year to year,
which is an additional cost for the parish. It can be an added expense to hire a Director of
Religious Education who has experience in CGS. If a parish has to pass these costs on to the
families, tuition for a CGS program can be costly. The point of CGS, which is a Christ-centric
program calling to all, can be quickly diminished by its cost. Children who are growing up in
high-risk neighborhoods may benefit immensely from the prayer, love, and reflection they may
find in a CGS program. Unfortunately, since CGS is not supported in all dioceses, the cost
passed down to the families means that not all have access to the program.
Work and Play
Within the atrium, and amongst Montessori interpreters, there are deep discussions on the
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idea of work versus play. Montessori, and Cavalletti in her footsteps, think that children are
drawn to working as they see adults working. Children gravitate towards doing work that is
challenging, but satisfying.114 Children work to perfect themselves using their environment
around them while adults work to perfect their environment.115 The action for the child is the
telos. The child has no need to hurry through an activity simply to complete it when they
genuinely enjoy being in the moment with that activity. In addition, as Montessori states, the
child is in no rush to complete a sensitive period before they feel completion of the task. The
atrium is a place of work where the child lives out the parables while having a relationship with
God.116 The child does serious work in the atrium that develops their whole person. Work seems
to come naturally to the child. Children often love to perform activities like doing the dishes,
sweeping floors, and even doing laundry. Children also do not feel the pressure of perfection in
their task in the way an adult seeks perfection. For instance, this morning while working, my son,
who is four, scoots his way onto my lap. He asks what I am doing while looking at this project
on the computer screen. I explain to him that I am writing words to create a book. He reaches
over to the keyboard and types this: Efrrgt34fghe4wsdshgdfcty. These typed letters and numbers
are nonsense to adults. If any adult were to see it, the text is out of context. It’s entirely possible
that he is mimicking my own actions of pressing the keys. When I ask him what he is doing,
however, he responds, “I was just doing some work for you.”
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Children desire good work. They work carefully, persist in their work, restrain impulses
while working and even have a sense of dignity in their work.117 In each atrium the freedom of
activity allows the child to not only choose their work, but to repeat their work as frequently or
persistently as needed. Repetition of an exercise for a small child actually allows them to feel
rested as their mind is absorbed and away from excess stimuli.118 Montessori notes that the
children never play with the fancier toys that they bring for the classrooms.119 Children choose
simpler toys that have meaningful actions. Their actions and work have meaning. If the
environment is created for children then children are able to work in their environment. Children
can pour liquids if the cups are within reach and the containers light enough in weight. Children
can count communion wafers with care and enough time. Children can pray with drawings and
crayons and paper.
In the Montessori Method, work is the center of life. Work has a stabilizing and
grounding effect on the child. Montessori and Cavalletti believe that children seek work over
play. Play is frivolous and disorienting while work inherently has purpose. Not all Montessori
scholars agree with this assertion. Do play and imagination have a more important role in
pedagogy? When children turn to work as their focus they rely on daily prosaic activity. Their
commonplace activities do assist them in becoming more grounded and focused. What do they
lose by not also using their imagination in play? Montessori, in particular, does not believe that
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fantasy worlds have a positive effect on children. In fact she thinks they represent an inability to
adapt to the realities of life.120 Fantasy also has a tendency to create desires in children that are
unrealistic to their lives.
Not all scholars believe the same about aspects of play and fantasy. Though Montessori
works with children from all socio-economic backgrounds, she does not directly relate the use of
imagination as a coping skill. Other scholars, such as Jerome Berryman, insist that imaginative
play is exactly how children are able to cope with existential issues like death, isolation, and
problems with freedom.121 Berryman turns to imaginative play as a means of spiritual therapy for
children in need. “Imagination and creativity enabled communities to produce art, symbols,
rituals and stories as means by which to give voice to the community’s experience of the
sacred.”122
If children are trying to cope with issues, such as abuse or death, they can use
imagination as a way to empower them to overcome in a safe place. Play also enables children to
live out alternate realities in which they may not face harm.123 This type of imaginative play
allows the child to transform the world into whatever they may need for the time being. “Playing
takes place in the intermediate and overlapping area of experience between the ‘me’ and the ‘not
me.’”124 Children who participate in imaginative play have tools to engage God on any level they
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can imagine. They do not necessarily have to find God in a particular system or place.
The child is supported by both work and play pedagogies. If the child works in an
environment that is specifically created for them, they will flourish. If the child engages in
imaginative play they create a space where they can engage their relationship with God. Both
pedagogical methods support the child’s need for developing their spiritual and sensitive selves.
Each brings to the forefront the voice of the child by the child.
Conclusion
In John Wall’s book, Ethics in Light of Childhood, he states that historian Philippe Ariès
too dramatically states that children are not cared for during human history.125 Wall takes the
opposite stance that adults have “always deeply cared about children.”126 Wall is correct in
asserting that people have cared deeply about children throughout history. Ariès is also correct in
suggesting that children have not been cared for enough. The most important question we can
ask ourselves is one that Maria Montessori poses in her book, The Secret of Childhood, “’What
have you done to the children I entrusted to you?’”127 If one child is suffering, then we are still
failing.
There are ways to begin the process of correcting thousands of years of inadequate
treatment of children. The theologians and thinkers in this chapter represent a group of
individuals who, in the span of 150 years, strive to understand children’s intrinsic value and act
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on it. They use the good of the Enlightenment thinkers, as well as the pedagogists who came
before them, to create a theological anthropology of the child by the child. That foundation
allows them to manifest a new pedagogy that steeps itself in the world of the child. The child has
subjectivity. The child can make definitive choices of growth if allowed to operate within their
own world.
Moving beyond Schleiermacher and the Montessorian Scholars, there are further
dimensions concerning the treatment of the child to take into consideration. Chapter Five builds
upon the bedrock established in chapter Four. Chapter Five will challenge the concepts of
subjectivity and dignity that are applied in the Roman Catholic Church’s understanding of the
child.

CHAPTER FIVE
CHURCH GUIDELINES TO RELIGIOUS PEDAGOGY OF CHILDREN
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops sets forth seven pastoral directives that
should assist in developing children’s catechesis.1 Adults should be able to understand,
communicate, listen, be sensitive to, and aware of children’s values and need for respect. Adults
should recognize that children have dignity and value of their own as they are now. Adults
should encourage children to respect, know, accommodate, and adapt to concerns of other races,
cultures, ethnicities, and persons with special needs. Adults should understand that children
develop their capabilities gradually and present deeper faith as they mature. Adults should
provide material that links to Liturgy and promotes the celebration of the Eucharist. Adults
should promote prayer from the heart and foster community. These seven guidelines are positive
structures for any parish to consider as foundational for their catechesis programs. They do not
explain, however, their development out of moral theology. The guidelines do not explain how
parishes can enact each guideline for the benefit of their children. Some of the guidelines support
the theology and pedagogy of the chapter Four thinkers like Schleiermacher and Montessori.
Certainly, Schleiermacher and Montessori agree that children require respect, have a value as
children, should foster healthy relationships with the community, and have dignity. A child,
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however, also requires agency. One of the guidelines in particular is problematic for the
requisite of agency. Guideline four, while it rightfully suggests that children develop their
capabilities gradually, suggests that it is their coming maturity that deepens their relationship
with Christ.3 The thinking that maturity indicates depth of faith is counter to the insights of the
chapter Four thinkers. The Roman Catholic Church makes progress with their first three
guidelines as they are in line with standards set by other children’s rights groups and advocates.
In the fourth guideline, however, the Church reveals their entrenchment in an authoritarian
hierarchy where the child is not complete until they reach maturity.
Children’s subordination to adults, spiritually and in their faith-lives, is just one issue that
chapter Five aims to tackle. The Roman Catholic Church has not been clear in its understanding
of children’s needs, in supporting children’s subjectivity, or in developing a pedagogy that
parents, parishes, and catechists can follow. Several concepts of the child are present in the
Church’s theology. Children are viewed as being part of fallen humanity having their sin
assessed in the same way as an adult. Children are seen as being favored for their potential in
what they can become as adults. Yet children are also favored via the Gospel as God’s model
human beings. Depending on the context, some of these concepts engulf others throughout the
Church’s teachings. Looking at the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ guidelines,
children are pegged as becoming deeper in faith through their potential to become adults. At the
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same time, the Church reaffirms their goodness as children, which is a step forward. Ideally, this
mixed moral theology can be given shape and form to better assist those who need to be present
to children on their journey.
In addition to the recommendations at the state-wide level, other guidelines exist at the
diocesan level as well. The Archdiocese of Chicago’s “Catechetical Ministry” webpage outlines
what religious education is for children. It roughly prescribes a methodology for educating
children. The methodology pinpoints the parents as the primary source of catechesis for children
in the family.4 In addition, the Archdiocese begins by stating that “Traditional Religious
Education is the primary model utilized to engage children and adolescents in catechetical
formational activities. A Family-Led Model enhances the participation of the entire family in
lifelong formation.”5 The Archdiocese does not describe a traditional religious education model.
There is a curriculum portion of the website containing documents with standards, recommended
activities, and assessments for each level.6 These sets of educational standards may be helpful for
directors of religious education, but not for a standard parish catechist. The Archdiocese of
Chicago does not choose for each parish what their educational pedagogy will entail. As in the
case of St. Teresa of Avila Parish, my place of work for nine years, the choice of the pastor and
director of religious education is Cavalletti’s Catechesis of the Good Shepherd. While embraced
by some, this choice was met with opposition from the hierarchy. The inconsistency of support is
a problem in itself. The diocesan lack of direction for the directors of religious education means
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that each parish is responsible, ultimately, for those children who are seeking religious education
outside of parochial schools. Each parish must find their own program and pedagogy.
At the parish level, there are many differences in programs as there are many different
programs available. The Archdiocese of Chicago requires that catechists are trained in safety
measures for the children in light of the Church abuse scandals. It does not, however, require that
catechists are trained in religious education pedagogy in order to serve as catechists at the parish
level. Each parish may require training, but that is up to the director of religious education and
the parish staff. Under Cardinal Cupich, the Office of Lifelong Formation has made great strides
in offering assistance to those wanting catechetical training. The training program, a three-level
process, is available for parishioners who feel called to participating in religious education.7 The
online-based program, My Catholic Faith Delivered, is designed to allow catechists-in-training to
access educational series based on the Catholic Tradition. The Archdiocese should be applauded
for directing their adult catechists to deepen their understanding of their faith and teaching
methodology. Yet, these measures for education and training, which are not required, do not go
far enough. The content in My Catholic Faith Delivered follows along the theological lines of the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, the National Directory of Catechesis, and the General
Directory for Catechesis.8 In chapter Two, I discuss the shortcomings of the Catechism of the
Catholic Church at length. In addition, issues with the Catholic Church’s understanding on the
child are still prevalent throughout teachings today. As I explain in chapter Four, The Catechesis
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of the Good Shepherd program has an extensive training pedagogy for its atrium leaders. Each
9

new atrium requires training, it is not optional. The catechists can continue their training and
education in the Montessori based program for years, deepening their understanding of the
children they guide as well as the foundational theological teachings The Catechesis of the Good
Shepherd is based on. It ensures that the catechists who are guiding the children understand the
needs of the child, the dignity of the child, and the subjectivity of the child.
Neither the guidelines on catechesis from the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops nor the content from the My Catholic Faith Delivered training program begin with the
child. The perspective of the child, indicated as most important by the chapter Four thinkers, is
engulfed by the perspective of the adult once more. Not all is insufficient in the Church’s
teachings on the child. Upholding the child’s rights, dignity, and well-being in life and in their
faith are admirable movements. They are also, however, abstract and misleading, of course, in
the basic understanding of the child evolves beyond Medieval theology. Adults have
responsibilities to children throughout the world. Children are dependent upon the adults in their
lives and their governing bodies to care for their needs. Adults have obligations to children.
These obligations are explained in universally adopted political Declarations, Conventions, and
Treaties from the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1924 to the CHRC, but also
explained in the obligations set forth in The Code of Canon Law. Obligations to the child mean
that all children are protected, should be protected, as dependent human beings.
In this final chapter, I will discuss the steps that are necessary to further develop the
theology of the child in three parts. Each part represents a pillar of thought based on the work of
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Mary McAleese in Childrens’ Rights and Obligations in Canon Law. While this project does not
represent juridical concepts on the development of the child, their subjectivity, and their
education, these concepts are the bedrock of the Roman Catholic Church’s stance on children.
McAleese’s work provides a complementary framework for the ethical building blocks explored
in my project. As such, I will defer to her expertise on, specifically, Canon Law, the relationship
of the Holy See to other governing bodies, such as the Children’s Rights Convention. I have
complemented her work in this study with some further insights from history of the Church’s
role in caring for and educating children. McAleese provides the best scholarship we have to date
on children under the Code of Canon Law.
The first pillar concerns the membership status of children in the Catholic Church. What
does membership mean for children? What are the parameters, if any, that children must follow
as members? The second pillar is the canonical persona of the child under Canon Law.
Canonical persona indicates the status of a child under Canon Law. Finally, the third pillar deals
solely with children’s rights. What are the rights of the child under the canons? Each part of this
chapter will defer to these three pillars throughout the discussion. The first part, Obligations,
looks to these pillars in their purest form. What are the obligations under membership, canonical
persona status, and to children’s rights? Part two reflects back on these three pillars with critique
and criticism. I will look at asymmetrical relationships in Church membership, the tensions of
the Church’s canonical persona versus other frameworks of subjectivity, and children’s rights
via creating safe spaces for children, particularly in educational settings. Finally, using the three
pillars I will state my own guidelines for updating, rebuilding, and securing developmental, just,
and relational pedagogies for our children.
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Obligations
Church Membership
Membership into a community means becoming a part of a larger group of persons. Most
of the time there is a common goal, idea, or value behind becoming a member of a group. In the
United States, when we use the term membership there is sometimes a price attached to being a
member whether it is a monthly fee or recommended donation. Most people in the United States
are a member of some group. Becoming a member of a group can be a rational choice. We
choose to become a member at a gym, we choose to join a social club, or we can choose to
become a member of a religious group. Membership, in general, means agreeing to belong and to
hold the title of being a member of that group. Becoming a member of a group also means that a
person has to abide by obligations, rules, or bylaws of the group. Oftentimes, members need to
sign documents agreeing to acquiesce to the parameters of being a member of the group. If a
member chooses not to abide by the rules and obligations, they can be asked to leave the group
and lose their membership. There are also benefits of being a member of a group. Each group has
rights, perks, and opportunities for members who dedicate themselves to the group. Membership
creates a relationship between a consenting person and a larger body of persons sharing
commonality. This section discusses membership into the Roman Catholic Church.10
There is not only one way for a person to become a member of the Roman Catholic
Church. There are actually three main ways to join. As an adult, a person can convert to Roman
Catholicism by going through the R.C.I.A. Program, the Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults.
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This program catechizes the adult and invites them to receive the sacraments of Baptism,
Reconciliation, First Communion, and Confirmation. If a person has already been Baptized into a
Christian denomination using the Tridentine Formula, they do not receive the sacrament of
baptism again as you can only receive baptism into the community of Christian faith once.
Adults progressing through RCIA have a choice to receive the sacraments or at any time during
their journey stopping. While RCIA is fascinating in its connection to Early Christian
communities, it is not the focus of this project. In this model of membership, Adults are free to
choose their pathway into becoming members of the Roman Catholic Church or not.
The other two ways of becoming members of the Roman Catholic Church concern
children. Similarly, to becoming Roman Catholic as an adult, a child can choose to become
Roman Catholic if they are over the age of seven. I will get into deeper explanation on the
designation of age in the Roman Catholic Church later in this chapter. As an adult would journey
through RCIA to receive the sacraments and become a member of the Christian community, the
child journey through R.C.I.C. - The Rite of Christian Initiation for Children. These children
who would receive the Sacraments of Initiation, Baptism, First Communion, and Confirmation,
also have a choice in either accepting or declining the Church’s invitation of membership. The
RCIC children are called the credobaptized. That leaves one group who become members in the
Roman Catholic Church, those who receive infant baptism.
Paedobaptism and Credobaptism Obligations
In contrast to credobaptism, those who receive baptism as infants are paedobaptized. The
paedobaptized are under the age of seven and, in the majority, have a parent(s) or legal guardian
who is a member of the Roman Catholic Church. Unlike the other persons who become
members, unlike most types of membership groups in the United States, the paedobaptized do
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not choose to become members. More importantly, they cannot choose to be unbaptized. They
cannot choose whether or not they are catechized, receive the sacrament of Reconciliation, or the
sacrament of First Communion. They are the only members of the Roman Catholic Church
whose consent is taken for granted from their birth.
Baptism gives the person a three-fold promise upon reception: freedom from all sins,
including Original Sin, entering into the community of Christ, and becoming a juridic person
with canonical rights and obligations.11 Baptism is, theologically speaking, how a person
receives salvation, but the effects of baptism impact the lives of the Christian Faithful.12 Baptism
invites, in some cases, and requires in others a canonical persona for the person.13 The depths of
canonical persona are to be discussed later on in this chapter. In the case of the paedobaptized,
the parents accept the Church’s invitation for the infant to enter into the Church through Christ.14
Paedobaptized are considered minors under the age of seven because seven is the age of reason
as determined by Canon Law.15 Canon 11 of the Code of Canon Law 1983 states that the
ecclesiastical law sees those who are seven and older as possessing the natural ability to
reason.16 According to the Code of Canon Law, both 1917 and 1983, a child under the age of
seven is a minor who is unable to accept Christ’s invitation to salvation on their own. These
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children under seven are considered infants by the Roman Catholic Church and are non sui
compos, incapable of personal responsibility.17
The credobaptized are those who possess that natural ability to reason as they have
celebrated their seventh birthday. Declining or accepting the invitation for baptism from the
Church is entirely up to them. Once they arrive at their seventh birthday, their parents no longer
have the ability to speak on their behalf. The minor, who is a child under the age of eighteen,
must be a willing and autonomous participant in the sacraments. The credobaptized are even
allowed to participate in RCIC without the permission of their parents.18 The most important
thing to note is that the credobaptized’s consent is instrumental in their membership.
Canon 96 of the Code of Canon Law 1983 states that baptism enters a person into the
Church of Christ with the duties and rights that are proper to Christians.19 That canon is
considered a general canon that applies to all members of the Church, not only the members with
use of reason. Membership, in short, means accepting the invitation to baptism, having a parent
or guardian accept on your behalf, and abiding by the obligations and rights that come with
membership into the Roman Catholic Church.
Parental Obligations
Whether a child is paedobaptized or credobaptized parents have obligations to their child
concerning their membership as part of the Roman Catholic Church. For the paedobaptized the
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role of parental obligations concerning the Church begins at birth and continues until their child
reaches adulthood. For the credobaptized parental obligation begins from the time the child
indicates they want to become a member in the Roman Catholic Church. Just as membership
obligations for the child differ depending on their type of baptism, so too do the obligations of
the parents. Catholic teaching indicates that some of the parental obligations to children are more
general, while some differ depending on context and situation of the family. The focus for the
Church, according to Familiaris consortio, is that the family unit is the primary structure for the
child. Parental obligation consists not only of raising children, but to ensure their propagation as
well.20
The Code of Canon Law 1983 contains canons directly related to parental obligations.
The Church also turns to Papal documents as well as the Catechism of the Catholic Church as
guidance for parents raising children.21 As discussed in chapter Two, most of the Catechism of
the Catholic Church is written to and for parents concerning children, while little to nothing is
written to or about children directly as active members. Generally speaking, canon 226 obligates
parents to ensure that their children are raised and educated in the Catholic faith. Other canons
that deal with parental obligations are directed toward baptism. It is interesting that parental
obligations really revolve around two items: baptism and education.22 Gravissimum educationis
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reaffirms that parents are the primary educators of their children, children should be instructed in
their faith as early as possible, and parents have a right to choose schools but should educate
their children in a parochial school.23
. . . Parents are bound by the obligation and possess the right of educating their offspring.
Catholic parents also have the duty and right of choosing those means and institutions
through which they can provide more suitably for the Catholic education of their
children, according to local circumstances.24
Parents are obligated to send their children to a parochial school, if available, and to support
Catholic Schools financially.25 They are obligated to support their bishops and pastors in
continuing Catholic education.
Parental obligations concerning baptism are more specific. For the credobaptized the
parental obligation is to lend full support and effort to their minor who is seeking initiation and
membership into the Roman Catholic Church. It is their obligation to ensure that their education
in Roman Catholicism continues beyond their initiation. For the paedobaptized, parental
obligation is entrenched in raising the child from infancy in the ways of the Church. Canon 867
states that new parents should have their infant baptized within weeks of their birth, they must
get proper catechization in preparation for the baptism and raising their children in the Catholic
faith, they must agree to bring up their child, according the Roman Catholic law, and through
marriage they must continue to propagate children to build up the people of God.26 Parents are
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the responsible parties for the paedobaptized. Once the paedobaptized reach the age of seven, it
is still the parental obligation to ensure that the child continue to be catechized. From the Code of
Canon Law to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, to the papal documents of Familiaris
consortio and Dignitatis humanae, parents are addressed directly about their obligations to their
children and the Church. Little is said of their children’s rights in baptism, education, or
development. Dignitatis humanae even suggests that if the minor is forced by a governing body
to worship a faith aside from Roman Catholicism, it is the rights of the parents and not the child
that have been broken.27 Similarly, Familiaris consortio states that it is the parents’ obligation to
baptize their child. It does not state that it is the child’s right to be baptized.28
The responsibility to raise children as Roman Catholic, to make the majority of the
decisions for children, lies on the shoulders of their parents. Parents are obligated to baptize,
catechize, and educate their children under the Roman Catholic Church’s teachings. The place of
the parent in the family is one of authority over their children. Other than the credobaptized
accepting their own invitation into the Church, parents are obligated to make the majority of the
decisions on behalf of their children.
Church Hierarchical Obligation
Mary McAleese writes, “The Catholic Church is the world’s largest non-governmental
provider of educational and welfare services to children (not all of whom are members of the
Catholic Church).”29 The people of the Roman Catholic Church come to the aid, financially,
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emotionally, and prayerfully to millions of people. McAleese is right to affirm the good that the
Church and the Church’s community of Christians does in terms of social services. Catholic
social teaching certainly calls all Christians to provide and care for one another. Just as parents
have parental obligations to the Church on behalf of their children, so too does the Church
itself.30 In terms of the Code of Canon Law and juridical Church documents, the Church’s
obligations to children mostly concern education. The obligations of the pastors, specifically, are
detailed to include general care and well-being for their entire congregation. The obligations of
pastors do not contain material on children alone outside of education. Canons concerning the
greater Church hierarchy, including bishops, are specific to education, schools, and articles of
faith.
In 1965 the Second Vatican Council publishes Ad gentes. Ad gentes states that it is the
role of priests and bishops to ensure that children are imbued with Catholic faith concerning
missions and ministry from infancy.31 From the Code of Canon Law 1983, canon 803 posits that
the Church must design all teaching and education around principles of Catholic doctrine.32 The
role of the bishop where children are concerned is to fulfill the obligation that Catholic children
will learn their faith properly in the hope that they will become adult Catholics. The bishops are
required to provide schools modeled on the Christian spirit.33 In parochial schools, the bishops
lead on most matter,
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The role of the bishops is all-embracing, operating at the level of set-up, pedagogy,
subject-matter, staff appointments and dismissals, oversight over curriculum, academic
standards of schools, oversight over qualifications of teachers, teaching competency and
probity of teachers’ lives inside and outside school or university in terms of Catholic
witness and behavior. In such ways is the Latin Catholic child’s educational environment
consciously shaped to ensure the conformity of all its important elements to the Church’s
magisterium.34
Teachers are expected to work side-by-side with parents to ensure that Catholic children are
receiving the best standards possible as part of their education. The relationship between parental
obligations, Church obligations, and pedagogical obligations is hierarchical. Just as children
defer to their parents, the teachers and parents defer to the bishops, who defer to the Ecclesial
Church.
However, the juridic relationship between these two sets of rights, of parents on the one
hand and the Church on the other is not a balanced relationship of equals but a hierarchy
of rights in which the Church can define the rights of parents and direct them as to how
and ever where to educate their children.35
Even the canons that are noted as Church obligations come down to obligations by the
whole of the faithful or the parents. Canon 800 states that the faithful need to promote, establish,
and maintain Catholic schools.36 The bishops determine everything from the pedagogical method
(if any is chosen) to the staff of the schools. Parents are obligated to send their children to the
parochial schools that are designed by the bishops. If parents do not send their children to
parochial or private Catholic schools, they are obligated to send them to a catechesis program
through their local parish. Above, I have already spoken in detail about the inefficiency of the
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catechesis programs. They are not required to be consistent in their program or pedagogy
throughout varying diocese, they often do not require catechists to be trained to understand the
needs of the children they are teaching, and in many cases the pedagogical method is outdated.
Even if we look at this from the parents’ perspective, there are obligations that parents need to
fulfill even before the Church takes seriously its obligations toward the best education possible.
Membership is only the technical aspect of a child entering into the Roman Catholic Church. It is
how the child becomes a Roman Catholic, which differs from what it means for them to be
Roman Catholic. The canonical persona describes what it means to be a child in the Roman
Catholic Church.
Canonical Persona
The canonical persona is the second pillar that I am gleaning from McAleese’s writings
on canon law. The canonical person according to McAleese is, “The persona (person) in can. 96,
canonically, means a physical person who has been baptized into or received into the Church and
as such has become a member with rights and obligations.”37 There are general guidelines by
which a member of the Roman Catholic Church would gain rights and be held to obligations,
including children who are baptized. In Sacrae disciplinae leges, John Paul II writes that norms
must exist for all individuals as members of the Church.38 John Paul II understand norms within
the Church to outline the parameters of freedom for the faithful. Canonical persona choose
freely to be in communion with the Roman Catholic Church and uphold the obligations set forth.
Freedom for individual members of the Church is linked to a relational dimension to each other

37

Mary McAleese, Childrens’ Rights and Obligations in Canon Law: The Christening Contract (Leiden:
Brill, 2019), 110-111.
38

Ibid, 96.

176
and most importantly to God. In freely choosing baptism, the canonical persona gives
themselves over to God’s love in trust of God’s goodness. To freely give themselves to God and
to accept the invitation into the Church, a person has to be able to make a reasonable and
autonomous choice.
There are general canons that apply to all canonical persona. Canon 96 is a general canon
that is intended to apply to all. It is impossible to ignore, however, that there are differences
between the canonical persona of an adult, a credobaptized, and a paedobaptized. The Code of
Canon Law does not indicate in its general canons a differentiation between these three groups
based on varying age, ability, or status. Writing, specifically, on children, there is a difference
between the paedobaptized and the credobaptized. It is helpful first to discuss children in general
terms and then in specific terms to each group.
Age matters under the Code of Canon Law. Age is defined to be indicative of maturation
within the broad group of children. The term minor is used rather than children in the Code of
Canon Law. A minor is a child under the age of eighteen.39 Upon reaching the age of eighteen, a
child has matured fully into adulthood. Under the age of seven, a child is considered an infant.40
Infants are considered non sui compos; incapable of personal responsibility.41 Infants also do not
possess the ability to reason, which is determined, as stated already above, at the age of seven
making the age of reason, seven, the most important threshold with respect to Canon Law.42 The
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age of reason is a canon that was not altered from the Code of Canon Law 1912. Though many
43

important discoveries and developments continue to take place in children’s developmental
studies, the age of reason has not been a topic of discussion in the greater Church. Obviously, the
capacity to reason is reached at a different point in each person.44
What can. 11 failed to produce by way of innovation was any change in the centuries old
view that the use of reason is presumed to start at the age seven (cf. Can. 97 §2) and that
obedience to the precepts of merely ecclesiastical law starts on reaching age seven and
having sufficient use of reason (cf. Can. 11).45
The use of reason for the Roman Catholic Church is as much a matter of continuing to abide by
the tradition as anything else.46
Though these canons are the same for all children, their effect on the credobaptized
versus the paedobaptized differ. Since the credobaptized can choose from age seven to accept the
invitation of initiation into the Church, they are not strictly under the authority of their parents in
this respect. Canon 210 indicates that minors’ sui compos assume an individual commitment to
the Church and leading a holy and faithful life.47 They acknowledge their personal relationship
with God, the accept baptism into the Church, and they accept full communion with the
Church.48 These children attend RCIC as a means of education as well as preparation for
receiving of the sacraments. The Code of Canon Law treats them as human beings with an
43
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independent subjectivity, capable of using their ability to reason to make autonomous decisions.
Such provisions in the Code of Canon Law “. . . place minors under parental control but also
provide for a degree of personal choice and autonomy.”49 As an infant the child has no voice or
choice in their baptism, their education, or their faith life. “For paedobaptized minors raised in
the Catholic faith, going to Catholic schools or receiving Catholic catechesis, being prepared for
and receiving the sacraments of Penance, Eucharist and Confirmation, there is no personal
baptismal decision point as there is with catechumens.”50 The paedobaptized members of the
Church are assumed to have accepted their faith on account that they are spoken for by their
parents. Even a paedobaptized minor who is beyond the threshold of reason is still considered to
be under the direction of their parents and pastor to receive their sacraments on a different
timeline than the credobaptized.51 In the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the paedobaptized
are categorically placed in a system of obligations that they must follow, handed to them by their
parents and the Church, while RCIC is about choice.52
“It is axiomatic therefore that Latin Catholic children, as Church members have canonical
rights and obligations by virtue of their baptism. They also have inalienable rights by virtue of
being human persons.”53 The rights of the child as members of the Roman Catholic Church are
not easy to pin down. They are afforded protection, they are granted education, and they have a
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right to be cared for by their parents. The rights of the child exist by way of being a canonical
persona within a familial structure.54 The Code of Canon Law enunciates the rights and
obligations of the faithful. Children are part of the faithful canonical persona, but they are never
given a more specific sub-category that addresses their more specific needs.55 For the
paedobaptized their personal formation focuses on “submission to authority.”56 These are not
representative of the rights that the child requires under guidelines set forth by governing bodies
at least since the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959. In
sum, the defined canonical persona for the child is lacking and confusing at best. In conjunction
with other efforts to assert rights for children, the Roman Catholic Church must elevate their
efforts to clarifying the moral status of the child.
Children’s Rights
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
Important developments in the fight for children’s rights in modernity has been taking
place since the League of Nations formed the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child in
1924. Over the next fifty years, the push for securing children’s rights continued with the
formation of UNICEF in 1946, the United Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of the Child in
1959, and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflict in 1974. After these declarations in 1959 and 1974, the Holy See
creates the Code of Canon Law 1983. The Holy See edited the 1917 Canon Law to form the
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1983 version keeping much of the material unchanged despite access to all of the material that
the United Nations formed between 1924 and 1974. In 1989 the United Nations charters the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.57 Thirty years after the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child and less than thirty years after the Second Vatican Council, the efforts of the
most detailed bill of rights comes to fruition. This convention has ambition rights to guarantee
every child has protection, access to education, and care. The UNCRC is built up from previous
declarations and guidelines to be comprehensive in its coverage for children’s rights. The
UNCRC covers four types of rights for the child, survival rights, developmental rights, protective
rights, and participation rights.58 These rights include the right to life, the right to nationality, the
right to family, the right to health, the right to education, and the right to worship a faith of their
choosing, just to name a few. The UNCRC aims to elevate the rights of children and the child’s
right to self-expression while limiting their range of autonomous decisions.59 The rights afforded
to the children are dependent upon capability, maturity, and age. The UNCRC does not suggest
that children have the ability or the availability to make choices that go beyond their maturity
level.60 For each right that the child is granted, an obligation is determined on the part of the
governing bodies to ensure that the right is protected and promoted.61 The United Nations with
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this convention ushers in one of the most important discourses on human rights. As a result, one
of the initial signatures, the Church also joined the Convention in 1990 and elevated its discourse
on human rights in the twentieth century.62
With the exception of the United States every other member of the United Nations is also
a State Party to the UNCRC. This means that most Catholic children live in countries
whose governments have undertaken, as State Parties to the Convention, to respect and
ensure the rights set out in the UNCRC ‘to each child within their jurisdiction.’63
The Holy See is a State Party to the UNCRC. While The Holy See signed United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, it signed only two of three Optional Protocols from 2000
and 2011. The two Optional Protocols signed are from 2000. The Holy See has not signed the
2011 Optional Protocol on communication procedure in assisting children. The Church, however,
and particularly the Holy See, has not participated or abided by the CRC fully in demonstrating
its fervor for children’s rights. The Vatican State as well as the universal Roman Catholic Church
publishes documents that are loosely about the family. Most of the documents, however, do not
even mention the rights of children. The argument by the Holy See in 2013 for not updating their
teachings or enacting the rights, globally, set forth by the UNCRC is that they are only
geographically responsible for Vatican City.64
The CRC for its part says that as a State Party to the UNCRC the Holy See like every
other State Party has undertaken to implement the Convention in the interests of the
children within its own internal legal domain and that means many millions of Catholic
Church child members. It means making and updating canon law and Church teaching to
ensure compatibility with the Convention.65
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The Catholics outside of Vatican City have other jurisdictions. According to McAleese, this is a
strawman argument. When needed, the Holy See promulgates obligations that their members
must follow in order to be in communion with the universal Church. The Code of Canon Law is
promulgated outside of the walls of Vatican City. McAleese states,
According to can. 361 the term ‘Holy See’ means not only the Pope but unless clearly
stated otherwise ‘the Secretariat of State, the Council for public affairs of the Church and
other Institutes of the Roman Curia’. The Pope is the supreme head (and legislator) of the
universal Catholic Church (cf. can. 331). Can. 360 says that the Pope usually conducts
the business of the universal Church through the Roman Curia ‘which acts in his name
and with his authority for the good and for the service of the Churches.66
Canon law has no organization that indicates foresight into materializing children’s rights
though the CRC works to implement them in their own convention. “Children’s right and
obligations in canon law are as a consequence distributed across a range of subject areas
throughout the CIC.”67 McAleese criticizes that the Canon Law does not provide a systematic
treatment of children under the law.68 The United Nations asks for the Holy See to make
provisions to update and change the way they understand children’s rights. Up to today, the Holy
See does not comply fully or is late or absent in their reporting, though since they did not sign
the last protocol, they are not bound by it. When the Holy See submits their reports to the
Optional Protocol bodies of the UNCRC, some of the responses increase tension. Once item in
particular states that though the child has the right via human dignity to choose their own beliefs,
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it is the rights of the parents to choose the religious upbringing for the child. Not only does this
69

not uphold the rights of the child, it also further confuses the matter between paedobaptized and
credobaptized minors. Who has the right to make choices and who does not? The UNCRC sends
the Holy See a catalogue of failings on the part of the Church to implement needed children’s
rights protocol. The items range from the non-investigations of the Magdalene Laundries to the
lack of action and follow-up of the sex abuse scandals. Some of these items have yet to be
addressed.
In the past thirty years, the Roman Catholic Church, led by the Holy See, has made
attempts to put children at the forefront. The Church has dicasteries concerning aiding the child
and protecting them from abuse. There are commissions on education and the right to life, and
documents that reaffirm the dignity of the child.70 According to McAleese,
Nowhere in any official Church document can one find a methodical, explanatory and
thoroughgoing account of the rights and obligations of child members of the Catholic
Church much less a critique of them in the light of Church teaching on human rights and
international law on children’s rights.71
The Roman Catholic Church as a whole must take the need for a revision of children’s rights
seriously including theological doctrine on their understanding of the child, the person of the
child, and the need for a reform of children’s catechetical education.
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The Right to Education
Membership - A System of Asymmetrical Relationships
The Roman Catholic Church has been specific as to what it requires of its members. It
states obligations in canon law, papal documents, and Church doctrine. McAleese writes in great
detail about where the Church is successful in explaining the obligations and rights of its
members. She also takes the time to dig down through the canon law to examine where the
Church falls short, particularly to its youngest members. Looking at the body of Church teaching
and doctrine on children, the importance of familial relationships is evident. Pacem in terris and
Familiaris consortio both place the child under the care of a family, preferably parents in a
married relationship. The family unit is where the child finds their rights.72 Children are a
complicated grouping of human beings. They are human beings, which according to the UNCRC
means they have inalienable rights. Children also live in countries with governments meaning
that they are given legal rights. Their human rights and their legal rights should not be
compromised by any membership or relationship. There are canon laws and teachings that
supersede these human and legal rights. The right of a child to worship in their choice of religion
is superseded by the Holy See’s comments to the UNCRC Optional Protocol committee.73 Taking
a step back to chapter Four and Wall’s understanding of adults’ relationships to children, the
Church operates in an authoritarian top-down structure.74 Children need to be taught obedience,
children need to be treated with dignity and care, but they function within a structure that is
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superimposed upon them. The canon law states time and again that a child’s parents are their
prime teachers, their moral guides, their caretakers, and their voices before they are deemed to
have one. The child-parent relationship followed by the child-teacher relationship are
relationships that determine child development. While a good relationship can assist a child in
flourishing, a negative relationship can cause damage to a child’s growth and development. The
Church, however, is not wrong in their view that the adult has control where the child does not.
The relationship is inherently asymmetrical. Acknowledging this, it becomes essential to
understand that asymmetry. Ethically, how can an asymmetrical relationship be just? How can it
help the child grow if it has inherent imbalance of power?
Taking the insights from previous chapters into consideration, two major typologies
emerge: one that affirms the subordination of children, the other the equality of human beings.
According to the first model, children are categorized as inferior, lacking in ability and
capability. At best they have potential to become fruitful adults. In most cases, even to many
Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, children should be subservient to adults and not to
question their authority. There is no recognition of the child being fulfilled as they are, in their
own place in time. A second typology sees the child as an equal member of society with equal
responsibilities, obligations, and sufferings. In this model, the child is distinguished in their
uniqueness, but taken more as a small adult than child. “The model of childhood it operated out
of was strongly influenced by the idea of the child as a sinner, primarily in need of salvation
through a personal formation which was focused on submission to authority.”75 Augustine’s
influential theology of sin and grace especially suggests that the original sin makes the child
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makes equally culpable to any adult. McAleese unmasks in her work on canon law that these
views held by the Church have not changed over time. The language has softened over time in
Church teachings. The twentieth century teachings, in particular, provide the language of dignity
of the child. Dignity of a person, especially someone in an asymmetrical relationship, is easily at
risk to being violated. The Church makes clear in its writings that the parents, as primary
caregivers, represent the rights of the child as their guardians. The parents, at least for
paedobaptized children, inquire and respond to invitations of membership through baptism. The
obligations for upholding communion with the Church are theirs, not the child’s. The parents
decide on education for the child. Once again, the education they choose must meet the standards
of obligation in the Church. Therefore, there has to be a relational partnership, fully understood
in its asymmetry, that will open both parents and children to working together. A child needs to
experience both dignity and subjectivity via agency to flourish as they are in each of their
moments. Children should neither be treated as subordinate nor treated as small adults. Nor
should parents be fully subordinate to a Church that is not updating their laws and teachings to
reflect the needs, rights, and obligations to children as determined in the UNCRC. At this time,
I’ll be considering the child-parent relationship primarily as it is the main relationship of
consideration by the Roman Catholic Church. The child, however, realistically navigates many
relationships around them. In addition, though many institutions influence a child’s life, the focus
here is the Roman Catholic Church as governed by the Holy See. I am calling into question the
Roman Catholic Church’s standards for the child, including its stance on child relationships.
The truth about children is that they are children. That word, children, brings with it a
different context and set of guidelines than being an adult. It can be a confusing and difficult
stage of life. As an adult looking at a child, the child encompasses the past, present, and future in
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everything they were, are, and will become. Perhaps our greatest failing, however, is continuing
to write children’s ethics, rights, and pedagogy from the perspective of an adult or as an adult
sees children. As for a child, they are not so concerned with their past or future. Their life, as
explained in chapter Four, exists temporally in the present. That shift in perspective changes
everything from relationships to the classroom. One of Schleiermacher’s marvels is the child’s
utter dependence on those around them. The asymmetrical relationship of dependency is natural
between the child and their adults. “Dependency, neediness, and therefore dependent care are
central, inevitable aspects of human existence.”76 Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar writes extensively on
issues of dependency and care ethics. She carefully notes the tension existing between the
inevitability of dependency and humanity’s drive for equal rights. “It is also a concrete reality:
human persons are, ontologically speaking, invested with a dignity that give us a fundamental
equality, and we should be treated accordingly.”77 Her work on dependency in a child-parent
relationship is essential, as dependency creates bonds between the child and the adult. SullivanDunbar’s conclusions on dependency and an ethic of care vary, however, from my own. Her
perspective is needed to address the shortcomings of ethics that conceal the dependency inherent
in many relationships, but she is primarily interested in the position of the caretaker. To do
justice to my project here, namely of forming a coherent and responsible ethics for the child
within the framework of the Roman Catholic Church, the child’s perspective must be elevated.
To properly elevate the child’s perspective, let us look at four focal points of dependency in the
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child-parent relationship. First, the child is entirely dependent on the parent. I have
acknowledged this dependency throughout my project. Second, speaking of equal human rights
is not enough without recognition of asymmetrical relationships in order to fully address inherent
inequalities. Third, a system of “nested obligations” a term that Sullivan-Dunbar attributes to Eva
Feder Kittay exists outside of a system of equal reciprocity.78 Finally, I will address and confront
the issue of vulnerability in the parent in the child-parent relationship in order for the relationship
to be one of mutuality.
The first focal point, the child’s utter dependency, has been acknowledged in various
places throughout this work. Dependency of the child is vital to their livelihood. The child trusts
the parent or the adult in the role of caretaker. The child’s needs to eat, be healthy, learn, and
even find enjoyment are dependent in large part upon the adult. To harken back to Montessori,
the child is born into an alien world that is not their own. It is only natural that they do not find
recognition in their surroundings. Newborns are unable to move or protect themselves, which
creates a fundamental child-parent relationship. Canon law requires parents to take on steep
obligations when it comes to their children, in part, to protect those most in need of protection.
The Church’s obligation to ensure that its most fragile and youngest members are cared for is not
taken lightly. Neither McAleese nor the UNCRC argue these points. Children’s dependency on
parents, family, organizations, governments, and schools is not in question. The Code of Canon
Law 1983 does not nuance the capabilities of a newborn from a six-year-old. The degree of
dependency and agency varies greatly throughout the different stages of childhood. As
dependency shifts in the child-parent relationship, the child becomes able to make reasonable
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choices for themselves. According to the Code of Canon Law 1983, this would be on a child’s
seventh birthday. As stated earlier in this chapter, the law does not account for psychological
states of personal development of each child. The tension in the law is between parental rights
versus the participation rights of children under the CRC. The United States of America also
hesitates to ratify the UNCRC due, in part, to article 12, which states that, “Citizen participation,
of course, is a key value of a democracy, and the CRC paves new ground by viewing children as
‘agents who share the power to shape their own lives’ and encouraging them to exercise their
own rights as ‘members of society.’”79 Similarly, canon law does not reflect the child’s ability as
they mature to be agents of their own lives in making choices for their flourishing. “This new
vision of youth marks a ‘paradigmatic shift’ from the traditional attitudes toward children and the
paternalistic ‘best interest’ focus that consider minors as passive subjects of parental or state
authority.”80
Understanding children allows us to form an ethic that elevates the child’s perspective.
The child’s dependency does not exist in a vacuum. Their dependency, in fact, is created by a
complex web of needs supported by relationships. Regarding the second focal point, asymmetry
in relationships, I turn to the concept of dependency. Naming the unequal distribution of power
in the asymmetrical child-parent relationship is crucial. The Roman Catholic affirms the dignity
and human rights of the child. The Church, however, is stuck, theologically, in Scholasticism in
terms of understanding relationships in a hierarchical structure. Chapter One explains the
Thomistic view of the great chain of being and its grave flaws in the Church’s theology.
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Sullivan-Dunbar also nods to the issues of using a Thomistic worldview in the twenty-first
century.
Aquinas’s conception of the order of love is pervaded by the assumption of a
hierarchically ordered universe, created and governed by God’s providence. While we
may share a notion of God’s providence, we cannot share Thomas’s conviction that the
hierarchical world order in which he lived mirrors providence.81
Aquinas’ concept of the great chain of being was driven by his understanding of sentient
reasoning creatures down through non-sentient creatures driven by instinct alone. This leads to
the third focal point on “nested obligations.” This concept of “nested obligations” seems to create
continuity of care from person to person between dependent parties. It is not about the dyadic
relationship of person via person. It does not need strict reciprocity to function. “This reciprocity
is not a two-party reciprocity because a dependent often cannot reciprocate care; rather, it must
exist in the form of a system of ‘nested obligations.’”82 Ideally this normative framework is
expressed in an ethic of care that could promote shared obligations in society. It is also an ethics
that, I believe, would function substantially better in relationships that are not power-driven. In
the theological sense, the dependency of the child is nested in the parent. The obligations for the
parent to the child’s well-being and Christian formation is nested within the Church. The
relationships exist only in a hierarchy of authority emphasizing dependency over rights of the
dependent. But what if these obligations, these duties, are not fulfilled? The Roman Catholic
Church is in the midst of a world-wide crisis of abuse. Individuals, representative of the
hierarchy, have acted in ways which abuse their power within relationships.
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Finally, Sullivan-Dunbar writes, “Dependent care also renders the caregiver vulnerable; it
prevents the caregiver from competing on an equal basis in the world of ‘fully autonomous’
participants in the market employment.”83 The obligations that the Church expects its members
to abide by are arduous. To expect a single caregiver of multiple dependents to worry about
catechesis may be asking too much. The United States of America has more multi-generational
households now than in the past seventy years.84 In most cases the middle-aged
mothers/daughters are caring for dependents of young children and/or elderly parents. SullivanDunbar rightfully accentuates the burden that this puts on caretakers. In turn the burden they
shoulder makes them a vulnerable group as well. Caretakers become vulnerable through their
deeply rooted understanding of their dependents’ needs; often taking them as their own.85 Caretakers experience marginalization in employment due to restrictions of time, resources, and gaps
in employment history. This certainly makes them vulnerable in their relationships. A mother
becomes vulnerable the day she affirms her pregnancy. I would like to thank the feminist
theologians who have worked endlessly to acknowledge the struggle and pain of caretakers.
At the same time, I turn back to a different understanding of dependency where children
are concerned. Schleiermacher’s concept of utter dependency emphasizes the child’s close
relationship with God. It is through this dependency that the child is open to unity with the
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divine. I affirm the goodness of Schleiermacher’s concept of utter dependency in chapter Four
because it informs my understanding of dependency as working directly with vulnerability. I
challenge the Church’s limited understanding of children’s dependency as it stymies the child’s
subjectivity.
Fully dependent children are not care-takers. Yet, as children mature and learn the
processes within a household, they are in fact able to act as caretakers in the stead of their
parents – and many children take on this role. Dependent children, however, are vulnerable in the
child-parent relationship in different ways than their caretakers become vulnerable. Canon law
that pushes for the subordination of children to their parents and seems to assume that children’s
rights exist within the confines of the family. The child-parent relationship is imbued in
dependency, marked by inequality, expressed hierarchically, and entirely open to vulnerability.
Yet, a corrective lens for the Church’s teachings is aligned with dependency, inequality, and
particularly, vulnerability. In the next section, I will reflect back upon the fourth focal point,
vulnerability, in view of the canonical persona.
Canonical Persona - Vulnerable Agency Over Authority
Discussing minors in the Roman Catholic Church also means discussing parental
obligations simultaneously. Church membership for the child is as much about rights as it is
about obligations of the parents. Due to the child’s dependency on their parents, canon law views
the family as one unit rather than a particular constellation of individuals. Canon law does not
address the unequal differences in treatment between paedobaptized and credobaptized children.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church describes different teachings for each group of children.
While the general canons insinuate that their canonical persona should be treated identically, this
is in fact not the case. The canonical persona, the description and understanding of what it
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means to be a member of the Roman Catholic Church differs between documents, between types
of baptism, and even between parishes and institutions within the world-wide Church. First, as
theology professors, teachers, directors of religious education, and catechists, we are only as
proficient in the religious education of our children as the material we engage allows us to be.
Training catechists or educators, but not allowing them to use material that goes beyond the
current teachings of the Church fails our children. Second, to correct the Church’s understanding
of children means to ensure that the child’s dignity and subjectivity are complementarily.
Accomplishing this objective is possible via the idea of vulnerable agency and proportional
autonomy.
Magisterial Training vs. Catechetical Training
All pedagogical methods and materials are the responsibility of the bishop and the
magisterium. The National Catechetical Directory for Catholics in the United States states
concerning sources, “The NCD therefore draws upon the Church’s biblical, patristic, historical,
liturgical, theological, missiological, and catechetical heritages.”86 Throughout the entire NCD
there are not available references to Church father’s, theologians, or primary sources outside of
those promulgated by the magisterium. The NCD claims to make use of the latest scientific
developments in its introduction, yet the section on stages of human development and behavioral
sciences is devoid of any scholarly work.87 The citations for that particular section include papal
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documents, canon law, and pastoral constitutions such as Gaudium et spes. The NCD is meant
88

to provide answers for catechists and those seeking pastoral degrees in the Roman Catholic
Church, yet it is lacking in appropriate content to develop pedagogy or to guide children. The
Catechism of the Catholic Church, which is another work used to train catechists as well as
catechumens, references Church fathers, but does so in a selective manner, in particular
Augustine and Aquinas. The references beyond that are sparse. Even private institutions that train
directors of religious education and pastoral associates are not required and oft times do not use
primary sources that would deepen their knowledge. Even Loyola Chicago’s Institute of Pastoral
Studies, which works hand-in-hand with the Archdiocese of Chicago, lists courses on Christian
Moral Theology and Ethics, IPS 553, with the only primary sources being Aquinas and
Aristotle.89 The body of material for Roman Catholic teachings is vast. I am not insinuating that
one course, or one book can or should cover every aspect of material regarding the studies of
children. I do believe, however, that as an institution we are lacking in reflection as to which
teachings and materials are appropriate. Catechists who will be guiding children as passive
teachers, allowing the child to lead, need to receive training to achieve that task. The Church has
failed in its attempts at formation.
As important as it is to recognize the imperfections of the whole, it is more important in
this project to examine the particular problems of catechesis and children. Are we creating
catechesis programs that attend to the needs of the child as canonical persona? McAleese argues
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that there must be a continuing discussion concerning canon law and the age of developmentrelated reason, the grouping of children, and children’s rights. I argue that in addition the
pedagogical methods to guide children in their faith development need to improve. The NCD
states that, “While giving increased emphasis to adult catechesis, the faith community must also
strive continually to provide parish programs of high quality for children.”90 Children’s
catechesis programs are created in addition to the primary program of adult education. There is
also no specification as to what “high quality” programs entail. A high-quality program ideally
means that catechists are well-trained in a pedagogical method, such as The Catechesis of the
Good Shepherd. The majority of the NCD, however, is not about children, but adults. “Preschool
programs should focus mainly on parents, providing them with opportunities to deepen their faith
and become more adept at helping their children ‘form a foundation of that life of faith which
will gradually develop and manifest itself.’”91 From Rousseau to Schleiermacher to Montessori
there is disagreement across the board. Parents who are engaged in their children’s faith journey
are not necessarily the source of their child’s faith. Parents, as Cavalletti suggests, should take a
passive role allowing the child to interact directly with the material. The NCD states that “God’s
love is communicated to infants and young children primarily through parents.”92 On one hand,
parents communicate their own love, which is encompassed in divine love, to their children. On
the other hand, the language of mediation of God to children through the proxy of their parents is
problematic. It undermines the direct faith experience of the child. It also is in direct conflict
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with Matthew 18 as children are those who are exemplar in their faith, not adults. Canonical
persona are in full communion with the Church and direct receivers of God’s love. The status of
canonical persona for the praedobaptized under the age of seven is that of a dependent child
whose only rights are mediated through the child-parent relationship.
The Vulnerable Canonical Persona
Relationships are often not as clear and simple as we would like them to be. Their
ambiguity makes them inherently difficult to navigate and even more difficult to describe on a
meta data level. The Roman Catholic Church’s task in creating law, obligations, doctrine,
teachings, and pedagogy about the child-parent relationship is an arduous task. It is also a
sobering task. Millions of children across the globe receive catechetical teaching on behalf of the
Roman Catholic Church every day. The status of the child in the Roman Catholic Church hinges,
in part, on two things, first understanding their capabilities as children and as different aged
children through proportional autonomy, and second understanding that the child-parent
relationship may be asymmetrical, but it is also relational through vulnerable agency.
Using Montessori’s wisdom, Sofia Cavalletti creates The Catechesis of the Good
Shepherd program. Cavalletti’s writings, based in part on the atrium-style classrooms of
Montessori, allow children to experience a world designed to their needs.
Indeed, we believe that early childhood is the time of the serene enjoyment of God, when
the response the creature gives to God consists in the very acceptance of the gift in
fullness of joy. The time for a different response will come, a response that will even
involve the person in effort and struggle. But we must respect the stages of human
development.93
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Understanding parents to be the mediator of God’s love is to misunderstand and misinterpret the
child’s depth and relationship with God. The child is in communion with God without external
accoutrement. The atriums are designed to provide the child with the materials they need to
develop their faith. The atriums are not a space of excess nor marvels of technology. Materials
provided are objects that access the senses, cognition, and depths of feelings that the children
experience in their faith and time with God. When we speak of proportional autonomy, we are
speaking of a concept that understands the child as being able to make autonomous choices in an
environment, in proportion to their capability. For instance, a Montessori classroom would have
cups and carafes. A carafe may be filled with a drink to pour into the cup. Unlike an adult setting,
the cups are within reach and smaller. The carafe is not overflowing, but small with a small
amount of liquid that a child would be able to pour on their own. Similarly, the design of the
atriums guides the children in their faith life without forcing them to experience their faith in an
adult setting. The items that a child would use to set the altar are smaller and lighter in size. The
altar itself would be low to the ground where the child may kneel to set it. The atrium may also
have a pen with sheep figurines as well as the good shepherd so that the child may tend to a
flock. They are able within their community of peers to choose, to give, to grow, to pray, and to
work. Montessori and Cavalletti both provide anecdotes of their time with children in which the
children make autonomous decisions that are proportional to their age group and setting. Of
these episodes, Cavalletti reflects, “… they let us glimpse in some way the mysterious reality
present within the child; they manifest the child’s potentiality and richness, the nature of which
we are not successful in defining clearly.”94
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Proportional autonomy accompanies the concept of vulnerable agency. Together these
95

provide a framework by which beneficial teachings on children can be formed by the Church,
theologians, or those working in pastoral ministries. Previously in chapter five concepts of
dependency and vulnerability are brought to the forefront as characteristics of the child-parent
relationship. Dependency, when thought about as restrictive to freedom, has a negative
connotation. As adults we seek freedom in all that we do. We act purposefully as autonomous
choosers and take pride in our abilities to choose. In view of this ideal of autonomy, children are
not autonomous. In contrast to autonomy as independence, Schleiermacher’s dependency means
openness to full acceptance of God without fear. Children experience this utter dependency as a
positive opening. Dependency requires trust in asymmetrical relationships.
Asymmetry, this means, does not necessarily lead to domination and submission but may
instead be regarded as one constellation among other that allows for mutual recognition.
Crucial for mutual recognition is only the simultaneous transformation of self and other
in their interaction.96
Haker notes in examining Jessica Benjamin’s work that mutual recognition is not a dyadic
relationship, but a system of recognition that involves more than the child and mother.97 The
child, of course, sees and responds to the parent. The child experiences the recognition of the
parent. The parent also receives recognition in return. Though the duties of the parent,
exemplified by Benjamin as the mother, are asymmetrical to the child in responsibility, the parent
does not escape vulnerability themselves. The child is vulnerable in their dependency. The adult

95

The terms proportional autonomy and vulnerable agency are terms used by Hille Haker in her work on
recognition.
96

Hille Haker, Recognition and Responsibility, Chapter 4 (unpublished Manuscript), 6.

97

Ibid, 5.

199
is vulnerable in their openness to the transformation they experience through mutual recognition
with their child.98 “Yet, it makes a difference, for example, whether the caretaker only tries to
‘manage’ the baby’s need while dissociating her own difference, her own subjectivity of
vulnerability and agency, or whether she can allow for the experience of mutuality that may
transform herself as much as the infant.”99 Though the child should not be described as an
autonomous chooser or rational agent, the child is a distinct vulnerable agent and has the
capacity for rational agency. In Kantian ethics all human beings are broadly vulnerable, while
some, such as children, are especially vulnerable.100 Vulnerabilities are conditions of rational
agency. “The core normative focus of Kantian ethics is on the dignity or absolute worth that
human beings have in virtue of their capacity for rational agency.”101 There exists a great risk to
seeing the child as especially vulnerable without granting them agency – they can be seen as
objects.102 As children are especially vulnerable, adults are broadly vulnerable. The relationship
of broad vulnerability alongside special vulnerability must be held in tension together. Only then
can the child-adult relationship be mutual by way of human dignity achieved through the
acknowledgment of vulnerability.
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Reflecting back on the status of canonical persona, the Church’s understanding of the
child as having subjectivity only as mediated through the parent is inadequate. As a vulnerable
agent the child transforms the parents and the family by their mere presence. A person cannot be
transformed by a non-entity, or a potential person, or an object. A person is transformed in and
through a relationship in which they receive recognition from an other, from a subject, from an I.
The child as a person, even as an infant, possesses remarkable capability and ability for their
stage in life. But theirs are not the capabilities of an adult and thus should not be measured by
adult scales. Children deserve the dignity of being seen through their own lens. The risk of not
recognizing their dignity and subjectivity is too great. “When others contemptuously treat us as if
we were worth less as a person, or mock and ridicule our practical judgments, then it can be very
difficult to preserve, or develop in the first place, respect for ourselves and our own
judgment.”103 In the concluding chapter I discuss five resolutions that form a new child-centric
framework steeped in dignity and subjectivity for the child.
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CONCLUSION
Children’s Rights: A Corrective Lens for the Twenty-First Century
The Holy See’s conflicts with the UNCRC over children’s rights are contextually
important to this project. The matters that are discussed in the protocols, reports, and resolutions
all involve immediate and direct rights of millions of children. On a macro level, that the
conflicts take place at all is also significant. For hundreds of years the treatment of children
under the care of the Roman Catholic Church remained unchallenged and not monitored. That is
not to say that every child has faced abuse while within Roman Catholic institutions, certainly
not. If only one child is abused, however, the system has failed. We, as Catholics, have failed.
These resonate as harsh words for all of us. Sexual abuse survivors across the globe now range in
the thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands of both known and unknown cases. Many have
not stepped forward yet, suffer the trauma of the abuse in silence. This project began with the
hope of changing the way we see, or don’t see, children within our Church. It’s time to change
and it must begin with the leaders of the Church, the law, and the teachings. These five
resolutions are at the heart of this project.1 Their aim is to create an environment where children
can attend catechesis, attend their parochial schools, attend mass, and experience safety,
understanding, and catechization.

1

I begin these resolutions with “we.” I am speaking on behalf of myself as a Catholic, a mom, and an
ethicist. I say “we” to my fellow Catholics who wish to create change instead of sitting by and watching.
Finally, I say “we” to include the magisterium who are also part of the Body of Christ of the Church as
Catholics.
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1. As Catholics, we need to make use of the available teachings, documents, writings, and
resources regarding the study of children, not only what has been approved as a matter of
tradition. Chapter One examined several Church fathers and theologians to get to the heart of
how the understanding of the child is formed. Some theologians are referenced frequently in
Church teachings, such as Augustine, while others such as Clement of Alexandria are hardly
referenced at all. Even biblical passages that uphold the goodness of the child are set aside for
more traditional teachings such as Aquinas’ natural law. These teachings need to be made
available to those seeking an understanding of the depth of understanding of the child and the
child’s anthropology. The Church must work to help Catholics access these documents rather
than setting them aside.
2. As Catholics, we need to be inclusive of all children’s rights as set forth by governing bodies
such as, but not limited to, the UNCRC and their mission of child flourishing. The Church makes
great strides in the twentieth century concerning the rights of children. Yet, there are United
Nations protocols that have yet to be ratified and changes in accordance to the protocols yet to be
made. Human rights violations against children continue to happen globally, and they in Roman
Catholic institutions, too. The Church needs to be responsive, swift, and decisive in actions taken
for the protection of children’s rights everywhere. Mary McAleese notes that there is no
department dedicated only to children in the Vatican. I would add that many dioceses also do not
have departments dedicated to children. These departments all too frequently only include the
education of children, but not the rights or welfare of children.
3. As Catholics, we need to create catechesis programs that are formed with better pedagogical
methods, current secular teaching methods, and child development methods. Though some
bishops may hold degrees in fields such as education and child development studies, most do
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not. The National Catechetical Directory sets aside studies, training, programs, and pedagogy
from experts in the fields of education, child development, and psychology to train its catechists
and directors of religious education by means of magisterial approved resources. If a teacher
does not understand their students’ needs, they are not able to teach them effectively. Teaching is
as much about the pedagogy and ability to enter into a relationship with the student as it is about
the material being taught. We need to truly use the best information of our time for the good of
the children we are teaching. Cavalletti’s Catechesis of the Good Shepherd is still looked at
suspiciously in some Catholic circles because it does not follow what has made the tradition. Yet
Cavalletti’s pedagogy is more child-appropriate and child-centric than most traditional catechesis
programs. I call on the United States Catholic Conference of Bishops to produce guidelines to be
implemented in local dioceses that suggest new pedagogical methods as part of a greater ethical
framework in support of the child. Parishes can use this normative framework of the
understanding of the child that is based on their dignity and subjectivity as agents with the
capacity to reason. This child-centric framework is foundational to catechetical programs.
4. As Catholics, we need to understand that the child has a deep relationship with God. Children
do not need adults as mediators to feel or understand God’s love. The utter dependency that
Schleiermacher adores speaks volumes to the child’s intimate experience of faith. Adults use
their own lens to see the world of the child. The adult lens is incapable of understanding or
traveling back to the child’s perspective. We can find recognizable joy in the face and presence
of the child. Fyodor Dostoyevsky writes in The Idiot that “Children soothe and cure the wounded
heart.”2 I believe that he is correct.

2

Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot (London: Vizetelly & Co, 1887), 64.
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5. As Catholics, we have a moral duty to understand the child as having dignity and subjectivity
which compels us to take action to ensure the protection of that status. It is easier to write that a
child has dignity and harder to ensure that they are entrusted with dignity and subjectivity.
Dignity means upholding the rights that we commit to. Subjectivity means an openness to
become vulnerable in their presence and allow us, the adults, to be acted upon. We are compelled
to continue working, indefinitely, until children are bestowed the dignity of being a human
person or the subjectivity of being a vulnerable agent.
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